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Hakanson, Erik, PhD., August, 2010     Forestry 
 
Fuels Management Policy and Practice in the U.S Forest Service 
 
Committee Chair: James Burchfield 
 
    This dissertation investigates the history and development of wildland fire and fuels 
management policy in the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and the implementation of this 
policy in fuels management project planning at the national forest and ranger district 
levels. The policy guiding fuels management is broad and ambiguous but may be 
summarized as: 1) reducing the risks posed by wildland fire and 2) restoring or 
maintaining ecosystem health and sustainability. 
    Wildland fire management policy is interagency in scope, including input from state 
governments and is dispersed among a multitude of policy and strategy documents, such 
as the 1995/2001 Federal Wildland Fire Policy, successive fire policy implementation 
guidelines as well as the various documents collectively known as the National Fire Plan. 
To these policy documents have been added the legislation and regulatory enactments of 
the Healthy Forest Initiative. The relationship between these policy and strategy 
documents and these legislative and regulatory enactments is not well defined nor are 
concepts such as risk, restoration and ecosystem health or sustainability. There is no clear 
guidance for determining environmental conditions or management actions that 
contribute to risk or sustainability or for adjudicating conflicts between them. 
    This research examined three national forests in the Forest Service Northern Region; 
the Bitterroot, Helena and Kootenai, to understand how fuels management project 
proposals are developed and to identify the key factors that affect this development. The 
results suggest that fuels management project proposals are developed within a loosely 
defined process called NFMA analysis. It is an iterative process of negotiation with 
specialists from other resource management programs in which a project’s objectives and 
treatments are refined and defined. This research suggests that the key factors that affect 
the development of project proposals are fuels management acreage targets and the 
budget associated with this target and the costs associated with data collection and 
analysis estimated by managers to be necessary for regulatory and policy compliance and 
to mitigate the threat of litigation. Some recommendations are offered in the context of 
current efforts to develop a cohesive wildfire management strategy and new forest 
planning regulations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about fuels management policy and practice in the US Forest 
Service. Land managers and scientists have long recognized that fire plays a vital role in 
many ecological processes of fire-adapted ecosystems, including the reduction of fuels, 
and that past land management policies and practices, including fire suppression, timber 
management, and grazing have disrupted these processes (Arno and Allison-Bunnell, 
2002). Ever since the early 1970s, when the Forest Service changed the name of the 
Division of Fire Control to the Division of Fire Management, fire researchers and fire 
management leadership have expounded on the need to develop policies that integrate 
fire and fuels management more fully into overall land management planning and 
implementation at a scale commensurate with the phenomenon of wildfire. While 
numerous conferences have been held, research conducted and articles written, progress 
has been slow, some say non-existent (Franklin and Agee 2003; Stephens and Ruth, 
2005). 
 
Fuels management remained primarily a support function to other resource 
management activities in the Forest Service until the late 1990s. The unprecedented fires 
of 2000 added a new level of urgency to the issue of fire and fuels management resulting 
in its expanded role in public lands management. Fuels management funding increased 
dramatically and it moved from a support function to an active participant in proposing 
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and developing projects. But this new role for fuels management is not guided by 
coherent policy and direction but has instead inserted fuels managers into the existing 
conflict ridden project planning and decisionmaking process of the Forest Service. 
 
Many federal strategies, interagency plans, legislation and administrative 
initiatives have been developed in response to the growing concerns over wildfire and the 
role of fuels management in mitigating these concerns. The National Fire Plan, begun 
while the fires of 2000 were still smoldering, and the interagency Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy of 1995, updated in 2001, both recommend and provided the general 
outlines of a coordinated and integrated approach to landscape-scale fuels management in 
order to reduce the risk posed by fire to social and economic values while at the same 
time restoring forest ecosystem health and the ecological role of fire. The legislative and 
administrative enactments of President Bush’s Healthy Forest Initiative of 2003 followed 
the development of these policies and plans, and rhetorically at least, builds on the notion 
of an integrated landscape-scale approach to fire risk and restoring forest health. These 
enactments, however, took these concepts in a different direction. 
 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO),1 as well as many large fire cost 
reviews and internal agency reports, have repeatedly criticized the federal land 
management agencies, particularly the Forest Service, for the disparate and 
uncoordinated nature of their fuels management programs, its lack of integration with 
other agency programs and objectives, the lack of criteria and procedures for prioritizing 
areas most at risk and the widespread use of fuels manager’s subjective professional 
judgment in the selection and development of fuels management project. While 
                                                          
1 GAO (1999a, 2002, 2003ab, 2004a, 2005ab, 2008, 2009). 
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coordinated landscape-scale fuels management is widely agreed to be necessary, nowhere 
in these many policy documents or legislation are “coordination” or “landscape-scale” 
clearly defined and remain ambiguous. Nor are the concepts of fire risk or the ecological 
role of fire clearly defined but rather than ambiguity there are a variety of competing 
conceptions and methods of analysis and classification. It is widely accepted, at lest 
rhetorically, both within and outside the agency that the current uncoordinated, project-
by-project approach to fuels management planning and implementation with little 
attention to broader ecological interactions and cumulative effects is entirely inadequate 
to the scope of the fuels and ecosystem health problem. As Chet Joy, Senior Evaluator, 
Natural Resource Management Issues for the GAO described it in testimony before 
Congress “…the Forest Service is facing some difficult reconciliation chores. Our point 
is, that can't be done on the basis of ad hoc. There has to be a very cohesive strategy that 
clearly recognizes those priorities and makes it absolutely transparent to everyone what 
the thinking is that is going into it” (Joy, 1999, 54). 
 
There is no consensus, however, and in fact considerable disagreement within the 
agency, from the Washington Office to the ranger districts where projects are actually 
planned and carried out, as to precisely what constitutes hazardous fuels, fire risk and 
forest ecosystem health, what landscape-scale management means operationally. This 
lack of consensus makes discussing and analyzing the relationships between hazardous 
fuel, fire risk and forest ecosystem health even more problematic. Consequently there is 
little agreement over precisely which management policies and practices should be 
changed, how they should be changed and how these changed practices can be 
coordinated together across the ecological and organizational landscape. A general 
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problem is recognized, in other words, but the solutions articulated are as vague as the 
problem itself. The federal Quadrennial Fire and Fuels Review Report (NWCG, 2005, p. 
1) states that “The federal wildland fire agencies must continue to modernize processes 
and infrastructure, reassess structure and organization at both the national and field 
levels…”2 Nazzaro (2005, p. 6) of the GAO  is slightly more explicit in testimony before 
Congress stating that  “…the agencies will have to overcome the challenges presented by 
the current lack of a consistent approach to assessing the risks of wildland fires to 
ecosystem resources as well as the lack of an integrated, strategic, and unified approach 
to managing and using information…in wildland fire decision making.” 
 
According to the GAO (1999a, 2005ab) the root cause of this lack of coordinated 
planning on a landscape-scale is the agency’s lack of leadership and its failure to develop 
and implement a cohesive strategy to guide fuels management. Federal agencies, 
however, are faced with implementing incongruent and often contradictory public lands 
policies, Congressional funding priorities overlain with non-binding and vague fire and 
fuels strategies (such as the Federal Wildland Fire Policy and the National Fire Plan). 
Moreover, each administration has pushed different land management agendas 
emphasizing different land management policies and practices. During the Clinton 
administration, when the Federal Wildland Fire Policy and the National Fire Plan was 
initiated, the Forest Service emphasized broad-scale assessments and ecosystem 
management influenced heavily by concepts from landscape ecology. The Bush 
                                                          
2 This report, submitted to the National Fire and Aviation Executive Board (NFAEB), “contains the Panel’s 
final analyses and strategy recommendations, but does not purport to represent any official policy or 
program decision by NFAEB and the federal wildland fire agencies…The Quadrennial Fire and Fuel 
Review (QFFR) represents, for the first time, a unified fire management strategic vision for the five federal 
natural resource management agencies under the Departments of Interior and Agriculture.” (p i and 1) 
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administration, by contrast, focused more narrowly on forest health influenced by more 
traditional utilitarian interpretations of forest health and management. The Interagency 
Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy captures 
the conundrum faced by fire and fuels management policy and practice in the context of 
competing visions of land management when it states that: 
Fundamentally…wildland fire policy improvements are attempting to 
marginalize a much deeper, much more systemic, and more problematic 
public lands policy dilemma. Until larger, overarching land/resource 
policy issues are reconciled, wildland fire policy evolution can only inch 
forward on the heels of undesirable outcomes in firefighting and fire use 
(USFS, DOI, 2003, p. 13). 
 
 
Both the GAO’s assertion that the complex problem of coordinated landscape-
scale fuels management can in fact be meaningfully guided by a cohesive strategy and 
effective leadership and interagency fire management leadership’s allusion to the 
dependence of progress in fire management policy on the reconciliation of “larger, 
overarching land/resource policy issues” both exhibit a bias towards an instrumental 
rationalist perspectives of organized and coordinated action. It is a perspective that holds 
that the actual activity of fuels management project planning and implementation more or 
less automatically follows from policies and strategies and that the current ad-hoc and 
uncoordinated approach to fuels management follows from current lack of a coherent 
policy and strategy. This perspective ignores what the actual practice of fuels 
management can tell us about what is driving ad-hoc fuels management practice. Mosse 
(2004, p. 640) notes that “…enormous energy [is] devoted to generating the right policy 
models, however, there is surprisingly little attention paid to the relationship between 
these models and the practices and events that they are expected to generate or legitimize 
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in particular contexts.” This observation holds equally well for the emphasis by the GAO 
on the need for a cohesive strategy and increased agency leadership as well as the view in 
the Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management 
Policy (USFS, DOI, 2003) that the larger policy dilemma must be reconciled before real 
progress can be made in the fire arena. Mosse continues: 
At best, the relationship between policy and practice is understood in 
terms of an unintended ‘gap’ between theory and practice, to be reduced 
by better policy more effectively implemented... What if the 
practices…are in fact concealed rather than produced by policy? (Mosse, 
2004, p. 640) 
 
 
In the case of fire and fuels management, where there is no coherent policy or 
strategy, what if the practice of fuels management, though it results in ad-hoc project 
planning and implementation, nonetheless follows some logic and exhibits some order 
rather than simply being the more or less random result of a lack of clear direction? A 
great deal of ethnographic research on work and the workplace suggests that coordinated 
and organized activity arises from the actual practice of work in context. Crabtree (2000, 
p. 6) notes that “there is a ‘necessary’ character to formal rules but it is not a prescriptive 
necessity (let alone a causal one)...” This research also suggests that the actual working 
practices of an organization’s staff, what Suchman (1987) calls situated action, results in 
relatively stable and reoccurring patterns that Garfinkle and Sacks (1969) call 
assemblages of practice. These stable and observable patterns in organized activity, 
according to this research, arise and are reproduced by organization members using 
established procedures and organizational structures to help interpret broad and often 
contradictory policy goals and objectives and meet the requirements of administrative 
direction in each specific situation. Latour (1996) notes, however, that such established 
 - 6 -  
organizational structures and procedures may themselves constitute “system goals” such 
that the interpretation of broad policy and direction often serves to protect and reproduce 
organizational hierarchies and bureaucratic interests tied to this administrative order even 
while they are rationalized through the language of formal policy goals and objectives.  
 
Bureaucracies, especially the Forest Service with its long history of administrative 
discretion, are more than instruments of policy. They generate their own interests and 
goals. Mortimer (2002) even goes so far as to describe the agency as having been 
delegated law-making authority by Congress through its avoidance or refusal to address 
longstanding policy conflicts and continually passing ambiguous legislation.3 At the 
same time, however, this delegation does not entail that the agency has clarified what 
Congress has not. Rather, Mortimer (2002, p. 910) notes, the agency replicates this 
ambiguity resulting in “administrative schizophrenia” such that the agency may not even 
recognize let alone articulate a coherent mission or policy to achieve it.” Thus the system
goals of which Latour (1996) speaks become both more important as guides for action, 
resulting in the stable behavior and reoccurring assemblages of practice of Garfinkle an
Sacks (1969), while at the same time become even more obscured by the rationaliza
offered for them using the ambiguous language of formal policy goals and objectives.  
 
d 
tions 
                                                          
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
Fire and fuels management policy in particular and land management policy in 
general are clearly important, as illustrated by the longstanding conflicts and contests to 
define them. Despite being less than clear and coherent, managers must attempt to 
3 Mortimer (2002) also describes a vicious cycle at work where continued conflict provides the impetus for 
further delegation of authority in successive ambiguous legislation that in turn produces yet more conflict. 
 - 7 -  
interpret and follow them. It is in this sense that policy, following Crabtree (2000), has a 
necessary but not a prescriptive character. But to understand the practice of fuels 
management and why it continues to be ad-hoc as the GAO asserts we must look beyond 
the ad-hoc character of policy and investigate the practice of fuels management project 
planning itself as well. This research seeks to answer the following three questions: 
 
1. What is fuels management policy and how did it arrive at its current state? 
 
2. How are fuels management projects identified, prioritized and developed into 
project proposals? Or, more simply, how are fuels management projects planned? 
 
3. What are the key factors that affect fuels management project planning? 
 
The overall goal of this research is to document the actual practice of project 
planning and the structure and patterns of behavior that illustrate the salient or operative 
goals of the institution enshrined in the agency’s procedures. These three questions are 
the means by which this goal will be approached. These questions are explored in two 
parts, the first broad based focusing on fire and fuels policy and its history. The second 
examines the practice of fuels management project development via a more fine-grained 
empirical approach. Following chapter two describing the methods and theoretical 
approached used in this research, chapter three will focus on question one and describe 
the history and development of fuels management policy in the Forest Service. Chapters 
four and five will focus on question two and three. Chapter Four describes the 
organizational structure and process of fuels management project planning and the key 
factors that affect project planning while chapter five describes the how projects are 
identified, prioritized and developed into project proposals. The discussion, chapter six 
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revisits fuels management policy in light of the practice of fuels management and 
discusses recommendations followed by a conclusion in chapter seven. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
METHODS 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
The theoretical approach and analytical methods used for this research for both 
the policy and practice chapters are derived from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as 
described by Latour, Callon, Law, Ciborra and others.4 ANT is derived from ethnography 
in general and ethnomethodology in particular and focuses on the practice or activity 
engaged in by actors (Lynch, 1993). A principle concern of ethnography is understanding 
events or actions in context because it is context that provides the tools with which 
participants to action interpret the meaning of direction and expectations passed down 
from above. ANT barrows from ethnomethodolgy the focus on the various means by 
which participants to action interpret situations and directions for action (such as policies 
or rules) and simultaneously use situations to interpret directions and directions to 
interpret situations and negotiate courses of action. Because there are multiple actors 
participating in action, attention must be paid to the diversity of interpretations brought to 
the negotiation over courses of action by these various participants. This leads to the 
advice, even insistence, for ethnographic studies to employ what is commonly referred to 
as thick description following Geertz (1973). Studies employing ANT, whether focused 
on broad and historical situations, such as policy development, or narrow and specific 
situations such as the practice of fuels management project development, seek to provide 
                                                          
4 Principle sources include: Callon (1986, 1991); Callon et al. (1986); Callon and Law (1995, 1997); Knorr-
Cetina and Cicourel (1981); Latour and Woolgar (1986); Latour (1987, 2005); Law (1992); Law and 
Hassard (1999) and Ciborra (2000, 2002). 
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such thick description so that the ingredients of actor’s interpretations and negotiations 
are front and center highlighting the basis of the analyst’s interpretations and 
explanations. ANT, in other words privileges thick description over sparse interpretation 
and explanation on the part of the analyst (Latour 1997). It is an effort to acknowledge 
rather than elide the contingency of interpretation and explanation. 
 
Effort was made in writing this dissertation to provide such thick description in 
both the policy and practice chapters since the question of interpretation is so important. 
Extended passages from interviews as well as policy documents, legislation and federal 
agency directives and reports as well as published material by various actors involved in 
the public discourse over land management are used throughout. As described in the 
introduction, the policy guiding fuels management is anything but straightforward and in 
the practice of fuels management there is such a wide variety fuels reduction treatment 
activities and environmental and administrative conditions taken into account by 
managers that many combinations are interpreted by some to be legitimate fuels 
management while others are not. It is a context dependent judgment. While the concepts 
and methodological approach employed for analyzing the documentary and interview 
data are derived from ANT, these concepts and their terminology are not employed in the 
resulting thick descriptions of policy and practice. The material is complex enough such 
that a narrative style was adopted rather than attempt to employ terms from ANT that 
have specific theoretical meaning. The following briefly describes 1) three forests studied 
in this research; 2) the data collection effort undertaken for this research; and 3) the 
theoretical approach of Actor Network Theory. 
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2.2 Site Description 
 
The three study sites for this research are the Bitterroot, Kootenai and Helena 
National Forests, all within the Northern Region (Region 1) of the U. S. Forest Service. 
These three forests were selected because they represent diversity in organizational 
structures and project planning capacity. It was suggested by managers during early 
investigations setting up this research that the full spectrum of project planning - from the 
early stages of an initial idea for a project, its selection for funding and finally the 
development of a formal proposed action that undergoes the analysis required by the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) – is heavily influenced by the organizational 
structure and division of responsibilities within the Forest Service. 
 
 
Project development and planning in the Forest Service is characterized by a 
dynamic relationship between forest leadership in the forest supervisor’s office or SO, 
and the forest district offices (ranger stations) headed by district rangers. Project planning 
requires the participation of a variety of specialists from the different resources 
management programs such as fuels management, vegetation management and watershed 
and wildlife management. These specialists are organized into what is called an 
interdisciplinary team or ID team. The SO controls the forest’s budget, establishes annual 
priorities and allocates funding and the time resource specialists on the ID teams may 
devote to the many project planning and implementation activities occurring on a forest 
in any given year. The analysis and planning of individual projects is carried out at the 
district level by the ID team under the direction of the district ranger on whose district a 
project takes place. These three forests were selected in an effort to account for the 
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organizational differences in order distinguish the idiosyncratic from the more general 
aspects of this dynamic as they affect fuels management project development and 
planning. 
 
The Bitterroot National Forest encompasses 1.6 million acres in west-central 
Montana on the border with Idaho. The forest is divided into four ranger districts; 
Stevensville, Darby, West Fork and Sula. The Forest Supervisors office is located in 
Hamilton, Montana. The Kootenai National Forest encompasses 2.2 million acres located 
in the north-west corner of Montana with a small portion (50,384 acres) in Idaho. The 
forest is divided into five ranger districts: Rexford, Fortine, Three Rivers, Libby and 
Cabinet with the Supervisors office in Libby, Montana. The Helena National Forest lies 
in west-central Montana encompassing just under one million acres and is divided into 
three ranger districts: Lincoln, Helena and Townsend with the Forest Supervisors office 
in Helena, Montana. These three forests were selected because they appeared to offer a 
broad range of forest organizational forms. The Kootenai National Forest is 
comparatively “well off” with each of its seven districts able to field what is described as 
a full complement of specialists from each resource management program (e.g. 
Vegetation management, Watershed and Wildlife management and fire and fuels 
management) to form an interdisciplinary team (ID team). The Bitterroot, by contrast, is 
not quite as “well off” with the majority of the members of the ID teams organized into 
zones encompassing two districts each. The Helena National Forest represents the other 
end of the spectrum with what is described as an “ID team and a half” for the whole 
forest. 
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2.3 Data Collection Overview 
  
There were two types of data collected for this research – 1) response to 
interviews and notes taken during participant observation in various activities and 2) 
documents. Both of these two types of data were analyzed and the results presented in 
chapters three, four and five. However, chapter three, on fire and fuels management 
policy, relies predominantly on current and historical documents relating to fire and land 
management policy. Chapter four relies on a mix of interview response and documents 
relating the organization of national forests, direction in the Forest Service Handbook as 
well as court cases that affect the process of project planning. Chapter five is based 
primarily on interview responses along with completed project decision documents 
described as illustrative of the topics discussed by interview participants. The individuals 
selected for interviews and the documents selected for analysis were identified using a 
version the snowball method where interview subjects suggest other individuals to 
interview and documents to analyze. Documents reference other documents and these 
were, in most cases, located and included in the data set. 
 
To ensure a degree of systematization to the snowball method when employed 
over three study sites (national forests), every effort was made to interview personnel in 
comparable positions and areas of responsibility across the three forests rather than 
simply following the suggestions of the interviewees. That is, when district Assistant Fire 
Management Officer (AFMO) suggested, for example, interviewing the assistant planner, 
this was done where possible on all three forests. This was not always possible with every 
follow-up suggestion due to a variety of reasons, including scheduling conflicts, 
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differences in organizational structures of the three forests and the personnel employed or 
simply position vacancies. Similarly for documents, covering topics or processes below 
the regional office level, every effort was made to ensure commensurable representation 
across the three forests. This primarily pertained to project planning decision documents 
and supporting assessment results. 
2.3.1 Interviews and Participant Observation & Documents 
 
Participants were interviewed using a set of open ended questions (Appendix A: 
Interview Schedule). The Interview schedule, consisting of eight very broad questions, 
was developed following eight interviews conducted for different but related projects 
focusing on the conduct of the FRCC Guidebook (USDA et al., 2004) assessment 
procedures. These initial interviews revealed a great willingness to describe and critique 
project planning in detail, including various internal conflicts that affect this process. 
They also revealed a very dynamic process of how project development and planning 
progresses from the general to the specific, from an initial idea for a project to a well 
defined proposed action, a formal document that incurs substantial regulatory 
requirements. The dynamic process revealed in these initial interviews suggested several 
consistent and common themes relating to this temporal sequence of project planning and 
the factors that affect it as well as many idiosyncrasies. Descriptions of what constitutes 
assessment or planning, for example, and their relationship to project objectives and how 
objectives are themselves determined are multi-faceted and not clear-cut. Thus, what 
constitutes the factors that affect this process of fuels management project planning, were 
also multifaceted and inter-related.  
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Interviews 
 
Following from the theoretical framework employed in this research, described 
below, the definition or nature of the phenomena of inquiry, their bounding and identities 
as distinct phenomena (such as project planning, resource assessment, the establishment 
of project objectives etc.) should be as free from preconceptions and a priori categories or 
definitions as possible. Yet research must begin somewhere. It was decided not to ask 
obvious questions directly focused on research question  #3 (what factors affect project 
planning?) in favor of letting this emerge from the responses to questions focused 
specifically on research question #2 (how are fuels management projects identified, 
prioritized and developed into project proposals?). 
 
Shortly into the interview process, once at least two subjects from each forest had 
been interviewed and initial analysis of the transcripts was conducted, several themes 
became immediately apparent, themes common to all forests. For example, the answers 
to the first question on the interview schedule, noted above (“what factors affect project 
planning”), almost invariably lead to a discussion of the “NFMA analysis.” NFMA 
analysis is a term from the USDA Forest Service’s NEPA/NFMA Forest Plan 
Implementation Training Course (1900-01) which all personnel who participate in project 
planning take early in their careers. In brief, the term refers to all the aspects of project 
development and planning that leads to a formal proposed action. NFMA analysis in fact 
became the central focus of chapter four on the practice of fuels management project 
planning. Several additional questions were added to the Interview Schedule to 
specifically probe these themes and the initial subjects interviewed prior to the addition 
of these probe questions were interviewed again. 
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In conducting the interviews the long answers to the first question on the 
interview Schedule (Describe the development, planning and analysis of a fuels 
management project) invariably touched on and partially answered many of the other 
questions.  In such cases follow up questions (called probing) were asked to obtain more 
detail on these questions as they came up. Thus, the order of questioning followed the 
flow of responses rather than order of the Interview Schedule. In almost every case the 
topics of all the questions were hit upon with the first three questions without prompting. 
The added probe questions were used to flush out the topic of NFMA analysis. Project 
planning documents, discussed below, were collected at the time of interviews. These 
documents, however, were for completed projects but they provided general information 
to guide subsequent follow up interviews. 
 
Interviews and site visits were conducted in a variety of settings usually dictated 
by the availability of managers. The majority were conducted with one or two managers 
at ranger stations or forest headquarters. Five interviews, however, were conducted as 
part of a visit to project sites in various stages of development. At least one such site visit 
was conducted on each forest. These ranged from forty five minutes to two hours. Forty 
individuals were interviewed using the Interview Schedule. Twenty three were recorded 
and transcribed. Extensive written notes were taken for the remaining seventeen 
interviews where respondents preferred not to be recorded. 
 
In conducting interviews, every effort was made to get a comparable breadth and 
depth of individuals in various positions at the three forests studied for this research. One 
of the reasons for employing the snowball approach to identifying interview subjects was 
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to learn the organizational structure of the three forests and the dynamics of fuels 
management project planning.  The resulting interviews were distributed across the 
Regional Office, the three Forest Supervisor’s offices and two districts on each forest (see 
figure 1 Distribution of Interviews). These included the Assistant Fire Management 
Officer (AFMO) responsible for fuels management at each Forest Supervisor’s office and 
district offices (ranger stations) as well as at least one fuels specialist from each district. 
Most of the upper level Fire Management staff interviewed had worked on their forest 
since before the fires of 2000 and the increased funding that accompanied the National 
Fire Plan. A few, however, were hired as a result of the increased spending for fuels 
management following the 2000 fires or had transferred from other forests. Similarly for 
non-fire management staff interviewed, the majority had worked on their forest since 
before the 2000 fires. Thus the range of experience on the job ranged from three to 
eighteen years. 
 
      Figure 1 Distribution of Interviews 
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At the time this research was conducted each of the forest in this study had a 
forest fire ecologist and these individuals were interviewed as well as one other resource 
management specialist from each forest (silviculture and watershed). Additionally, the 
forest planners from each of the three forests, as well as assistant planners for two of the 
forests were interviewed. Discussions were held with district rangers from two of the 
forests but formal recorded interviews using the interview schedule could not be 
conducted (arrangements for interviews were made but scheduling conflicts arose in each 
case). The interview schedule was employed for all formal interviews except those five 
from the Regional Office. Follow up interviews were conducted with each forest and 
district level AFMO, fire ecologist and three of the planners as well as several fuels 
specialists. The majority of formal interviews were recorded and transcribed. Extensive 
written notes were taken for the few interviews not recorded and at these site visits, 
meetings and training courses. 
  
Participant Observation 
 
In addition to interviewing managers several forms of participant observation 
were engaged in. Interviews using the Interview Schedule were not conducted but 
extensive notes were taken and included with interview data for analysis. These included: 
 
 Four site visits accompanying fuels management to project sites in the early 
stages of project development 
 
 Three meetings in district offices (covered a wide range of topics including 
specific projects). 
 
 Participation in four prescribed burning operations. 
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Three formal training courses were attended at which notes were taken on course 
content as well as informal interviews with several participants employing questions from 
the Interview Schedule as appropriate: 
 
 FACTS accomplishment reporting database entry and business rules course for 
fuels managers (3 day course, four individuals interviewed) 
 
 NEPA/NFMA Forest Plan Implementation Training Course -1900-01 (5 day 
course) 
 
 FRCC Guidebook training course (5 day course). 
 
Documents 
 
The documentation reviewed for this research was of several types. Policy and 
historical documents that are the subject of chapter three are too numerous to describe in 
detail here, please refer to the bibliography. They include, for example, the various 
official agency policy documents such as the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy (USDA 
and USDOI, 1995), the 2001 update to this policy (USDA and USDOI, 2001) as well as 
the many implementation guides that have accompanied these policies; the documents 
that make up the National Fire Plan; and various reviews of agency practice such as those 
of the Government Accountability Office (GAO); large fire cost reviews, as well as 
transcripts of Congressional testimony and peer reviewed journal articles.  The 
documents analyzed for this research were also identified using a version of the snowball 
approach, such as following up on interview participant referenced or suggested 
documents or “back-tracking” additional documents referenced within policy documents 
themselves. 
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The forest plans and Fire Management Plans (2004 – 2007) for each forest as well 
as the fuels management Program Direction for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 were also 
reviewed. Numerous memos and guidelines were also reviewed, such as 
recommendations from the Regional Office to forest planners and resource management 
specialists on a variety of topics. Examples include “lessons learned from appeals 
reviews” on the writing of decision memos (DMs) for projects categorically excluded 
from NEPA; regional guidelines on conducting FRCC Guidebook assessments and cross-
walking between different ecological classification systems (e.g. VRU & FRCC) for 
analyzing and representing current forest conditions; and regional directions for reporting 
fuel treatment accomplishments in the Forest Service’s national database (FACTS). 
Numerous chapters in the Forest Service Manual and Handbook covering topics referred 
to during interviews were also analyzed, such as the guidance on NEPA compliance in 
1909.15 Zero Code through 1909.15.40 to compare how managers interpreted and 
employed such guidance in the specific context described in the interviews. 
 
NEPA documentation for 26 projects between 2001 through 2007 that included 
fuels management as one of their objectives were analyzed to compare the formal 
outcomes of project planning, their description of project objectives and purpose and 
need statements with managers description of the project planning process and how the 
category of NEPA authority used is determined. Ten of these were small projects 
conducted under CE authority, nine were EAs and seven EISs). Seven additional project 
documents completed in the late 1990s were also reviewed. The project files of one CE 
and one EIS on each of the three forests were also reviewed and notes were taken but 
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copies were not made. Most of these NEPA documents were selected on the 
recommendation of interview participants. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Approach 
 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) fits within a larger paradigm of social research that 
focuses on relationships rather than categories, individuals, groups or their attributes as 
the unit of analysis. ANT is useful or for generating detailed descriptions of dynamic 
phenomena whose patterns and processes are closely inter-connected and not clearly 
delineated (such as the nature and relationship between assessment and planning). It is 
particularly useful in settings where key concepts are ill-defined and contested (such as 
fire risk, forest health the nature and attributes of ecosystems) and upon which the 
application of pre-defined conceptions of organizational structure or the nature of the 
object of management activity may obscure rather than reveal how actors contend with 
the lack of definitions. ANT encourages the researcher to discover the identities and 
relationships of the actors involved and how they temporarily stabilize the meaning and 
definition of otherwise contested concepts from the self-reporting and self-representation 
of the participants involved. 
 
ANT is sometimes referred to as the sociology of translation (Latour, 2005) and it 
is the heuristic concepts revolving around the concept of translation that proved the most 
useful and will be reviewed here. Translation is basically the same thing as negotiation 
but the term translation is used to convey the fact that the meaning or nature of the object 
of negotiation is changed or translated, in the act of negotiation. Like translating a story 
from one language to another, its meaning is altered as it is inserted into a different 
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context where the readers may share little few of the experiences or understand the 
culture within which the original text was produced.5 
 
There are many other concepts associated with ANT but these concepts of 
negotiation and translation are the most relevant here for describing the analysis of the 
development of federal fire policy and Forest Service fuels management project planning 
and will be described below. The primary purpose and utility of these concepts is to 
provide the researcher with what Garfinkle and Sacks (1969) call “ethnomethodological 
indifference.” Ethnomethodological indifference is the ethnographic principle that 
participants to action should be allowed to provide their own categories and ascribe their 
own meaning to words, things and phenomena. This is referred to as the principle of 
symmetry where the nature of actors in a network, their attributes and competencies, are 
not established a priori but rather approached as much as possible in an evenhanded way 
since the attribution of characteristics and competencies to actors by other actors is a 
large part of what needs to be discovered and a priori attribution by the analyst would 
restrict such discover.  It derives from the perspective that the identities of actors are not 
stable but context dependent or, in ANT terms, dependent on the network of associations 
among actors in a given situation. In order to discover how negotiation proceeds and 
transformation comes about it is necessary to discover how the participants of action 
employ their own categories and inscribe their own definitions in the process of 
negotiation, e.g. what constitutes hazardous fuels and a legitimate fuels reduction 
treatment. The concepts of translation (as combination of the act of negotiation that leads 
                                                          
5 Latour and others also uses the term transformation to describe the process of negotiation. Translations 
always result in transformation of the object of negotiation and the concept of translation helps to keep in 
mind the linkage between what the object of negotiation was at the start of the process and what becomes 
as negotiation transpires.  
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to transformation) are intended to provide the researcher with this ethnomethodological 
indifference. 
 
Callon (1986) describes four characteristic points of achievement within 
processes of negotiation he calls moments of translation. These are problematization, 
interessement, enrollment and mobilization. Problematization is the formulation of a 
rough framing of a situation and representation of a problem calling for a response. It is 
an act of making a case for a course of action that more or less correspond with the 
perspectives, interests and objectives of those actors framing the problem in that way. 
Callon (1998) later employs Goffman’s (1971) concept of framing to explain translation 
and negotiation and points out that much of the content and significance of a frame may 
be implicit and self evident to the protagonists initially involved if they share strong 
connections of some kinds such that agreement or consensus on the nature of the frame 
may not be explicit and only loosely specified. This entails that the proposed course of 
action may also be only loosely specified, the details also being implicitly understood. 
Making the frame and course of action more explicit and increasing their specificity and 
level of detail becomes necessary as actors that are necessary for the course of action to 
move forward are brought into the negotiation process but do not perceive or frame the 
problem in quite the same way.  
 
Interessement, roughly translated as “to make interested,” is the forming of 
alliances by aligning the various perspectives, interests and objectives of other actors 
with the proposed courses of action. To the extent that these new actor’s perspectives, 
interests and objectives are different such alignment will result in altering (translating) 
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the course of action into something different. Enrolment is the moment when buy-in is 
achieved, it “describes the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength, and tricks 
that accompany interessement and enable it to succeed” (Callon, 1986, p. 206). Finally, 
mobilization is the process whereby those actors made interested in and aligned with a 
problem framed in a particular way and enrolled through negotiation over interests and 
objectives into a supporting or adopting a particular course of action work together as 
allies in subsequent negotiations with additional actors to continue to move an effort 
forward. 
 
An important distinction is made in ANT between actors that behave as 
intermediaries and those that behave as mediators. Actors that behave as intermediaries 
do not transform the object of negotiation (such as the nature of a project, its objectives, 
size and the specific treatments employed etc.) in the process of being enrolled. 
Mediators, on the other hand, require changes in order to gain their support for moving 
forward with a proposed action thereby transforming the object of negotiation. 
 
There are three important points to make clear in this conception of negotiation. 
One is that these moments of translation are heuristic devices. While these moments are 
more or less sequential, aspects of each are occurring simultaneously during each 
moment. When new actors become engaged they are confronted with the results of the 
entire suite of negotiations thus far and the moments are likely repeated. If the new actors 
are not more or less instantly mobilized to support the course of action, because they 
frame the situation differently, negotiations begin again over the framing or re-framing of 
the problem, revising the courses of action and so on. 
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The second point is that the course of action that is eventually pursued after 
mobilizing all the necessary actors may bare little resemblance to the courses of action 
initially proposed. The course of action may change to such an extent that its content and 
significance only resemblance to the initial proposal is a name, and perhaps a loosely 
defined objective. The actors who initially framed the problem and proposed the course 
of action may even become un-enrolled in the process, either voluntarily or involuntarily 
or, more commonly, remain mobilized to support the chosen course of action despite 
disagreeing with it, as when a superior simply directs a subordinate to carry on despite 
their misgivings. 
 
Third, though perhaps it is obvious, negotiation over proposed courses of action 
may fail and a project may never get off the ground and move beyond a mere topic of 
discussion. They may fail early on or late in the planning process. However, even in the 
case where projects move forward, judgment of success or failure and even the identity or 
the nature of a project (e.g. its objectives and associated treatments) depends on the 
perspective of those passing judgment. Point two above is essential to bear in mind here.  
 
For example, a district fuels specialist described proposing a prescribed burning 
project and had mobilized other members of the fuels crew and his supervisor, the district 
Assistant Fire management Officer (AFMO) into supporting the project idea. Through 
these negotiations among the ‘fuels shop’ the project was refined, its objectives were 
established - hazardous fuels reduction to reduce the risk and impacts of wildfire. The 
project was named and the basic details were roughed out such as boundaries and size, 
the location of the different treatment units within the overall boundary and estimates of 
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the type and location of mechanical pre-treatments necessary to accomplish the burn 
safely. Specialists from the Wildlife program were enrolled and acted as intermediaries in 
the negotiations because the proposed project met their program goals of increasing 
wildlife foraging habitat in the area and, consequently, were successfully mobilized to 
support it. 
 
However, in the ensuing negotiations to enroll the other actors required for the 
project to move forward, principally vegetation management (the ‘veg shop’) and the 
district ranger, the size of the area designated for prescribed burning was reduced by over 
half and the size of area identified for mechanical treatments was more than doubled. 
Thus the ‘veg shop’ and the district ranger acted as mediators in the negotiation process, 
transforming the project proposal (the object of negotiation) significantly. The project 
went forward with the same name and objectives. 
 
In the judgment of the district ranger and the ‘veg. shop’ the project was a success 
– fuels were reduced, receipts from the timber sale helped off-set the costs of the project 
and many of the concerned public was satisfied, but by no means all of them. From the 
perspective of the ‘fuels shop’ however, it was less than successful. There was, of course 
the issue of egos and the sense that the project was “taken over by the Veg. shop.” There 
is also the issue of the reduction in acres treated and local units are held to account for 
meeting annual acreage targets. According to one fuels manager, the tradeoff of timber 
receipts to off set project costs was not enough to outweigh the added cost of increased 
NEPA analysis and mitigation efforts required to reduce the impacts of increased timber 
harvesting and the anticipated litigation harvesting entails, especially for the reduced 
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acreage of fuels treatment. The main reason, however, that the ‘fuels shop’ judged the 
project less than successful (and even considered to no longer qualify as fuels 
management in anything but name only) was because they felt the impacts on fire risk 
was marginal. In the course of the changes made to the project, the treatment unit 
boundaries were radically altered - boundaries which had been initially chosen based on 
topographic features and their effect on estimates of fire spread and the ability to both 
safely conduct the prescribed burning and to allow greater tactical options in the event of 
a wildfire. The stated objectives of the project were retained - reduce the risk and impacts 
of wildfire - but, in their view, compromised. 
 
Methods from Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) were used for data 
management and analysis. Like ANT, Grounded Theory emphasizes generation of 
explanations and understanding from the explanations and understanding of the actors 
involved and reproducing the phenomena of interest. Grounded Theory is an analytical 
method to qualitative data in which the material, (usually textual though other material 
such as images can be analyzed this way as well) is segregated into broad topics or 
themes and sub themes in a process called coding. The themes where identified following 
ANTs emphasis on relationships and the process of negotiations (e.g. the four moments 
of translation described above) for establishing the identity objects of management such 
as the objectives of a project. For example, though the nature of project objectives and 
project planning are poorly defined and interrelated in a dynamic and fluid process, 
managers descriptions of the NFMA analysis process mentioned above revealed a distinct 
sequence in the process of project development and planning where ideas for projects and 
their objectives start out as very general and are refined and more clearly defined in a 
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sequence marked by specific institutional prescribed events such as the development of 
the annual program of work developed by the forest leadership team. This sequence was 
distinguished by the increasing number of actors brought into the negotiation process 
until the broad outlines of the project have been provisionally accepted and funding for 
further development has been allocated. After this decision to allocate resources the 
number of actors involved more or less stabilizes. Manager’s description of the process of 
negotiation during this sequence of NFMA analysis as a project moves from a rather 
vague idea of an opportunity for management to a formal proposed action revolved 
around negotiating over the myriad of interrelated issues that must be addressed in order 
for a project to succeed. These were grouped into themes and coded according to this 
described sequence and what considerations were described as most salient by managers 
during different phases. 
 
These considerations were eventually distilled into what are called in this 
dissertation the two “key factors” affecting project planning: Targets & Budgets and 
Compliance with Law, Regulation and Agency Policy, the Threat of Litigation and the 
Cost of Analysis. These factors were identified as “key” because they were topics of 
negotiation throughout NFMA analysis. These key factors, however, and their 
interrelationship to one another, were described by managers in different ways. At times 
they were described in a manner that distinguished them as separate and countervailing 
factors while at other times they were combined into a more general influencing factor in 
project development. This is the principle reason they are described as two sets of 
interrelated factors – to maintain the variety of meanings and conveyed in manager’s 
accounts. They simply do not have stable, distinct meanings and influence across 
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different projects and throughout the sequence of negotiations characterized by NFMA 
analysis, according to mangers accounts. Rather, from an ANT perspective, these factors 
derive their meaning and impact upon negotiations depending on their association with 
other aspects of the negotiation process, i.e. the context or network of relations. 
 
As described above, actors in the negotiation process may behave as 
intermediaries or mediators depending on whether changes to proposal are required to 
enroll their support. Also as described above, problem framing (which in this research 
means the proposed project, its objectives and treatments) becomes more explicitly 
defined as actors who do not share the same problem frame due to disparate interests and 
objectives enter into the negotiation process. The heuristic concepts of moments of 
translation and the distinction between intermediaries and mediators were employed 
during the coding process to distinguish the various definitions of and the role played by 
these factors in the negotiation process as it proceeded through the sequence of NFMA 
analysis. The coding and analysis process was carried out and managed using the QSR 
NVivo qualitative data management and analysis software as well as FreeMind and 
CmapTools cognitive mapping software. NVivo allows the tagging of passages within a 
text with a theme or code so similarly coded passages may be compared and contrasted. 
The surrounding text can be interrogated when questions arise over membership in a 
theme or their relationship with other themes. FreeMind and CmapTools are two 
examples of mind mapping or concept mapping tools, tools for graphically representing 
the relationships, similarity or differences between concepts (or themes and codes). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
FUELS MANAGEMENT POLICY IN THE 
U.S. FOREST SERVICE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes fuels management policy. It briefly describes the historical 
background leading up to current policy and sets the stage for the chapters four and five 
on the organizational structure and practice of fuels management project planning. The 
policy governing fuels management is complex and not well defined because fuels 
management is a component of the larger enterprise of fire management and fire 
management is itself embedded in the even more diffuse enterprise of land management. 
While fuels management is the provenance of individual agencies, such as the Forest 
Service, wildfire incident management is an interagency endeavor, owing to its historical 
development as an emergency response requiring mobilization of resources across 
jurisdictions. The administrative apparatus of fire management thus has developed a 
degree of autonomy from each individual agency yet not quite separate from them either. 
Fire policy is written by this semiautonomous administrative apparatus yet must be 
approved by the leadership of each agency as well. Each agency, however, follows its 
own policy inscribed in their own directive system (such as the Forest Service Manual 
and Handbook) but this is supposed to reflect the agreed upon interagency policy. 
Moreover this directive system also reflects each agency’s different legislative mandates 
and organizational culture. The three areas of fire, fuels and broader land management 
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policy are intertwined and overlapping in myriad ways. Understanding fire policy thus 
requires starting with a brief account of the early days of fire management and policy. 
 
3.2 From Fire Control to Fire Management 
 
Public policy and attitudes towards wildfire have varied tremendously over time. 
Federal policy and practice has largely treated fire as an unmitigated evil to be excluded 
from the landscape while many private landowners and timber companies in the west 
advocated “light burning” to control undergrowth and promote seedling establishment. 
Shaped by the “Big Blowup” of 1910 in the northern Rockies, where 78 fire fighters were 
killed and five million acres burned, the Forest Service promoted a policy of total fire 
exclusion. In a 1920 article titled “Paiute Forestry” or the Fallacy of Light Burning, 
written shortly before he became Chief of the Forest Service, William Greeley denigrated 
the practice of prescribed burning as native folklore, lacking any scientific basis and 
stated that “[t]h protection of our western forests from fire is one of the finest 
accomplishments in forestry yet witnessed in the United States” (Greeley, 1920 and 2000, 
p. 21).6 
All Fires Out By 10 AM 
 
In 1935 the Forest Service adopted the policy of “all fires out by 10 AM” the 
morning after detection. The Forest Service became the dominant agency defining and 
implementing the Federal response to fire. Federal fire research, dominated by the Forest 
Service, focused predominantly on techniques of fire prediction and suppression. 
Increasing interest and fear of fire as a weapon aroused by the firestorms of World War II 
                                                          
6 This article originally appeared in the March, 1920 issue of The Timberman. It was reprinted in fall, 2000 
issue of Fire Management Today. 
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were intensified with 1949 detonation Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb and the Mann 
Gulch fire in which 13 firefighters, most of them elite smokejumpers, lost their lives. 
Forest Service fire research intensified focusing primarily on the physics of fire and the 
development of mathematical equations to help predict fire danger and fire behavior in 
support of the total fire control mission of the federal agencies (Pyne 1982). 
Early Opposition to Total Fire Control 
  
An alternative undercurrent to the official federal policy of total fire control 
remained however. Aldo Leopold argued in 1924 that fire was an important natural 
process necessary for the propagation of many plant and tree species. In 1943 Harold 
Weaver, a forester for Bureau of Indian Affairs, presaging the dilemma that would 
confront fire management 30 years later, wrote in the Journal of Forestry about the 
negative effects of fire exclusion on ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) and the potential 
for severe consequences due to fuels buildup.7 While Federal research, dominated by the 
Forest Service, focused on increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of fire control, 
research into the positive side of fire had to find alternative venues. The annual fire 
ecology conferences initiated in 1962 by the privately funded Tall Timbers Research 
Station in Tallahassee, Florida became the primary arena for research into the ecological 
role of fire and its beneficial effects (Rothman 2005).8 
 
In the mid 1960s National Park Service (NPS) began to break away from the total 
fire control orientation of federal fire management. The Leopold Report on wildlife in the 
                                                          
7 Weaver, H. (1943). Fire as an ecological and silvicultural factor in the ponderosa pine region of the 
Pacific Slope. Journal of Forestry 41(1): 7-14. 
8 Weaver was invited to present at the second Tall Timbers conference in 1963 but was denied permission 
to attend (Carle, 2002).  
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National Parks, released in 1963, recommended that the Park Service “recognize the 
enormous complexity of ecological communities and the diversity of management 
procedures required to preserve them” (Leopold et al, 1963, no page number). Many, 
both within and outside the NPS, such as Harold Biswell, advocated for a greater role for 
the findings of scientific research in public land management, especially fire ecology, in 
formulating management responses to fire beyond simple protection (Stephens and 
Sugihara, 2006, Kilgore, 2007). 
 
The passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 (P.L. 88-577), with its requirement to 
preserve the “wilderness character” of natural environments, strengthened the case of 
those calling for a new approach to fire. In 1968 the Park Service changed its fire 
management policies to allow lightning (e.g. “naturally”) caused fires to burn following, 
a determination of minimal risk to human life and park facilities and beneficial effects to 
the ecosystem and became known as “let-burn” (Kilgore, 2007). 
Fire by Prescription 
 
The Wilderness Act and the example of the Park Service gave support for the 
cause of those in the Forest Service advocating for the reintroducing fire on the landscape 
and a more nuanced approach to the policy of total fire control. Management-ignited 
prescribed fire was approved for limited areas of the front country and exceptions to the 
10 a.m. policy were made in 1971 for prescribed natural fires on small portions of a 
handful of the new wilderness areas, the first being the White Cap Fire Management Area 
in the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness on the Bitterroot National Forest (Mutch, 1974). In 
1973, the Forest Service's “Division of Fire Control” was renamed the “Division of Fire 
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Management” to symbolize what Forest Service Chief John R. McGuire (1973, p. 1) 
described as "a significant change in our attitude and approach to managing fire.” Pyne 
(1982) called this new approach to fire management fire by prescription. 
Defining Fire Management 
 
 With suppression no longer the automatic response and fire formally recognized 
as potentially beneficial, a phenomenon to be managed rather than controlled, the 
question became how to conceive of the role fire management was to play in land 
management more generally. What were to be the objectives of fire management and the 
basis of fire prescriptions? The Forest Service manages multiple natural resources such as 
timber, water, species habitat and recreation under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act 
(MUSY 1960) but it is not itself a natural resource as classically understood or 
legislatively defined. Yet fire affects all of these resources and the management of these 
resources in turn affects fire. How were these interactions to be conceived and specified 
in order to devise prescriptions? This question consumed the attention of researchers and 
fire managers at all levels of the Forest Service during the 1970s. Retired Northern 
Region Assistant Regional Forester, Fire Management William (Bud) Moore, noting the 
Forest Service’s historic 1973 publication of the public information booklet The Natural 
Role of Fire, described fire management as: 
 
…fire protection, the scientific use of fire, and hazard reduction 
activities… organized to support the objectives sought in managing each 
unique tract of land…As in the past, fires with destructive potential will be 
controlled…Fires will be prescribed for beneficial purposes. Lightning 
and other incidental fires will be allowed to burn under surveillance where 
land use plans and fire prescriptions indicate that fire has beneficial 
influence on the ecosystems (Moore, 1974, p. 12). 
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Jack Barrows (1974, p. 3 ), who planned the development of the Fire Lab in 
Missoula, noted that fire is an “eternal agent of ecological change that may coincide or 
conflict with the interests of man”, described the new mission of fire management as the 
use of new knowledge and technologies for distinguishing “wanted from unwanted fires”. 
Barney (1975, p. 498) defined fire management as “the integrating of fire-related 
biological, ecological, physical, and technological information into land management to 
meet desired objectives.”9 
Fire Knowledge and Considerations 
 
In 1972 Richard Rothermel (hired by Barrows) had released the most enduring 
results of the research effort into the physics of fire with the publication of his surface fire 
spread equations and stylized models of fuel complexes that allowed the prediction of 
important aspects of fire spread and behavior.10 Work began in earnest to develop simple 
applications for field use of Rothermel’s equations. There was, it seems, increasing faith 
and optimism during this period in the efficacy of various research initiatives to develop 
analytical techniques that would help in the determination of “wanted and unwanted fire” 
based on analysis of fire behavior and fire history. 
 
Research in fire history and ecology also expanded greatly. Heinselman (1973) 
was one of the first researchers to articulate the concept of the natural fire regime as a 
way of describing the fire history and ecological role of fire for particular ecosystems.11 
                                                          
9 The article, in the Journal of Forestry was titled “Fire Management: a definition” 
10 “Dick and his team set the stage for the things we’re doing today” according to Mark Finney, a 
researcher at the Missoula Fire Sciences Lab and developer of the Farsite and FSPro fire modeling 
applications. Fire Science Digest, Issue 2, March, 2008.  http://www.firescience.gov/Digest/FSdigest2.pdf  
(Last accessed September, 2009). 
11 Based on fire history research in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of Minnesota and presented at a 1972 
symposium jointly held by the Ecological Society of America and the American Institute of Biological 
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His initial formulation was rather crude but including the three components from which 
the concept has since evolved: Fire frequency, severity and size. It is apparent that these 
fire researchers and managers conceived of the “fire knowledge” that should guide the 
establishment of fire management objectives and prescriptions as some combination of 
fire history analysis - to determine fire’s ecological role - and fire behavior analysis - to 
determine the safe and ecologically appropriate use of prescribed natural fire, prescribed 
fire and/or mechanical fuels treatment to alter and steer fire appropriately. 
 
In 1974, the Forest Service held a symposium titled Fire and Land Management in 
conjunction with the Tall Timbers Fire Ecology conference in Missoula, Montana. 
During a policy panel held in conjunction with this symposium, the Forest Service 
announced the establishment of the “Fire in Multiple-Use Management Research, 
Development, and Applications Program” (Lotan, 1979). This new program was charged 
with developing procedures and techniques to define the role of fire in ecosystems and 
integrating these findings within fire and land management planning and implementation. 
(Lotan, 1979, p. 9), head of the RD&A program, defined fire management as the 
incorporation of “fire considerations” such as “knowledge of preburn conditions, the 
particular kind and amount of fire involved, and the response of the ecosystem over time” 
into the management planning and decision making process. The introduction to Arno 
and Sneck’s (1977) RD&A sponsored report that is still in use today titled A method for 
Determining Fire History in Coniferous Forests of the Mountain West begins: 
 
Throughout much of western North America, forest managers are making 
a transition from a narrow policy of fire control to a broader approach 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sciences. Many others also used the term fire regime but did not specify the elements that would 
distinguish one regime from another.  
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called fire management…This change reflects their increasing interest in 
using fire in fuel management, wildlife habitat improvement, silvicultural 
improvement, and natural area management. Thus, managers want to 
evaluate the influence of fire on forest ecosystems. But, to fully 
understand the role that fire has played, one should learn about the fire 
history. The following questions should be investigated: what were the (1) 
average, minimum, and maximum intervals between fires in various forest 
habitats? (2) sizes and intensities of fires? (3) effects of past fire on forest 
vegetation, particularly stand composition and age-class structure? (4) 
effects of modern fire suppression? (Arno and Sneck, 1977, p. 1). 
 
For Heinselman, Arno and many other researchers and practitioners, knowledge 
of fire behavior and fire history should inform general land management objectives to 
avoid unintended consequences to ecosystem and public health due to altered fire 
regimes. These researchers advocated for “fire restoration”, with the determination of the 
natural fire regime of an ecosystem, as the basis upon which a “conscious” fire 
management policy could be pursued. Sando (1978, p. 36) for example, argued that 
because fires will continue to occur and fire was such a major influence in the evolution 
of the species, management should “recognize…the constraints placed on our activities 
by the natural fire regime.” Kilgore (1981, p. 58) stated that “[B]etter understanding of 
fire regimes is basic to our management of western ecosystems.” 
 
3.2.1 The Role of Fire Management in Land Management 
  
The 1970s were a time of controversy and policy change throughout the Forest 
Service, not just in fire management. Many authors have described the Multiple Use 
Sustained Yield Act  of 1960 (P. L. 86-517) as the last successful policy initiative by the 
agency to maintain discretionary control over national forest management based on 
managers professional judgment and expertise unencumbered by statutory constraints 
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(Hirt, 1994; Koontz, 2007). Many new laws were passed that greatly affected forest 
management such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970, the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 and the National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA) of 1976. The NFMA, in particular, was to have a great impact on forest 
management and was central to the debates over the meaning of fire management. The 
NFMA was the product of intense controversy and preceded by critical reports on the 
dominance of timber production in Forest Service management. The Bolle Report12 of 
1970 found that, despite the agency’s multiple use mandate timber production trumped 
all other objectives and the culture of professional forestry within the agency was 
unresponsive to other concerns. The practice of clear-cut logging was particularly 
controversial but clear-cutting, in addition to its economic advantages, was also argued 
by many advocates to be a surrogate for fire where fire suppression was used to protect 
commercial timber thus opening up for debate the relationship between fire and timber 
management.13 Following the Monongahela decision14 the NFMA placed restrictions on 
clear-cutting and saved timber harvesting on National Forest lands but also required the 
agency to assess its lands to determine the suitability for the various land uses stipulated 
in MUSYA and to develop land and resource management plans (L/RMP) for each 
national forest, following analysis of environmental effects required by NEPA and 
ensuring persistence of species under ESA. It would take the Forest Service until 1982 to 
develop the planning rules that each national forest must follow in developing their 
                                                          
12 Named after Arnold Bolle, dean of the School of Forestry at the University of Montana, the report was 
formally titled A University View of the Forest Service and was published as a Senate document by Senator 
Lee Metcalf of Montana, who commissioned the study. 
13 See for example the Eugene Register-Guard, March 12, 1972, p. 37. 
14 Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975) which found clear-cutting to be illegal, in 
violation of the Organic Act (1897). 
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individual L/RMPs, more commonly referred to as Forest Plans, but the NFMA required 
such plans to: 
be prepared by an interdisciplinary team. Each team shall prepare its plan 
based on inventories of the applicable resources of the forest; … (Sec. 
6(f)(3)) 
 
provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the 
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall 
multiple-use objectives… (Sec. 6 (g)(3)(B)) 
 
The concept of fire management as the incorporation of fire knowledge in the 
determination of “wanted from unwanted fire” raised the question of the relationship 
between the objectives of fire management and those of land management more 
generally. How and to what extent, in other words, should fire management, armed with 
new knowledge of fire behavior and ecology, participate in and inform the determination 
of land management objectives or, conversely, to what extent are land management 
objectives to determine what aspects of fire behavior and ecology are considered? It was 
a time of advocacy both for the discipline of fire management in forest planning and for 
its subject matter – fire behavior and fire’s natural ecological role. Presumably fire 
management would have the opportunity to include fire considerations as part of the 
interdisciplinary teams that were to prepare the future forest plans since fire has such a 
large impact on the diversity of plant and animal communities. Orville Daniels, a pioneer 
of the prescribed natural fire program in the Northern Rockies (who would later face 
severe criticism as the Forest Supervisor in charge of the Canyon Creek Fire in 1988) in a 
conference paper titled Land Management Planning: Where Fire Management and 
Resources Meet noted that: 
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Fire has the potential to interfere with many of our land management 
decisions. This is true both of unwanted fire and the exclusion of fire from 
various dependent ecosystems. Any land management prescription must 
take into account these two factors…Thus, it is important that the fire 
management implications of various land practices be taken into account 
fully in land management planning processes (Daniels, 1979, p. 95-6). 
 
Heinselman (1978) described five general fire management alternatives: (1) Fire 
Exclusion, (2) No fire-control program, (3) management of lighting-caused fires, (4) 
prescribed fire, and (5) mechanical manipulation of vegetation and fuels. The failure to 
“consciously pursue” one or a combination of these options, to ignore the interaction of 
the requirement for and effects of pursuing these options, will, Heinselman (1978, p 265) 
warned, “result in the unintended or haphazard implementation of one or more of these 
same options.” Analysis of fire history and potential fire behavior to answer the basic 
questions of why, how and when should inform the flexible pursuit any of these option, 
singly or in combination, in any given ecosystem. While there was no consensus on 
precisely how to define the new mission of fire management nor how to determine 
“wanted from unwanted fire” it is clear that the majority of researchers and fire managers 
wrestling with these questions saw the role of collecting and analyzing information on 
fire behavior, history and ecology as fundamental to the incorporation of fire 
considerations into land management planning and implementation. This, however, went 
unheeded. 
 
3.2.2 The End of Total Fire Control 
  
While discussions continued over the ecological merits and administrative 
implications of the change from fire control to fire management, such as fire’s role in 
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providing plant and animal diversity, it was the cost of suppression that finally led to an 
agency wide policy change (Lotan 1981). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
had challenged the efficiency and effectiveness of Forest Services leadership’s intention 
to request continually rising budgets for fire suppression. This led to an internal analysis 
and eventual proposal for an agency wide change in fire policy known as the Gale report 
(Gale 1977, Lotan 1981). The Forest Service, according to the report, could not afford to 
maintain the policy of total fire control. In 1978 the Forest Service revised its total fire 
control policy of 1935 making the exceptions granted to a few forests in 1972 to allow 
prescribed natural fire available to all national forests. The new policy allowed prescribed 
natural fires and even promoted prescribed fire in areas covered by an approved fire 
management plan. The new policy specified, for example, that: 
 
 Fire management planning be totally integrated into Forest Service land 
management planning processes. 
 
 In areas where natural resource conditions, such as wildlife habitat, can be 
improved by prescription fire and where plans have been approved for this 
purpose, the fire suppression action may be modified to meet these resource 
management objectives. 
 
 Land managers are to make more use of prescription fire to protect, maintain, 
and enhance the natural resource values and esthetics within approved areas 
on the National Forest. 
 
Unintended or Haphazard Implementation of Fire Management 
 
The calls for fire management to be totally integrated with land management 
planning were essentially ignored. Pyne (1982) described fire management and policy 
during this period as “ambivalent,” no longer total fire control but not really management 
of fire either. While the National Park Service began to establish objectives specific to 
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fire and its ecological effects15, the Forest Service’s first round of forest plans were 
developed largely by dividing up the forests according to suitability for various multiple 
uses with fire treated as a use rather than an agent of ecological change that functions 
without regard to human designations of use and value. Prescribed natural fires were 
allowed in wilderness areas, prescribed fire in others in order to, as the fire policy put, 
“protect, maintain, and enhance the natural resource values.” Prescribed fire was used 
largely to dispose of logging slash (activity fuels) following timber harvesting, which 
increased dramatically following passage of NFMA. Prescribed fire was also used for site 
preparation prior to replanting after timber harvesting, as required by NFMA, as well as 
for improving wildlife forage.16 This effectively meant that fuel management objectives 
and activities were determined by the objectives of other resource programs, principally 
timber, vegetation and wildlife management.  
 
Analysis of fire history and the development of the natural fire regime concept 
remained primarily a topic of fire research rather than a topic of concern to land 
management. The recommendation to consciously base fire management activity on an 
area’s specific fire history and ecology went unheeded. Fire management expanded to 
include prescribed fire and prescribed natural fire but focused on how to implement fire 
prescriptions tied to the goals and objectives of other resource programs. The question of 
the relationship between fire management and land management planning and the 
formulation of land management objectives with respect to the fire behavior and ecology 
                                                          
15 See for example Graber (1985) and Bancroft et al. (1985). 
16 See Schuster et al (1997) and Cleaves et al. (1999, 2000). Data collected for these reports indicate that for 
the 6 Forest Service Regions in the Western U.S. 43.5% of the acres burned using prescribed fire between 
1985 and 1995 were for slash disposal. 
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of an area were rarely addressed directly. There was no process of deliberation at the 
programmatic level or local planning levels. Rather, the application of “fire knowledge” 
to fire management, and the relationship of fire management to land management more 
broadly, was piecemeal and ad-hoc with little oversight of the fire management planning 
process and the development of individual fire prescriptions. The development of fire 
prescriptions were determined largely by local capabilities with little institutional support 
for preseason analysis of fuels and potential fire behavior or fire history studies that 
would allow the conscious pursuit of policy options. Heinselman’s (1978, p. 265) 
warning about “unintended or haphazard implementation” of fire management options 
were realized with the fires of 1988. These fires would eventually lead to the first major 
review of fire policy since the elimination of the total fire control policy in 1978. It would 
also increase attention on the role of fuels management. 
 
The Fires of 1988 
 
The Yellowstone Fires resulted in perimeters covering almost 800,000 acres, 
roughly 45% of the park, driven by prolonged drought, numerous lightning and human 
ignitions and abnormally strong and persistent winds (Christiansen et al. 1989). The 
Canyon Creek fire started in the Bob Marshal Wilderness and, fanned by a jet stream that 
dropped to the earth’s surface, the fire spread eastward 21 miles in five hours. The fire 
spread over the divide out of the wilderness and onto the prairies west of Augusta, 
Montana with a final perimeter of 250,000 acres, the largest fire in Montana since 1910 
(Daniels 1989). Both of these fires were initially allowed to burn as prescribed natural 
fires and, particularly those in Yellowstone, led to intense criticism of federal fire 
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management, especially the policy and practice of derisively called “let it burn.”17 
Following the fires an all-agency moratorium was put in place on the use of prescribed 
natural fire and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior established a Fire Management 
Policy Review Team (Review Team) in September, 1988 (Dilsaver, 1994). 
 
The Review Team’s direction was to review fire policy "to determine the 
appropriate fire policies for national parks and wilderness" only, and not an “overall 
management direction of national parks and wilderness areas” (Wakimoto 1990, p. 22). 
Nor was the review to focus on the implementation of fire policy outside of wilderness, 
such as the bulk of prescribed fire and suppression actions on Forest Service land. The 
Review Team’s report18 found that the overall policy was sound but that clarification was 
needed in several major areas. The primary criticisms revolved around the overall 
inadequacy of fire management planning and the lack of funding and qualified staff to 
carry it out. The Review Team pointed out, in particular, that there was “inadequate 
attention to reducing hazardous fuels to allow for safe prescribed and prescribed natural 
fire…Hazard fuel reduction programs have not been adequately funded in some cases” 
(p. 14) Forest Service policies, the Review Team noted, “…require that prescribed fires 
be managed with appropriated funds from the benefiting program” such as wildlife or 
timber management rather than through dedicated funds and that “presuppression 
activities have declined in real dollars in recent years” (p. 14-15). The Federal agencies, 
                                                          
17 ABC News’ anchor Hodel said it was “clear that this let burn policy is a disaster”, while Montana 
Senator John Melcher assured constituents that the Park service and the Forest Service will “never go back 
to this policy” and two Senators from Wyoming called for the resignation of the Director of the National 
Park Service, William Mott, who was an ardent supporter of the prescribed natural fire program. See 
Shabecoff (1988) Park and Forest Service Chiefs Assailed on Fire Policy. 
18 Report Concerning Fire Management Policy for National Parks and Wilderness. Available at: 
http://www.nifc.gov/fire_policy/mission/1988_fire_ 
mgmt_preview_team_rpt.pdf. Last accessed January, 2009. 
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the Review Team noted “…must re-evaluate the opportunities to use prescribed burning 
(by planned ignitions) to achieve management objectives and to complement prescribed 
natural fire programs…hazard fuels must be reduced to protect selected areas, 
particularly developments within and adjacent to boundaries, from prescribed natural fire 
and high wildfire risk” (p. 18) The Review Team made many recommendations 
including: 
 Development of a better understanding of agency objectives as they 
relate to fire planning standards and decision criteria. 
 
 Additional studies of fire history, occurrence, and size in parks and 
wildernesses. 
 
What the report illustrates, even with its narrow focus upon prescribed natural 
fires in parks and wilderness, is the general failure of the federal agencies to invest in 
“fire knowledge” in terms of both information collection and analysis of fire behavior, 
history and ecology as well as workforce development of the professional expertise 
necessary to collect, analyze and apply such information to fire planning. The size, 
severity and ecological consequences of the fires could not be determined with any 
certainty immediately after the fire when the Review Team conducted its investigation. 
However, Romme and Despain (1989, p. 695), using methods developed by Heinselman 
(1973) and Arno & Sneck (1977) later estimated the fire history of Yellowstone over the 
past 300 hundred years and determined that the fires extent and pattern of severity were 
not unusual for this ecosystem and that the fires in the park “should not be viewed as an 
abnormal event.” 
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Arno and Brown (1989, p. 44), calling for a new initiative on fire management 
and policy, noted that “despite widespread adoption of the fire management concept a 
decade ago, forest fuels continue to increase faster than they are being recycled through 
harvesting, fire and decomposition…fuels management through prescribed fire or other 
cultural methods have been hampered…[while] vast sums of money are spent attempting 
to control severe fires in untreated fuels.” The GAO (1990, p. 6), while agreeing with the 
findings of the Review Team, also found that strong resistance to the policy of using 
prescribed fire by managers who “still subscribe to the philosophy of suppressing all 
fires” severely hindered adequate allocation of resources to preseason analysis and 
planning. The Forest Service did revise its planning requirements in 1991,19 adopting 
many of the Review Team’s recommendation as to some of the specific decision making 
elements that must be addressed before a natural ignition could be managed as a 
prescribed natural fire. Agee (1993, p. 73) noted, however, that despite such revised 
direction for developing prescribed fire prescriptions the focus of prescribed natural fire 
decision making remained “to burn or not to burn” rather than the “how, when or why” of 
burning. 
3.3 The Rise of Ecosystem Management 
 
A principle reason decision making remained focused on burn or not burn rather 
than the how, when and why of burning, is due to the larger forest management policy 
context that unfolded following the fires of 1988. Land management was again in crisis 
and again centered on the Forest Service. The Review Team’s recommendations, 
particularly that of “understanding of agency objectives” was at the center of this crisis 
                                                          
19 Forest Service Manual (FSM) 5142.2 through 5142.24 (1991). 
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and “developing a better understanding” of how “they relate to fire planning” was central 
to how the controversy over its solution played out. This controversy came to be 
articulated as two different yet overlapping sets of problems and their corresponding 
solutions. On the one hand was the problem of ecological damage, the loss of habitat due 
to past intensive management and the threat to species viability mandated in the forest 
planning rules of 1982 implementing the NFMA. The problem was framed in terms of 
ecosystem sustainability, or where this term was too controversial, as ecosystem 
resiliency. The proposed solution to this framing of the problem was ecosystem 
management. The other articulation of the problem was framed more narrowly as a 
problem of forest health, characterized by the over-accumulation of brush and small trees 
that lead to increased insect and disease outbreaks and catastrophic fires. The proposed 
solution to the problem articulated in this way was increased active forest management 
more narrowly focused on thinning. 
 
For a host of reasons, not least of which is the fact that it became agency policy, 
fire management leadership, and hence fire policy, aligned squarely with the problem 
framing and proposed solution offered by the concept of ecosystem management. As the 
Review Team investigating the fires of 1988 pointed out, both the Forest Service and 
Department of Interior fire management programs emphasized prescribed fire as the tool 
of choice for reducing hazardous fuels. But the widespread employment of this tool was 
constrained by a whole set of institutional arrangements and priorities. As unresolved 
issues in land management articulated in the 1970s again came to the fore, however, 
issues such as the Bolle Report’s criticism of the near complete dominance of the 
discipline, practices and objectives of professional forestry in forest planning, ecosystem 
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management also offered fire and fuels management the opportunity of equal billing for 
its own objectives and practices based on fire knowledge through a reorganization of 
these organizational arrangements and priorities under ecosystem management. 
Early Developments 
 
The controversy over the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) in the 
Pacific Northwest that had been brewing throughout the 1980s came to a head when the 
owl was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act in 1990, following 
repeated attempts by the Forest Service under the Reagan administration, to avoid the 
listing.20 This brought the last heyday of timber production on Forest Service lands to a 
halt.21 The 1988 fire season was followed by yet more severe and costly fire seasons. 
Fires starting in the hills just outside of Oakland and Berkeley, California in 1991 had 
killed 25 people and destroyed over 2,500 homes. In May of 1992 the U.S. District Court 
ruled that the Forest Service had violated NEPA in preparing its Final Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) for the management of the spotted owl. Also in 1992, facing 
severe criticism at the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro on a host of issues, including 
forest management and the spotted owl controversy, President George H. W. Bush 
announced a new approach to forest management called ecosystem management. 
Putting Meat on the Concept 
  
 In 1993, newly-elected President Clinton vastly expanded the concept of 
ecosystem management from its initial conception under President Bush and Forest 
Service Chief Robertson. Robert Lyons, the new Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for 
                                                          
20 55 Fed. Reg. 26114-2619 (June 26, 1990). 
21 Timber production dropped from about 12 billion board-feet in 1989 to 4 billion board-feet by the mid 
1990s (Chilson, 1998) 
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Natural Resources and Environment, initiated the Forest Ecosystem Management 
Assessment Team (FEMAT, USDA, USDOI, USDC and USEPA, 1993). Headed by the 
new Chief of the Forest Service, Jack Ward Thomas, FEMAT’s mission was to provide a 
new evaluation and set of recommendations for forest management on the west side of 
the Cascades.22 The FEMAT report “was viewed by many as a hallmark effort to view 
forest management from a broad ecological perspective, putting meat on the skeletal dicta 
of the FS for beginning a new era of ecosystem management” (Marcot and Thomas, 
1997, p. 11). The initial concerns for the northern spotted owl in particular and the 
species viability requirements of NFMA23 in general led to a focus on broader 
ecosystems in their own right as a means of integrating multiple uses in a sustainable 
fashion (Meslow, 1993).  
 
Chief Thomas initiated an internal review called The Forest Service Ethics and 
Course to the Future24 outlining the new direction for the Agency. Speaking before 
Congress in February 1994, he described this new direction as a “holistic approach to 
natural resource management, moving beyond a compartmentalized approach focusing on 
the individual parts of the forest. It…integrate[s] the human, biological, and physical 
dimensions of natural resource management. Its purpose is to achieve sustainability of all 
resources” (Thomas, 1994, p. 13). The GAO (1999b, p. 2) described this as a 
fundamental shift in the agency’s mission from “producing goods and services to 
                                                          
22 Thomas was the first Chief not selected by his predecessor and the first biologist to head the agency. 
According to the Forest Service history website, former Chief Robertson and Associate Chief George 
Leonard were reassigned by the Clinton administration for not advancing changes fast enough. See Forest 
Service online history page at http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/history/chiefs/robertson.shtml last accessed 
Nov., 2008. 
23 36 CFR §219.19. 
24 USDA Forest Service. 1994. The Forest Service Ethics and Course to the Future FS-567. Administrative 
document for internal distribution. Washington, DC. 9 p. For a brief description see 
http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Publications/multiple_use/chap7.htm. Last accessed January, 2009. 
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maintaining and restoring the health of the lands entrusted to its care.” A new Ecosystem 
Management Office was established in the Forest Service Washington Office and in 1994 
the Ecosystem Management Interdisciplinary Team produced A National Framework – 
Ecosystem Management to accompany the ethics outlined in the Course to the Future that 
identified four key components: 
 It includes understanding the role of fire, insects and disease, and drought 
cycles in shaping ecosystems and bringing that understanding to bear in 
national forest management decisions and actions. 
 
 It requires developing and using measures of ecosystem sustainability while 
supporting the quality of life in those ecosystems (in rural, suburban, and 
urban settings). The effects of human use and habitation on ecosystem 
sustainability must be evaluated. 
 
 It manages ecosystems to provide the uses, values, products, and services 
sought by the American people from national forest and grassland resources, 
including water, recreation opportunities, timber, minerals, fish, wildlife, 
forage, wilderness, cultural heritage, and aesthetics, while maintaining 
ecosystem health and diversity. 
 
 Its workforce reflects the cultural and disciplinary diversity needed to provide 
the skills and abilities as well as the public partnerships and collaboration 
required for the effective interdisciplinary application of the ecosystem 
approach to managing multiple uses. The workforce is empowered to carry 
out the mission of the national forests and grasslands with accountability for 
achieving negotiated objectives. 
 
The fire season of 1994 again brought attention to the problems plaguing fire 
management and policy when 34 firefighters lost their lives, 14 on Storm King Mountain 
during the South Canyon Fire on the White River National Forest (Butler et. al, 1998). 
Chief Thomas chartered the Western Forest Health Initiative which released its report in 
October 1994 (USDA Forest Service, 1995). The report recommended addressing the 
problem of catastrophic fire by restoring ecological processes and focusing on priority 
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ecosystems. Particular emphasis was placed on low severity high frequency fire regimes, 
particularly low elevation ponderosa pine where ecological alteration was thought to be 
the most severe - the forests Weaver had warned about in 1943. These forests had been 
subject to the most intensive land use practices and where there was greater consensus on 
the need for management action since this fire regime also tended to encompass much of 
the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). It also recommended a review of the interagency 
fire policy reaffirmed after the 1988 fires to bring it in line with the new mission and 
objectives of ecosystem management. 
 
While the interagency Fire and Aviation Executive Board began work on the 
review of interagency fire policy, Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management began its 
own internal review of the agency’s fire policy. The resulting report, Course to the 
Future: Positioning Fire and Aviation Management, released in May 1995 (USDA Forest 
Service, 1995 hereafter FAM Course to the Future)25 recommended that: 
 By the year 2005, establish a multi-funded, interdisciplinary account for 
restoration and maintenance of fire dependent ecosystems. 
 
 Develop a workforce capable of achieving, restoring, and protecting these 
ecosystems at this scale. 
 
 Establish prescribed fire objectives and assess fire consequences into the 
land management planning process. 
 
 Intensify training of line officers to better redeem fire management 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 The FAM Course to the Future was an internal document that could not be obtained for this research. 
The information referenced here is derived from descriptions in An Agency Strategy for Fire Management: 
A Report from the National Management Review Team, USDA Forest Service (2000a) as well as in 
Schuster et al. (1997), Cleaves et al. (1999) and GAO (1999a). 
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The FAM Course to the Future proposed a massive expansion of fuels 
management, based on an estimated 39 million acres of Forest Service land at risk of 
severe fires, primarily in the West.26 Not all of these acres needed direct treatment 
according to the FAM Course to the Future. Rather, what was recommended was 
strategic planning for “landscape-scale prescribed burning,” an expansion from roughly 
570,000 to 3 million acres annually by fiscal year 2005.27 This recommended six-fold 
increase represented a significant shift in the role of fuels management within Forest 
Service land management and planning. Forest Service economic reviews of fire and fuel 
related practices and expenditures between 1979 to 1995 by the same team that derived 
the 39 million acre figure (e.g. Schuster et al., 1997, Cleaves et al. 1999, 2000) suggests 
that the projects undertaken by fuels management were almost entirely determined by the 
objectives of other resource management programs, primarily timber management (for 
logging slash disposal), silviculture (for vegetation management and site preparation) and 
wildlife management (for habitat improvement). Cleaves et al. (1999) found that 
nationally slash disposal burning accounted for just over 25% of the acres treated but 
75% of the number of burning operations conducted per year, accounting for an estimated 
                                                          
26 The 39 million acre estimate was derived from a separate internal report titled Fire Economic Assessment Report 
(Bell, 1995). This report was also unavailable for this research. Information on the contents of this report was 
derived from Schuster et al. (1997), Cleaves et al. (1999) and GAO (1999a). 
27 Cited in Cleaves et al. (1999). It should be noted that a “landscape” is not a scale and the term 
“landscape-scale” is thus rather enigmatic if not outright misleading. See Allen (1998) who also states the 
term “landscape-level” also promotes confusion. The most consistent use of the term seems to refer to any 
area larger than a forest stand or treatment unit. Landscape-scale (as well as landscape-level) is also often 
used to refer to a watershed or sub-watershed in the USGS hydrologic unit code (HUC) classification 
system (e.g. 5th level or 6th level HUC respectively) just as ecosystems are often delineated by HUCs for 
practical management purposes (such as conducting ecosystem analysis at the watershed scale (EAWS). 
This term, however, will be used through out this paper and is intended only to refer to whatever it is that 
that managers and researcher themselves are referring to. 
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63% of total annual burning costs.28 In the western Forest Service regions (1-6), slash 
disposal accounted for 43.5% of acres treated.29 
 
Moreover, because the history of fuels management was, for the most part, 
composed of prescribed burning, the proposed massive increase in fuels management 
discussed in the FAM Course to the Future, and these economic assessments upon which 
it was based, considered this increase to also be carried out mostly through burning; both 
prescribed fire and prescribed natural fire.30 Mechanical treatments, such as pre-
commercial and commercial thinning, was treated as a vital yet separate component of 
fuels treatment. They are the purview of other programs – vegetation (silviculture) and 
timber management. Under this proposed massive increase in prescribed fire and 
prescribed natural fire following the recommendations of the FAM Course to the Future, 
the objectives of fuels management would no longer be defined solely by the goals and 
objectives of these other resource management programs. Fire and fuels management 
objectives - landscape-scale prescribed fire - was to inform the establishment of desired 
future conditions in forest planning alongside the objectives of other resource 
management programs and what the FAM Course to the Future called “prescribed fire 
                                                          
28 Schuster et al (1997) note that   “Comprehensive information on the extent and expense of fuel treatment 
does not exist…We could not determine whether fuel treatment expenditures were for burning or some 
other method of fuel reduction…The current Forest Service accounting structure allows for more than 20 
different work activity codes to be recorded under fuels-related fund codes. But only a subset (the PF-2's) 
pertain to on-the-ground applications of fuel treatment, and only a subset of those concern prescribed 
burning. Fuel treatment (including prescribed burning) expenditures are recorded under work activity codes 
for activity fuels reduction (PF-25) and natural fuels treatments (PF-24), including management-ignited 
(PF-242) and prescribed natural fire (PF-241).” 
29 Derived from data in Cleaves et al. (2000), which provided breakdowns by region but only summarized 
percentages nationally. 
30 See for example the background section of the interagency report A Strategy for Increasing Fuels 
Treatment on Federal Lands in the Pacific Northwest (1999) available at 
http://www.fusee.org/docs/fuelbreaks/strategy_fuel_treatment.html. Last accessed June, 2009. 
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objectives” and “fire consequences” were to be incorporated into the objectives, selection 
and design of timber and vegetation management projects. 
 
The recommendations of the FAM Course to the Future tied this more active and 
role for fire and fuels management directly to the new agency mission of ecosystem 
management.31 Fire and Aviation Management leadership, in other words, aligned itself 
with the new Forest Service leadership in order to re-engage the very same themes that 
had been debated in the 1970s - and summarily ignored in the first round of forest 
planning – on the meaning and purpose of fire and fuels management and its role in 
determining land management objectives and how these are incorporated into planning 
and decisionmaking. Jerry Williams (1995), then Forest Service Assistant Director for 
Fire Operations, described the new more involved role envisioned for fire management 
under the new paradigm of ecosystem management this way: 
The Forest Service will more completely develop and communicate the 
scientific rationale behind management of fire-adapted ecosystems…Align 
fire management programs to better complement one another… 
(prevention, pre-suppression, suppression, fuel management, and 
prescribed fire use) will be fully integrated, better reflect a common 
purpose, and complement one another toward an ecosystem management 
objective. These goals and actions signal important changes for Forest 
Service fire and aviation management. They require…an improved, more 
balanced fire management approach to land and resource management 
(Williams, 1995, p. 140). 
 
  
The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy & Program Review Report 
(USDA and USDOI, 1995, hereafter Federal Fire Policy) released in December, 1995 is 
remarkably similar to the FAM Course to the Future, unsurprising, perhaps, given the 
                                                          
31 The title Course to the Future: Positioning Fire and Aviation Management, was even adopted from the 
internal review in which the new mission of ecosystem management was announced - The Forest Service 
Ethics and Course to the Future. 
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Forest Service remains the dominant agency in federal fire management. The Federal 
Fire Policy restated the general consensus on the existence of a massive wildfire and 
fuels problem and framed the necessary response squarely in terms of ecosystem 
management. The dominant themes that had been emerging to plague federal fire 
management since Weaver articulated his warnings in the early 1940’s and again widely 
discussed in the early 1970s when fire control became fire management were reaffirmed: 
Although ecological knowledge and theories have evolved relatively 
quickly, the scope and process of land management have had difficulty 
keeping pace. Ecological processes, including fire and other disturbance, 
and changing landscape conditions are often not integrated into land 
management planning and decisions. With few exceptions, existing land 
management planning…is based on single-program goals that…preclude 
the ecosystem perspective in land management planning. This type of 
planning can result in an inefficient, fragmented, short-term approach to 
management that tends to ignore broad, interdisciplinary-based, long-term 
resource issues…Land management agencies now recognize the need to 
break down these barriers and seek cooperative, ecologically sound 
approaches to land management on a landscape scale. One way to break 
down these barriers is to involve all interests, including the public, 
scientists, resource specialists, and regulators, throughout the planning 
process (USDA and USDOI, 1995, p. 8). 
 
 
“The task before us – the reintroducing fire – is both urgent and enormous” the 
Federal Fire Policy states. The executive summary begins. The Federal Fire Policy is an 
outline of principles, goals and organizational capacities interagency fire management 
should strive towards in an evolving process of organizational change. The central thrust 
of the Federal Fire Policy was to promote “a balance between suppression to protect life, 
property, and resources, and fire use to regulate fuels and maintain healthy ecosystems.” 
(Zimmerman and Bunnell, 2000, p. 289). This was to be accomplished by the 
incorporation and integration of these goals and principles into fire and fuels management 
planning and operations guidance of each federal agency in order to, as the memorandum 
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accompanying the review put it, “move our approach to wildland fire management 
beyond the traditional realms of fire suppression by further integrating fire into the 
management of our lands and resources in an ongoing and systematic manner, consistent 
with public health and environmental quality considerations.”32 The first four “key 
points” in the executive summary largely capture these goals and principles of the fire 
Federal Fire Policy: 
 Protection of human life is reaffirmed as the first priority in wildland fire 
management. Property and natural/cultural resources jointly become the second 
priority, with protection decisions based on values to be protected and other 
considerations. 
 
 Wildland fire, as a critical natural process, must be reintroduced into the 
ecosystem. This will be accomplished across agency boundaries and will be based 
upon the best available science. 
 
 Agencies will create an organizational climate that supports employees who 
implement a properly planned program to reintroduce wildland fire. 
 
 Where wildland fire cannot be safely reintroduced because of hazardous fuel 
build-ups, some form of pretreatment must be considered, particularly in 
wildland/urban interface areas. 
 
 
The Federal Fire Policy was rather vague on details but explicit that current plans 
and planning processes are entirely inadequate (for both land management plans and the 
fire management and project plans that must tier to them, as was pointed out in the 
previous fire policy review following the fires of 1988). The Federal Fire Policy was 
followed by the interagency Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy: 
Implementation Procedures Reference Guide released in 1998 (USDA and USDOI, 1998, 
hereafter Reference Guide) which provided additional “direction, guidance, and 
assistance in interpreting the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy.” In this 
                                                          
32 No page number given. 
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Reference Guide the term “prescribed natural fire” was replaced with “wildland fire use” 
(WFU) and the term “appropriate suppression response” was replaced with “appropriate 
management response” (AMR) to emphasize the move away from the historical emphasis 
on suppression and control: 
Agencies must ensure that wildland fire management is fully integrated 
into land management planning. Every Agency Administrator must ensure 
that these policies are incorporated into all wildland fire management 
actions. Managers and staff personnel must actively embrace and 
implement the recommendations. Every employee of every agency must 
be committed to fully carry out implementation at the ground level. 
Agencies must change their expectations that all wildland fires can and 
should be controlled and suppressed (USDA and DOI, 1998, p. 4). 
 
 
The Reference Guide described, in only slightly more detail than the Federal Fire 
Policy itself, what the various planning levels entail, how they are supposed to “tier” to 
one another and what the general content of each level of planning should include. Table 
1 from the Reference Guide, for example, describes the relationship between land 
management plans, fire management plans, and project-level plans for prescribed fire and 
fuels management.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Reformatted from table in Reference Guide p. 20. 
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Table 1 Tiered Fire Management Planning (From Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management 
Policy: Implementation Procedures Reference Guide, USDA and USDOI, 1998) 
Land Management Plan, 
NEPA (as applicable) 
Fire Management Plan, 
NEPA (as applicable) 
Wildland Fire Situation 
Analysis, 
NEPA (as needed), and/or 
Project-Level Analysis 
1. Establishes the desired 
condition for management 
area (e.g. percent of area 
within a successional stage) 
1. Describes the desired 
condition in context of fire 
management parameters 
1. Develops alternatives 
from forest plan 
management -area desired 
conditions 
2. Establishes air-quality 2. Describes operational 
procedures that meet 
land management plan 
objectives (i.e. number 
of planned ignitions 
occurring at one time) 
2. Uses site-specific 
analysis of particulate 
production and plume 
drift 
3. Establishes a range of 
acceptable management 
practices 
3. Describes operational 
procedures to implement 
acceptable management 
practices 
3. Identifies site-specific 
implementation practices 
4. Establishes fuel-
treatment priorities 
4. Schedules fuel-treatment 
projects for management 
areas 
4. Implements projects 
within the context of 
established priorities 
 
 
The lack of specificity and the sense of earnest pleading rather than explicit 
direction in the Federal Fire Policy and the Reverence Guide is due in part to the fact that 
land management planning was itself fraught with uncertainty. Forest plan revisions 
under the NFMA were due and expected to begin shortly. A new proposed planning rule 
was released a month before the FAM Course to the Future but was withdrawn later that 
year.34 Nonetheless, the ecosystem management approach had been found legally sound 
in litigation over the North West Forest Plan. The District Court for the Western District 
of Washington noted in its 1994 decision upholding the plan noted that “[g]iven the 
current condition of the forests, there is no way the agencies could comply with the 
                                                          
34 60 Fed. Reg. 18886 (April 13, 1995). 
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environmental laws without planning on an ecosystem basis” (in GAOb, 1999, p. 11).35 
How fire management was to be integrated into land management based on the 
ecosystem management approach remained unclear. Teensma (1996, p. 81) noted for 
example that: 
Efforts to integrate fire management into land management planning date 
back at least to the early1970s…land managers and government regulators 
had become concerned about the environmental impacts of a highly 
effective fire suppression policy and…a concern that managers were not 
listening to those with knowledge of the ecological role of fire and its 
beneficial uses. It may seem discouraging that we are attempting to 
resolve some of the same issues and problems 20 years later…The 
essential question remains, ‘How do we integrate fire into land 
management planning? 
 
3.3.1 Ecosystem Management: Taking Fire Ecology Seriously 
 
The Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project (ICBEMP, USDA 
Forest Service USDOI Bureau of Land Management, 1994) was initiated shortly after 
FEMAT responding to President Clinton’s direction to "develop a scientifically sound 
and ecosystem-based strategy for management of eastside forests."36 Forest Service 
participation in the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project (SNEP), initiated by Congress in 
1992, vastly expanded. Theses efforts attempted to focus on whole ecosystems through 
an expanded set of scientific disciplines, such as landscape and disturbance ecology 
practiced by the so called “o-ologists,”37 as well as broad-based participation of the 
public in the analysis and planning process. Whatever landscape-scale fire and fuels 
management was to mean within the as yet to be revised land management plans, it seems 
it was to be worked out alongside increased research into fire behavior and fire ecology 
                                                          
35 This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1996 (GAOb, 1999). 
36 ICBEMP website, available at http://www.icbemp.gov/. Last accessed January 20, 2009. 
37 Wilkinson (1998). 
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to provide the content for these planning levels (such as “the desired condition in context 
of fire management parameters” in the table 1 above). The research branch of the Forest 
Service was fully supportive of these new initiatives surrounding ecosystem management 
with its heavy emphasis on science and numerous research efforts were undertaken 
focused specifically on fire and fuels management to answer just this question. Another 
implementation action called for in the Federal Fire Policy Implementation Plan was 
initiated in 1998 establishing the Joint Fire Sciences Program to expand agency and 
academic research and provide the “best available science” on fire ecology and behavior 
for incorporation into land management plan revisions and Fire Management Plans in 
order to reintroduce fire to the landscape and expand WFU through AMR. 
 
The early advocates of employing fire in forest management, such as Harold 
Weaver and Harold Biswell, became sages among researchers advocating for restoration 
forestry. Arno (1996, p. 4), summarizing the proceedings of a conference titled “The use 
of Fire in Forest Restoration” in a chapter titled The Seminal Importance of Fire In 
Ecosystem Management – Impetus for this Publication noted that “perhaps the most 
widely recognized example of the negative effects of fire exclusion is the “forest health” 
problem on tens of millions of acres in the ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) and related 
forests of the Inland West…Ironically, a government forester named Harold Weaver 
(1943) identified the problem almost 50 years ago…” Numerous agency research projects 
were initiated with titles like Ecosystem Management, Forest Health and Silviculture 
(Kaufman and Regan, 1995). 
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Fire history and ecology, by its very nature, focused on statistical patterns and 
variation of fire effects over time and space linking it easily to concepts central to 
ecosystem management, concepts such as biodiversity, species viability, sustainability 
and resilience. Heinselman’s concept of the natural fire regime became linked with 
concepts from landscape and disturbance ecology, principally the concept of the “natural” 
or “historic” range of variability (HRV). From modeling work conducted for ICBEMP 
the HRV concept became the means of defining the bounds of sustainability and 
departure from HRV as a measure of ecosystem health (Quigley and Arbelbride, 1997). 
The concept of HRV, according to Morgan et al. (1994, p. 91-92) was developed as a 
means of describing the importance of ecological disturbance processes such as fire to the 
overall dynamics of ecosystems: 
Understanding ecosystem function and the magnitude of current 
departures from historical conditions can help identify risks to ecosystem 
sustainability…The historical range of variability provides researchers and 
managers with a reference against which to evaluate present ecosystem 
change. This is useful both for describing ecosystem dynamics and for 
measuring the effects of management activities. For example, the 
historical range of variability is useful as a standard in cumulative effects 
analyses of environmental impacts resulting from multiple management 
activities. 
 
 
In 1997 the Forest Service’s Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research 
Station in Missoula, Montana began the Fire Regimes for Fuels Management and Fire 
Use project, soon followed by the Ecosystems at Risk project. These were combined after 
receiving funding in the first round of projects sponsored by the newly established Joint 
Fire Sciences Program. This project eventually resulted in the coarse-scale (one KM2 
pixels) map for the entire continental United States of historic fire regimes, based on a 
classification similar to those advocated by Heinselman’s (1978, 1981) pushing for 
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inclusion of fire ecology in forest management in the 1970s. The departure of current 
conditions from these historic fire regimes, called condition class, a concept similar to 
departure from HRV.38 While some of the data was available for analysis in late 1999, 
the coarse scale fire regime condition class (FRCC) map was not published until 2001 
and was to become a central feature in the continuing effort – and controversy – over fire 
management and its relationship to land management planning and decision making 
following the fires of 2000. 
3.3.2  Tensions over a Shifting Mission 
 
While leadership within the Forest Service were advancing the ecosystem 
management approach and fire management was expanding the role of fire within this 
approach, there were many who opposed the shift in the agency’s mission and the 
proposed increase in wildland fire use (WFU) in particular. Some have suggested this is 
because of the perceived loss of control over the Forest Service mission to the “o-
ologists” and to the public with its attendant shift from the traditional utilitarian 
perspectives and objectives of professional forestry and forest resource protection - the 
historical heart and soul of the Forest Service. Franklin (1998) noted that: 
Development of a new social consensus on the management of forest 
resources is proving to be much more challenging than most participants 
and onlookers imagined…Development of new information and its 
application in forest management are particularly difficult problems 
because the new information can alter basic premises and undermine 
assumptions (Franklin, 1998, p. 134). 
 
 
Whatever their motives, the influence of those resistant to change within the 
                                                          
38 Strictly speaking, condition class is a classification of departure from the mean rather than a measure of 
range of variability itself. Hardy et al. (2001) and Schmidt et al. (2002) do not describe condition class as 
departure form HRV though it will later be described as such by others e.g. Hann. et al (2003) and in the 
project scale FRCC assessment protocol developed by Hann and others released initially in 2003. 
 - 63 -  
agency was substantial, and they were not alone. Mrowka (2003), a silviculturist by 
training who worked with Chief’s Thomas and Dombeck on many efforts to galvanize 
internal support to institutionalize ecosystem management, called this contingent of 
agency managers opposed to this shift the “back to basics proponents.” These managers 
“silently resisted” these changes because of their faith in traditional utilitarian forestry, 
focused on forest stand vigor achieved through active management using tried and true 
silvicultural techniques. This faith in traditional forestry was accompanied by a lack of 
faith that the pressing forest health crisis could be resolved through a vastly expanded 
landscape analysis and planning processes encompassing a vastly expanded conception of 
forest health with no clearly defined or accepted definitions for such things as ecosystems 
themselves, their sustainability or how to measure their historic range of variability, not 
to mention the required inclusion of a wide array of new disciplines and the public which 
would only bog down the needed work in endless debate. 
 
At the same time that the ecosystem management concept was being fleshed out 
in the early and mid 1990s, with the initiation of large regional efforts of the FEMAT and 
ICBEMP assessments (to put “meat on the skeletal dicta” of a new direction for Forest 
Service land management) another response to the challenges facing forest management, 
particularly the specter of “catastrophic wildfires,” took the form of a “forest health 
crisis.” This framing of the problem focused more narrowly on structural characteristics 
of forest density rather than the functional characteristics of ecological processes 
emphasized in ecosystem management. The traditional emphasis on active forest 
management was reframed from its focus on timber management to a focus on forest 
restoration through silvicultural treatments. This framing of the forest health crisis 
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emphasized the need for immediate action. This framing of the problem was put forth in 
the report released by the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters, established by 
Congress following the 1988 fires.39 Sampson et al. (1994) warned that without “the 
application of needed silvicultural treatments within a fairly short time (15-30 years), 
there is great danger that over the next century this region's forest legacy will be a series 
of large, uniform landscapes recovering from wildfires and other widespread ecosystem 
setbacks.”40 
 
A coalition of sorts formed between these back to basics proponents, the forest 
products industry and their congressional backers. This coalition perceived the forest 
health crisis and the problem of severe wildfire to be the result of constraints on active 
forest management. The forest health crises and the problem of increasing catastrophic 
fire was their ticket for reversing the precipitous drop in timber production since the 
spotted owl controversy. The Quincy Library Group, formed in northern California in 
response to the controversy and litigation over the California spotted owl habitat and the 
resulting decline in timber harvesting, released its Community Stability Proposal in 1993 
which said very little regarding fuel reduction and the problem of severe fire. After 1994 
most of the group’s proposals were couched in terms of thinning to reduce catastrophic 
fire, promote forest health and sustain the local forest products industry. This culminated 
in the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act of 1997.41 The 
salvage timber sale rider in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions 
                                                          
39 Wildfire Disaster Recovery Act of 1989, later Public Law 101-286 of May, 1990. 
40 Sampson was the chairman of the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters. 
41 See for example, the Quincy Library Group (QLG) archives at http://qlg.org/. See also the description of 
QLC at the Red Lodge Clearinghouse 
http://rlch.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=238&Itemid=36 as well as the critical 
review of QLC by Inglesby (1997) at http://www.fusee.org/docs/fuelbreaks/fuelbreak_schemes_copy.html 
Last accessed June 2009. 
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Act (1995), for example, expedited timber sales on burned federal lands that had 
previously been disallowed in order to protect threatened and endangered species by 
exempting them from administrative appeal, limiting their judicial review and easing 
environmental analysis requirements. The stated purpose of salvage projects by their 
proponents went beyond the old arguments of “recovering wasted resources” and touted 
forest health restoration and fire hazard reduction.42 Many environmental groups, for this 
reason, dismissed the idea of a forest health crisis outright as nothing more than an 
excuse to increase logging.43 Others drew a sharp distinction between forest health and 
ecosystem health by noting the utilitarian values of resource production implicit in a 
narrow focus on tree sizes, densities and tree “predators” (severe fire, insects and 
mistletoe) that characterize the discussion of a forest health by timber interests and their 
Congressional backers’ while ecosystem health encompasses the “full range” of complex 
ecological processes, e.g. those studied by the “o-ologists” such as nutrient cycling, patch 
dynamics and forest edge effects on succession and species habitat requirements (Kolb et 
al, 1994). With the meaning of forest and/or ecosystem health undefined and hotly 
disputed the nature of restoration and the type, intensity and scale of the needed 
treatments were also hotly disputed. The Congressional Research Service (1995, p. 1) 
noted that: 
Many observers suggested that the extent and severity of the fires was 
largely due to the poor health of the national forests of the West. It is 
widely accepted that livestock grazing, timber harvesting, and fire 
suppression over the past century have led to unnatural conditions -- 
excessive biomass (too many trees and dead woody material) and altered 
species mix -- in the pine forests of the West; these conditions make the 
                                                          
42 See for example the review of the issue by the Congressional Research Service (1996) Forest Fires and 
Forest Health, available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Forests/for-
17.cfm?&CFID=12099146&CFTOKEN=60937532 Last accessed September, 2009. 
43 “There’s No such thing as a Forest Health Crisis.” New York Times, Monday, May 8, 1995. 
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forests more susceptible to drought, insect and disease epidemics, and 
other forest-wide catastrophes (including large 
wildfires)…However…[t]he damages of wildfires on lands and resources 
are often overstated…The recognition of…ecological benefits from fire 
was a major factor in the end of the 10-acre and 10:00 a.m. policies and 
their replacement with fuel management and prescribed fire (natural and 
otherwise). Finally, the possible extent of fuel management and forest 
health activities is largely undefined. To date, the discussions of 
prescribed burning, salvage sales, and other fuel management or forest 
health activities have identified neither the acreage needing treatment nor 
the likely treatment costs. 
 
Opposition from the Old Guard 
 
Forest Service Chief Thomas resigned in frustration in 1996, complaining that the 
efforts to comply with the Salvage Rider in particular side-tracked efforts to introduce 
more analysis and scientific evidence into agency decision making (Anderson 1999). 
Thomas was replaced (with his support) by Michael Dombeck in early 1997 (Anderson 
1999). Dombeck, who previously served as acting director of the Bureau of Land 
Management and holds a Ph.D. in fisheries biology, was another break with Forest 
Service culture and precedent. Tensions within Congress remained high. In 1997 
Congress placed a moratorium on forest plan revisions until new planning regulations 
were established. Secretary of Agriculture Glickman soon thereafter appointed a 
Committee of Scientists to develop guidance and recommendations for these new 
regulations as was done with the first round of forest plan regulation development in the 
late 1970s. Dombeck, however, moved aggressively with efforts to shift the agency away 
from the dominant utilitarian focus on timber production towards ecosystem 
management. Within his first two years as chief he replaced seven of nine regional 
foresters and all six deputy chiefs and renamed the Timber Management division the 
Forest Ecosystem division. Dombeck noted that "Over the past 50 years, the watershed 
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purpose of the Forest Service has not been a co-equal partner with providing other 
resource uses such as timber production. In fact, watershed purposes were sometimes 
viewed as a ‘constraint’ to timber management" (Anderson 1999, online, no page 
number). 
 
Also in 1997 Representative Bob Smith Oregon (R. OR) introduced “The Forest 
Recovery and Protection Act” (H.R. 2515) which would have relied on revenue 
generating activity, principally timber harvesting, to fund forest restoration. Oregon 
Governor John Kitzhaber led the charge against the bill noting that "[m]ost of the needed 
treatments generate little if any revenue. We cannot fall back into the practice of heavy 
overstory removal to generate revenue, or the health of our forests will continue to 
decline" (Kitzhaber 1997, online, no page).44 The issue of institutionalized financial 
incentives for timber harvesting brought about by permanently appropriated trust funds 
and special accounts (such as the Salvage Sale Fund, the Knutson-Vandenberg Fund and 
the Brush Disposal Fund) that are financed by retaining a portion of timber sale receipts, 
became a central target of chief Dombeck’s attempted reforms. These funds, according to 
the Congressional Research Service (2000) provided an incentive to National Forests to 
focus on timber production because a portion of the timber sale receipts are retained by 
the forest for use on later projects.45 These conflicts over forest management and funding 
soon engulfed the issue of fuels management since, as discussed earlier, fuels 
                                                          
44  Statement issued by Governor Kitzhaber: Governor responds to Congressman Bob Smith’s Forest 
Health Bill. Available at 
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/governors/Kitzhaber/web_pages/governor/press/p971008.htm Last accessed 
January, 2008. The bill eventually failed to pass a house vote in 1998. 
45 A portion of these receipts also go to state and county treasuries in lieu of taxes on federal land .This 
complicated issue is beyond the scope of this research but has been the subject of long running critiques of 
agency accountability regarding incentives for timber production and subsidized logging. See for example 
O’Toole (1988); Congressional Research Service (1994, 2000bc, 2004) and Oppenheimer (2001). 
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management up until the mid 1990’s was predominantly focused on slash disposal and 
the principle source of funding for this activity was the Brush Disposal Fund. Congress 
tasked the General Accounting Office (GAO) later in 1997 with reviewing the Forest 
Service’s efforts to address the “growing threats to national forest resources and nearby 
communities from catastrophic wildfire” and in particular how the agency intended to 
fund this effort. 
 
3.3.3 The GAO’s Call for a Cohesive Strategy 
 
The tensions and conflicts between Forest Service leadership pushing the new 
mission of ecosystem management and the old guard, back to basic proponents within the 
agency resisting this shift is evident in description of the goals and objectives of the 
Forest Service’s first Strategic Plan for 1997 to 2002, as required by the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA 1993)46 and the first accomplishment report 
released in 1997 under the Act’s pilot phase. The first goal of the Strategic Plan reflects 
the new mission of ecosystem management - “Ensure Sustainable Ecosystems.” 
Objective 1.2 under this goal is “Ecological integrity of forested ecosystems restored or 
protected to maintain biological and physical components, functions and 
interrelationships, and the capability for self-renewal.” 47 It is under this first Goal and 
objective 1.2 that fuel management accomplishments are to be reported. The first 
accomplishment report however lists accomplishments under this first goal using 
                                                          
46 USDA Strategic Plan 1997-2002: A Healthy and Productive Nation in Harmony With the Land, Forest 
Service Strategic Plan, USDA, Office of the Secretary (Sept. 30, 1997). There are three strategic goals 
identified: Goal 2 is “Provide multiple benefits for people within the capabilities of the ecosystem”; and 3 
is “Ensure organizational effectiveness”. 
47 Report of the Forest Service 1997, p1. Available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pl/pdb/97report/overview.pdf. 
Last accessed May, 2009. 
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traditional timber management criteria and measures characteristic of the objectives of 
the back to basics proponents: 
The number of acres treated annually through the regular and salvage 
timber sale programs is indicative of the extent of maintenance and 
restoration of forested ecosystems on NFS lands and the implementation 
of forest plan goals and objectives. Timber sales are usually designed to 
incorporate multiple objectives, which may include insect and disease 
control, fuels treatment, and habitat restoration in addition to the 
production of wood. Because of this, reporting accomplishments in terms 
of acres treated better reflects the work being done to accomplish these 
objectives than do other measures of accomplishment (USDA Forest 
Service 1997, p. 4). 
 
 
The only reference to the Fire and Aviation Management program states that 
“…the agency champions firefighter and public safety, supports the role of fire in 
restoring and sustaining healthy ecosystems, and integrates fire and aviation management 
into the land management planning process” (USDA Forest Service 1997, p. 7). The 
agency’s first annual performance report, under goal 1 objective 1.2 (ecological integrity) 
the report states: 
Nearly 1.5 million acres of prescribed burning and other fuel reduction 
treatments in 1998 enhanced forest health and diversity by reducing 
wildfire intensity, protected vulnerable urban-wildland interface areas, 
promoted forage productivity, and restored fire-dependent 
ecosystems…Stand improvements…such as precommercial thinning, have 
improved forest health by reducing stand density and allowing the 
remaining stand to grow more vigorously. More vigorous stands reduce 
the potential for insect and disease outbreaks and high-intensity fires, both 
of which impair forest health…Commercial timber harvests can be 
another tool used to improve and restore forest health.48 
 
It was precisely the kind of disconnected prattle between the stated mission and 
actions that the GAO’s 1998 report targeted - a disconnect between the stated mission of 
                                                          
48 USDA Forest Service, Results Act Performance and Accountability Report (1999). Webpage, no page 
numbers. Available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pl/pdb/98report/07_gpra_goal_1.html Last accessed May, 2009. 
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ecosystem management in which disturbance processes such as high severity fire are to 
play their natural ecological role, on the one hand, and, on the other, measuring 
accomplishment towards this goal with indicators such as stand vigor characteristic of the 
agency’s traditional timber production mission – a perspective that, as the above passage 
makes clear, treats all high-intensity fire as impairing forest health. In testimony before 
Congress the GAO (1998, p. 2) explicitly pointed out this disconnect in the agency’s 
stated mission and its accomplishment reporting of efforts towards achieving this mission 
in noting that: 
The agency has taken an important first step toward becoming accountable 
for its performance by making clear that its overriding mission and 
funding priority, consistent with its existing legislative framework, has 
shifted from producing goods and services to maintaining and restoring 
the health of the lands entrusted to its care. However, it has not identified 
the actions required to correct decade-old problems with its data, 
measurement, and reporting. 
  
 
While the GAO has regularly criticized the Forest Service and its individual 
programs and practices to little avail,49 the report resulting from this review of Forest 
Service fuels management was to have a unusual impact on subsequent development of 
federal fire management and policy (though not a resolution of the problems the GAO 
identified). The Forest Service’s response was completed just before the fires of 2000. It 
was not released, however, until afterwards and became one of the three documents of 
making up the National Fire Plan. Subsequently, some of its concepts found their way 
into the legislative and administrative enactments of the President Bush’s Healthy Forest 
                                                          
49 Similar findings on this subject of accountability and the relationship between goals, measures and 
funding stretch back to 1988 (GAO 1988) and have continued with the latest in 2009 (GAO, 2009ab). The 
agency has also been criticized over problems of funding and accountability with respect to the backlog of 
timber stand improvement (TSI) treatments paid for with timber receipts (K-V funds) which are 
predominantly pre-commercial treatments now also considered fuel treatments and restarting and 
developing an adequate prescribed fire program GAO (1990), issues directly related to the problem of fuels 
management within the agency. 
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Initiative (2002) - though in an abridged and misrepresentative manner contrary to their 
intent. 
 
The GAO’s report Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy is needed to 
Address Catastrophic wildfire Threats was released in April, 1999 (GAO, 1999a). The 
GAO report repeated agency leadership’s line that “[d]uring the 1990s, the Forest Service 
began to address the unintended consequences of its policy of putting out wildfires” and 
that past forest planning efforts “did not adequately consider historical fire disturbance 
cycles.” It was for the most part, however, a scathing rebuke of the agency’s failure to 
implement its own stated fire and fuels management policy, updated twice in the wake of 
the 1988 fires. 
 
The GAO’s principle criticism was that the agency proposes a six fold increase in 
fuels management acreage to address the estimated 39 million acres at risk but that the 
agency also says not all of these 39 million acres necessarily requires active treatment. 
However, the GAO pointed out, the agency has no strategy or systematic approach for 
differentiating which areas need treatment, what kind of treatments are necessary or how 
much it will cost. The GAO stated that the agency needs better data and a better data 
collection process and a cohesive strategy to systematically identify, prioritize and design 
these treatments. The focus of such a strategy, according the GAO, must be on 
illustrating how reducing risk will be accomplished consistent with the agency’s other 
stewardship responsibilities. 
 
The reliance on the timber program for fuels reduction and using acres treated as 
the measure of accomplishment was singled out for particular criticism precisely because 
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the objectives of the timber program are driven by funding and targets incentives that are 
not aligned with the objectives of wildfire hazard reduction and restoring the ecological 
role of fire, let alone other stewardship responsibilities of the agency’s other resource 
management programs such as wildlife habitat and water quality. The bulk of hazardous 
fuels, the GAO pointed out, is non-merchantable surface fuels or small diameter trees and 
that areas that present the highest hazard may not be in areas with merchantable timber. 
The GAO also pointed out and timber management itself creates hazardous fuels in the 
form of slash and the timber program often conducts activities that are difficult to 
reconcile with the agency’s other stewardship objectives making the needed fuels 
management projects more controversial and time consuming. 
 
According to the GAO, the timber program’s favored metric of acres treated, as 
noted in the above GPRA report, is poorly correlated with reduction of fire risk whether 
in terms of risk presented by fire or risk presented by treatments to other stewardship 
objectives and legal requirements, such as species viability and water quality. At the 
same time, the GAO points out, the use of acres treated as a metric of accomplishment 
exerts pressure on local units to meet acreage targets that may further exacerbates the 
difficulty of reconciling these various management objectives, especially fire risk 
reduction on the one hand and restoring the role of fire on the other, pointing out that 135 
species of threatened, endangered or rare plants in the United States benefit from wildfire 
or are found in fire-adapted ecosystems. 
 
The report acknowledged the lack of consensus within the agency and among 
outside experts and the public on what constitutes forest and/or ecosystem health, an 
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issue it had reported on previously (GAO, 1994, 1997a). It also acknowledge that this 
lack of consensus was related to and confounded by the lack of data on fire risk and 
ecosystem health necessary for the identification and prioritization of areas at risk, the 
design of appropriate treatments and the measurement of their effectiveness. To address 
these issues the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of 
the Forest Service to develop and present to Congress a “cohesive strategy” for managing 
fuels consistent with its overall mission and legal obligations. Such a strategy, the GAO 
stated, would facilitate achieving some measure of consensus over conflicting definitions 
of forest and ecosystem health and facilitate agreement on the needed treatments. The 
GAO recommended the cohesive strategy include specific steps for: 
1. acquiring the data needed to establish meaningful performance measures 
and goals for fuel reduction, 
 
2. identifying ways of better reconciling different fuel reduction approaches 
with other stewardship objectives, and 
 
3. identifying changes in incentives and statutorily defined contracting 
procedures that would better facilitate the accomplishment of fuel 
reduction goals.50 
 
Forest Service Fire & Aviation Management Response to the GAO 
 
In its initial response, included as an appendix to the GAO’s report, the Forest 
Service stated that “We are committed to complete such a strategy in a timely 
manner…We envision this strategy to be fully integrated with all of the Forest Service 
missions and program areas, not just a strategy for the Hazardous Fuels Treatment 
Program” (GAO, 1999a, p. 52). An “Integrated Response Team” was established to 
                                                          
50 The GAO also recommended that the agency develop a schedule indicating dates for completing each of 
these steps and estimates of the potential and likely overall and annual costs of accomplishing this strategy 
based on different options identified in the strategy as being available for doing so. 
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develop the strategy. However, in a follow up report on the agency’s progress in 
developing a cohesive strategy, presented at a hearing of the House Subcommittee on 
Forests and Forest Health in June of 1999, the GAO pointed out that this strategy was 
being prepared within the State and Private Forestry division of the agency, the division 
in which Fire and Aviation Management is administratively housed. According to the 
GAO, the fact that the agency’s response was not being prepared by the core division of 
the agency responsible for land management decisionmaking and agency policy - the 
National Forest System - together with the fact that the problem posed by wildfire is not 
reflected in the agency’s GPRA Strategic Plan indicated that the Forest Service did not 
consider the wildfire and fuels problem a priority for the agency: 
Developing and implementing such a strategy presents a difficult 
challenge to the agency because the wildfire issue transcends the 
boundaries of both its regions and forests and its resource-specific 
programs…To date, we have not seen the strong leadership or the 
marshalling of funds and resources within the agency that would indicate 
to us that the Forest Service feels a sense of urgency and assigns a high 
priority to reducing the threat of catastrophic wildfires (Hill, 1999, p. 17). 
 
 
It appears that Forest Service chief Dombeck used this opportunity to attempt to 
marshal internal support for his efforts to institutionalize ecosystem management and 
break down the barriers between the resource specific programs by bringing to bear the 
influence of fire management in his confrontation with back to basic proponents within 
the National Forest System. Citing such critical evaluations by the GAO and others, chief 
Dombeck,51commissioned an internal evaluation of the agency’s Fire and Aviation 
Management program to accompany the externally oriented cohesive strategy being 
                                                          
51 Dombeck replaced Jack Ward Thomas as Chief in 1997. Dombeck, like Thomas, was not promoted from 
the ranks of professional foresters, nor even from within the agency. Dombeck holds a PhD in fisheries 
biology and previously served as Acting Director of the Bureau of Land Management. 
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developed by the “Integrated Response Team.” The Chief’s stated objectives for the 
evaluation were “to verify that current policy, direction, and resources are adequate to 
manage the fire and aviation program into the foreseeable future, or to generate 
alternative approaches that stage fire and aviation management for success in the 
future.”52  
 
This internal evaluation of the fire program resulted in the report titled “An 
Agency Strategy for Fire Management” (hereafter Fire Management Review53) released 
in January, 2000 (USDA Forest Service, 2000a).54 The Fire Management Review 
reiterated the general themes of past GAO reports and testimony regarding the need for 
change but in even more strident and scathing terms. The report concluded that the 
agency’s “current policy, direction, and resources” are manifestly not adequate to 
implement the agency’s own fire management strategy or the Federal Fire Policy. What 
the GAO described rather blandly as a high degree of autonomy in local unit’s 
interpretation of policy and discretion in its implementation, the Fire Management 
Review described as a systematic refusal of the larger organization to deal with the 
problems of “Divergent views of agency goals”; “Different perspectives on roles and 
responsibilities”; “Arrogant decision making (line and staff);” and the “Absence of fire 
involvement in planning.” The report notes: 
The standard approach of conducting a review, finding problem areas, 
developing recommendations, and implementing action plans does not 
seem to solve repetitive and recurrent issues. The approach to solving 
                                                          
52 Letter to Robert T. Jacobs from Chief Mike Dombeck, dated July 2, 1999, included as an appendix to the 
report. 
53 The word review is used here to maintain clarity because so many reports have the word strategy in their 
title and it may be difficult for the reader, as it is for agency personnel, to keep track of them all. 
54 The National Management Review Team that was assembled to conduct this review included staff from 
USFS Fire and Aviation Management as well as a Regional Forester and representatives from National Fire 
Protection Association, the National Association of State Foresters and the Brookings Institution. 
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these continuing, repetitive issues has always been the same and the 
results are also always the same…[The] issues raised repeatedly in 
program reviews seem to transcend fire management such that they 
require an agency solution, rather than a simple program fix (USDA 
Forest Service, 2000a, p. 4). 
 
 
 The report pointed out that the strategy outlined in the agency’s Course to the 
Future: Positioning Fire and Aviation Management of 1994 (USDA Forest Service, 
1994) has underlain the Forest Service’s as well as the Federal Fire Policy’s “recognition 
that fuels management is necessary for success in reducing large fire costs and improving 
ecosystem health” but that key recommendations from the Course to the Future remain 
unimplemented. Particularly, the review noted, was the need for an integrated 
interdisciplinary approach towards “restoration and maintenance of fire dependent 
ecosystems [and] a workforce capable of achieving, restoring, and protecting these 
ecosystems at this scale” (USDA Forest Service, 1994, p. 2). The integration of fire and 
fuels management into land management decision making is “paramount,” the review 
states, because it is, “in many places, nonexistent” (USDA Forest Service, 1994, p. 3) 
Land management decisions “should not create, or further promote, a paradox where fire 
as an ecosystem agent contradicts the intended land management goal, yet they 
frequently do” (ibid). The report describes the lack of integration between resource 
programs as a problem of “functionalism” stating that: 
Lack of integrated planning results in competing and conflicting direction 
and objectives. Many times land management decisions are compromised 
by creating conditions which cannot be sustained in fire dependent 
ecosystems. Functionalism is promoted when an integrated approach is not 
used in land management decisions. When professionals are not available 
to participate in land management decision making, resultant decisions 
suffer. Functions that are adequately represented will overshadow the 
missing function, leading to land management decisions of lesser quality. 
The same problems arise operationally when land management projects 
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are implemented. Functional budgets and programs promote competition 
among staff areas, single benefit resource projects, and narrowly focused 
personnel. This prevents integration, efficient funding and staffing of 
projects, and inhibits broad based understanding of fire's role in ecosystem 
management….Functionalism results in conflicting and competing 
agendas for limited agency resources…It appears that there are 
disconnects among Forest Service mission and culture, agency priorities 
and workforce (USDA Forest Service, 2000a, p. 4-5). 
 
 
The report examined three options or “pathways” the agency could take to resolve 
the problems facing the fire management, including one that would nationalize fire and 
aviation management taking it out of the Forest Service all together. Stating that the 
linkage between fire and land management was too important to separate fire 
management from the land management, the recommended pathway was “redefinition” 
of the role of fire and fuels management within the agency to deal with the institutional 
barriers to integration posed by functionalism. This recommended redefinition involved 
expanding local fire management capacity so that “local resources stay local to provide 
effective initial and extended attack, and most importantly, to provide improved land 
management input and better integration into ecosystem processes and decisions” and 
adopting the cohesive strategy being developed by an Integrated Response Team 
responding to the GAO’s 1999 report (GAO, 1999a) calling for a cohesive strategy.55 
 
 
                                                          
55 The recommended pathway, more specifically, involved a two-pronged approach: 1) Development of a 
fully staffed, year around National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) to respond to large and 
complex wildfire incidents and 2) Enhancing local units initial and extended attack capabilities. The NIMO 
concept was intended to relieve the problem of local units of loosing key fire management staff during fire 
season while the expanded initial and extended attack capabilities are intended to increase the 
organizational capacity of national forests to “…maintain expertise of fire management personnel to better 
integrate fire management considerations for planning and implementation of local projects and land 
management activities”  
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3.3.4 The Forest Service Cohesive Strategy 
 
The Integrated Response Team spent a year developing the agency’s response to 
the GAO’s criticism titled Protecting People and Sustaining Resources in Fire-Adapted 
Ecosystems: A Cohesive Strategy. The Forest Service Management Response to the 
General Accounting Office Report GAO/RCED-99-65 (GAO, 1999a, hereafter Cohesive 
Strategy). The Cohesive Strategy restated the familiar causes of the current fire and forest 
ecosystem health problems noted by the GAO’s - that past management practices 
including fire suppression, logging and grazing had contributed to a fuel build-up that 
predisposed 39 million acres of forest land predominantly in western low elevation, dry 
forest ecosystems to uncharacteristic fire behavior and effects. 
 
The problems associated with using the timber program reiterated by the GAO 
and the scathing critique in the Fire Management Review regarding the functionalism and 
lack of integration between resource management programs within the agency are only 
hinted at in the Cohesive Strategy report. However, it indicates that while the tools of the 
timber program are necessary to implement the strategy where mechanical treatments are 
necessary, timber production, as an objective in itself or as a means of off-setting costs 
will not guide the development of projects under this strategy: 
Better integration of existing program budgets could reduce the amount of 
money requested. In most cases, any receipts associated with treatments 
will not be significant due to the need to reduce the disproportionately 
large number of small, non-merchantable trees, brush, and shrubs that 
dominate short interval fire-adapted ecosystems and leave standing the 
larger, fire tolerant trees…To improve forest ecosystem health and reduce 
wildland fire risks at larger scales, action needs to be expanded over 
broader areas and coordinated among Forest Service research, state and 
private forestry, and National Forest System programs. Restoration and 
maintenance of fire-adapted ecosystems depends on…[u]nderstanding and 
valuing ecological processes as the means to sustain ecosystem (USDA 
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Forest Service, 2000b, p. 17-19). 
 
 
The stated objective of the Cohesive Strategy was to “describe actions that could 
restore healthy, diverse, and resilient ecological systems to minimize the potential for 
uncharacteristically intense fires on a priority basis” (p. 12). The Cohesive Strategy 
attempted to be “consistent with the guiding principles” of the Federal Fire Policy and 
represents an effort to provide the conceptual basis for integrating fuels management 
within an overall ecosystem management approach using information about fire regimes 
and current conditions. Uncharacteristic fire is defined in terms of “wildfire 
effects…compared to that which occurred in the native system” (p. 57). The Cohesive 
Strategy adopted the ecological classification system of fire regime condition class 
(FRCC) as the means of determining uncharacteristic fire effects compared to native or 
historic systems. FRCC was the result of the work conducted to provide an ecological 
basis for fuels management within the ecosystem management paradigm that emerged 
from the Fire Regimes for Fuels Management and Fire Use and Ecosystems at Risk 
projects at the Forest Service’s Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research 
Station in Missoula, Montana begun in 1997 (Schmidt et al., 2002). 
Table 2 Historic Natural Fire Regimes (USDA Forest Service, 2000b). 
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Table 3 Condition Class descriptions (USDA Forest Service, 2000b). 
 
 
FRCC was proposed as the means of assessing ecological risk within a risk 
management approach, as called for in the Federal Fire Policy and in the GPRA 
Strategic Plan as well as the proposed accomplishment metric to replace acres treated in 
the strategic plan. Though “sound risk management” was not operationally defined (and 
remains undefined), the Cohesive Strategy stated that “[c]onsiderable progress can be 
made in reconciling stewardship objectives by assessing values at risk at national, 
regional, and local scales” (p. 77) The Cohesive Strategy states that fire regimes I & II: 
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…occupy nearly all the lower elevational zones across the U.S. They have 
been most affected by the presence of human intervention and our analysis 
shows that these types demonstrate the most significant departure from 
historical levels. The departures are affected largely by housing 
development, agriculture, grazing, and logging. These areas are at greatest 
risk to loss of highly valued resources, commodity interests, and human 
health and safety (USDA Forest Service, 2000b, p. 75). 
 
The priority areas for treatment set forth in the Cohesive Strategy are broad 
categories of “resource values” to be protected or maintained arising from this analysis:  
 Wildland-urban interface 
 Readily accessible municipal watersheds 
 Threatened and endangered species habitat 
 Maintenance of existing low risk Condition Class 1 areas 
 
 
While the description of these general priority areas and their relationship to 
FRCC presented in the Cohesive Strategy focused on the risk posed by fire to these 
“resource values” it is important to point out (as is done in later publications) that FRCC 
is not a measure of fire hazard or increased fuel loading.56 Rather, it is a relative measure 
of fire’s role in maintaining various characteristic ecosystem structures and processes and 
the relative degree of departure from these characteristic structures and processes. Fuel 
arrangement and loading, rates of spread and fireline intensity – factors commonly 
considered in estimating fire hazard and risk – are not components of FRCC 
classification. These ecosystem changes may lead to different fire behavior and effects 
but such differences depend on the specific nature of the change. FRCC is an explicit 
recognition that fuel reduction may or may not constitute restoration of forest ecosystem 
                                                          
56 The FRCC Guidebook V 1.3.0 (USDA, USDOI & The Nature Conservancy, 2008) notes for example, 
that “[u]sers should note that FRCC is strictly a measure of ecological trends and not a fire hazard metric. 
Nonetheless, inferences about current fire hazard can sometimes be made after examining FRCC outcomes. 
For example, a savanna biophysical setting (BpS) heavily invaded by trees as a result of fire exclusion 
would often be considered to reflect both FRCC 3 and high fire hazard” (p. 13). 
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health. It is presented, in other words, as the conceptual basis for a formal risk assessment 
procedure that allows the weighing of tradeoffs between various management objectives 
in line with the agency’s various stewardship responsibilities (e.g. hazard reduction and 
forest ecosystem health, corresponding with the first and second principles of the Federal 
Fire Policy – safety and reintroducing the ecological role of fire, respectively). 
 
Departure (condition class) is a measure of change and this change may or may 
not be characterized by a fuels buildup that leads to uncharacteristically severe fire 
behavior or effects. Fire regime IV and V, for example, are characterized by stand 
replacement fire. That is, these fire regimes are characteristically severe (as measured by 
overstory mortality) as illustrated by the fires in Yellowstone National Park. A reservoir 
or parking lot will change condition class and fire behavior and effects but not by making 
fire more severe but less frequent. Similarly, departure as a measure of risk to an 
ecosystem, entails that the system is at risk from any disturbance, whether through 
management action or “natural” events. That is, whether a disturbance (such as wildfire, 
prescribed fire or mechanical treatment) increases or decreases departure, depends on the 
nature of the departure (and of course on the structural or functional components of the 
ecosystem measured and the measurement methods used). Put another way, reducing fire 
hazard through thinning only reduces the departure if the thinned component of the 
ecosystem is the cause, or contributes to the cause of the measured departure. At the same 
time, thinning in those forest ecosystems that historically experience infrequent, stand 
replacement fire (e.g. Fire regime IV and V) may in fact increase the departure from 
historic conditions because it removes the fuel that supports “natural” severe fire 
behavior and effects. Where such activities are considered necessary for a hazard 
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reduction objective the Cohesive Strategy implies that FRCC should be measured as a 
means of estimating the ecological tradeoffs and potential mitigation costs involved. 
 
The Cohesive Strategy (USDA Forest Service, 2000b) recommended a number 
“institutional” and “program management” changes to the GPRA Strategic Plan to 
address the disconnect and functionalism between fire management and land 
management pointed out by the GAO and reiterated in the agency’s own Fire 
Management Review (USDA Forest Service, 2000a). Among these are “adjustments” to 
the Strategic Plan to reflect the priorities outlined in the Cohesive Strategy and codify 
FRCC as well as recommending that future forest plan revisions in turn reflect these 
adjustments and employ FRCC assessments as the basis for integrated restoration and 
management of fire adapted ecosystems. For example, the Cohesive Strategy 
recommends: 
 Establishing ecosystem restoration as a performance element in the Forest 
Service Annual Performance Plan…Use changes in condition class as one 
of the measures for annual performance and accountability…(p. 35) 
 
 Establish assessment procedures that integrate considerations of current 
ecosystem condition (status), probability of degradation from disturbance 
events (risk), and alternatives to reduce risk or improve conditions 
(opportunity). Include objectives at the national, regional and local scales 
for: watershed protection, species conservation, ecosystem resilience, and 
public safety. Coordinate information across all program areas…(p. 35) 
 
 In Land and Resource Management Plan amendments and revisions: 
identify land by condition class categories…(p. 35) 
 
 Consistent with Land and Resource Management Plans, develop fire 
management plans that provide for suppressing fires that would threaten 
public safety, communities, species habitat, or degrade ecosystems. 
Increase the management of natural ignitions for resource benefits where 
values and resources will be increased or improved. (p. 36)  
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 Design and implement systematic methods for broad-scale and landscape 
scale assessments of the history, status, and trajectory of ecosystem 
conditions; values at risk; and management opportunities for maintaining 
and restoring ecosystem integrity. (p. 73) 
 
 Assess what fuel treatment works most effectively to protect communities 
and restore fire-adapted ecosystems. (p. 74) 
 
 
Though it is perhaps only a coincidence that the Cohesive Strategy was released 
in the same Federal Register (November 9, 2000) as the final forest planning rule, the 
linkage between them is quite clear. 57 The Cohesive Strategy’s confidence that 
“[c]onsiderable progress can be made in reconciling stewardship objectives by assessing 
values at risk at national, regional, and local scales” (p. 77) appears linked to an 
assumption that forest plan revisions will proceed forthwith under the 2000 planning 
rule.58 The 2000 finale forest planning rule would require a single assessment framework 
to be employed at the forest and project planning levels. Section 219.20 “ecological 
sustainability analysis” of the final rule, for example, states that “characteristics of 
ecosystem diversity” include “a description of the principal ecological processes 
occurring at the spatial and temporal scales that influence the characteristic structure and 
composition of ecosystems in the assessment or analysis area” (65 Fed. Reg. 67574 
(November 9, 2000)). The rule further states that: 
                                                          
57 65 Fed. Reg. 67514-67581 (November 9, 2000). 
58 It is interesting to note one of the comment and response items included with the final rule in the Federal 
Register: “Comment: Fire management strategies. Some respondents felt that the Forest Service should 
suppress fires. Allowing forests to burn was seen as a waste of resources to these people. Others asserted 
that the Forest Service should allow fires to burn, proposing that restoring fire disturbance regimes will, in 
turn, help restore ecological sustainability. Response: The Department does not believe that this rule is the 
appropriate place to resolve questions of fire management policy. However, the planning framework 
provided by this rule will facilitate resolving them at the appropriate scale. Fire may be an issue handled at 
the national or regional scale. For example, the Forest Service has recently developed new information 
about the risk of catastrophic fires that may be useful for planning …The collaborative and flexible 
planning process outlined in this final rule is fully consistent with ongoing efforts at the Forest Service to 
address fire risks to communities and the environment.” 
 
 - 85 -  
These descriptions must include the distribution, intensity, frequency, and 
magnitude of natural disturbance regimes of the current climatic 
period…and the identification of the risks to maintaining these processes. 
These descriptions may also include an evaluation of the feasibility of 
maintaining natural ecological processes as a tool to contribute to 
ecological sustainability…Plan decisions affecting ecosystem diversity 
must provide for maintenance or restoration of the characteristics of 
ecosystem composition and structure within the range of variability that 
would be expected to occur under natural disturbance regimes of the 
current climatic period. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this 
section, in situations where ecosystem composition and structure are 
currently within the expected range of variability, plan decisions must 
maintain the composition and structure within the range. Except as 
provided in paragraph (b)(1)(v) of this section, where current ecosystem 
composition and structure are outside the expected range of variability, 
plan decisions must provide for measurable progress toward ecological 
conditions within the expected range of variability (65 Fed. Reg. 67574 
(November 9, 2000)). 
 
 
The reformulation of Forest Service fire policy, first articulated in the1995 Course 
to the Future: Positioning Fire and Aviation Management, as well as the Federal Fire 
Policy of 1995 (USDA Forest Service, 1995), was conducted under the rubric of 
ecosystem management and sustainability that came to be defined through the concepts 
of disturbance ecology and the historic range of variability. Like the Course to the Future 
and the Federal Fire Policy (USDA and USDOI, 1995) the Cohesive Strategy is more of 
an outline of a strategy or a general set of guiding ideas and concepts by which a future 
strategy might be produced. Before the Cohesive Strategy and the 2000 finale forest 
planning rule were released, however, the fire season of 2000 erupted eventually burning 
more than 6.8 million acres of public and private land, more than double the 10-year 
national average. The events that followed had complex and confounding effects upon 
the policy and practice of fire and fuels management within the forest Service. 
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On the one hand, these fires seemed to provide the sense of urgency that the GAO 
viewed as necessary to catalyze the commitment of resources to fuels and forest 
ecosystem health problem. Fuels management has since become a major focus of agency 
land management. In the fall after the fires, following recommendations of Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Interior, Congress substantially increased funding for fire and fuels 
management in fiscal year 2001 appropriations (P.L. 106-291) initiating what became 
known as the National Fire Plan.59 On the other hand, however, the direction from 
Congress in these appropriations ignored key recommendations of the Secretaries, many 
of which were derived from the as yet unreleased Cohesive Strategy. Moreover, these 
fires occurred just before the election of a new president whose administration had a very 
different agenda for natural resource management.  
 
As the new administration made its appointments, the “back to basics” proponents 
within the agency, who had been resisting the changes represented by ecosystem 
management, ascended to leadership positions within the agency – except, apparently, 
within Fire and Aviation Management. While the new leadership emphasized the need 
for action in the face of the immanent forest health crisis and redirected agency policy 
towards reducing analysis requirements to allow the increased use of traditional forest 
management practices, particularly thinning, fire management leadership continued to 
push for a larger role in land management decision making and to emphasize the need for 
integrated planning and the large scale reintroduction of fire. The result is a plethora of 
policies, strategies, plans and initiatives vying for consideration and entirely lacking in 
coherence. Thus this new, more active role of fuel managers in forest management 
                                                          
59 Forest Service fuels management rose from $70 million in FY 2000 to $205.2 million in FY 2001 and 
has steadily increased since then (CRS, 2007). 
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decision making is focused on project planning and implementation and this takes place 
in the absence of an overall strategy or vision. There is no direction or resources provided 
for developing what the Federal Fire Policy and its implementation procedures reference 
guide (USDA and USDOI, 1995, 1998)calls a landscape-scale planning framework at the 
national forest level, the level where fuels management projects are developed and 
implemented. 
3.3.5 The National Fire Plan 
  
The 2000 fire season began dramatically. An escaped prescribed fire on the 
Bandelier National Monument in early May became the Cerro Grande fire burning over 
47,000 acres including areas of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The resulting 
independent review noted serious deficiencies in planning and implementation reflecting 
the same themes as previous critical reviews and reports that fuel management does not 
appear to be a high priority and it is not well integrated into management decision 
making. 60 It recommended that: 
The agency administrator must be held responsible and accountable for 
ensuring that any wildland fire management or prescribed burning activity 
is in compliance with the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and 
the Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management Policy. There must be clear 
                                                          
60 Cerro Grande Prescribed Fire Independent Review Board Report of May 26, 2000 (USDOI, 2000) was 
actually formed by Secretary of the Interior Babbitt to review the findings of the Cerro Grande Prescribed 
Fire Investigation Report of May 18 and make further recommendation. The board report concurred with 
the investigation reports findings that the prescribed fire was improperly planned and implemented but 
absolved the National Weather Service of failure to follow existing policies. It should be noted, as pointed 
out in these reports but not covered in the media, that the original “slopover” that led to the prescribed fire 
being declared a wildfire was contained at 30 acres. It was an escaped backfire set as part of the 
suppression effort that escaped and spread beyond the Monument’s boundaries. The recriminations of the 
two reports were directed at the poor planning and preparation for both the initial prescribed fire and 
subsequent suppression operations that led to conflict and misunderstanding over stated and pursued 
objectives. The GAO (2000) also conducted a review of the incident: Fire Management Lessons Learned 
from the Cerro Grande (Los Alamos) Fire GAO/RCED-00-257. These were then followed by the Cerro 
Grande Prescribed Fire Board of Inquiry Final Report of February, 2001 (USDOI, 2001). See the National 
Park Service website devoted to the incident with links to all reports at http://www.nps.gov/cerrogrande/. 
Last accessed may, 2009. 
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linkages and consistency among the prescribed burn plan, the Fire 
Management Plan, the Land Management Plan, and the Federal Wildland 
Fire Management Policy (USDOI, 2000, p. 9). 
 
 
The review noted that “[w]hen agencies do fail, it is generally not because of a 
lack of adequate policy, standards and guidance, but a result of not following that 
guidance. Agencies write a plan, but do not live the plan” (p. 13). The report 
recommended that the team established to ensure implementation and consistency of the 
Federal Fire Policy be re-chartered to reevaluate the policy’s Implementation Action 
Plan in order to address these shortcomings. The fire season, however, postponed this 
review until the fall. 
 
Public outcry over the 2000 fires was intense. Frustration and recrimination ran 
high. To call it a public debate or public discourse would be poor description. It was as 
much a shouting match as a dialogue. It was, after all, an election year. Timber interests, 
and Presidential candidate George Bush, blamed the fires on poor federal land 
management, in particular the reduction in timber production over the past decade, for 
allowing forest to become overgrown and susceptible to insects, disease and catastrophic 
wildfires.61 They advocated more aggressive timber management and invoked the theme 
of needless paperwork, what Representative James Hansen (Republican of Utah and a 
harsh critic of the Clinton administration’s public lands policies) in 1999 had called a 
“paralysis of analysis” for hindering good forest stewardship (Vaughn and Courtner, 
                                                          
61 “Fires aren't Clinton's fault but bad policy is, Bush says” Seattle Times, August 13, 2000. Available at 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000813&slug=4036481. Last Accessed 
May, 2009. 
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2005).62 Environmental groups blamed the past focus on timber production and the lack 
of adequate attention to other values as the cause of ecosystem health and the catastrophic 
wildfire problems. They advocated against logging pushing instead for greater regulatory 
controls that focused on ecological restoration and treating fuels in the wildland urban 
interface. 
 
The Congressional Research Service was tasked with reviewing the connection 
between timber production declines and wildfire increases but found none noting instead 
that “[i]t is logical, and widely accepted, that reducing fuels will reduce the severity and 
extent of wildfires, but no research literature documenting this relationship has been 
found.”63 Numerous fire researchers provided testimony before Congress during and after 
the fire season of 2000 to the effect that action is urgently needed but caution is 
warranted in the face of this lack of knowledge and the uncertainty that accompanies the 
complexity of fire behavior and ecology. Swetnam (2000), for example, in testimony 
before Congress noted that past climate, along with past management, was directly 
related the severity and extent of the 2000 fires but that a changing climate has increased 
the uncertainty over future ecological effects of fire and response to various kinds of 
treatments. Stephens (2000) echoed the view of many researchers in stating that: 
…the debate on whether we should use silviculture (including logging in 
some cases) to manage our national forests is unproductive, the real issue 
is the definition of desired future conditions and how are we going to get 
there and once there, how they will be maintained. The recent report of the 
Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project highlighted these issues and explained 
the need for large-scale strategically located fuels treatments… the need 
for large increases in the use of restorative management practices is clear. 
                                                          
62 Roll Call, April 19, 1999, on the thirtieth anniversary of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
Representative Hansen (chair of the House Resources Committee) stated that NEPA implementation has 
become a sham, crushing federal agencies with process and paper work he called a paralysis of analysis. 
63 CRS (2000a). 
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Less clear, however, is the appropriate balance among silvicultural 
operations, mechanical fuel treatments, and prescribed fire… Each area of 
the country is unique but in most forest types that historically had 
frequent, low intensity fire regimes the most critical fuel complex from a 
fire hazard standpoint is the surface fuels, followed by the ladder fuels, 
and then the crown fuels…Economics and practicability in light of current 
stand and landscape conditions are important considerations that are often 
involved in managers decisions about which tools to use. However, to 
achieve goals for ecosystem integrity and sustainability, we also need 
much better information about the ecological consequences and tradeoffs 
of alternative management practices…For the most part, information 
necessary to answer such key questions is anecdotal or absent (Stephens, 
2000, p. 2-3). 
 
 
 Despite the escaped prescribed fire that led to the Cerro Grande fire researchers 
and managers impressed upon the need for increased reintroduction of fire for both 
ecological and fuel reduction purposes. Others, however, cited Cerro Grande as a reason 
for rejecting the proposed increase in prescribed fire and wildland fire use proposed in 
Federal Fire Policy and the Cohesive Strategy. Responding to a draft copy of the 
Cohesive Strategy, the Quincy Library Group (Quincy Library Group, 2000) released its 
own “cohesive strategy” stating emphatically that fire should not be used where other 
treatments are feasible. It “isn’t sufficient to clean up the forest” with fire, the report 
stated, they must be “thinned out” through silvicultural methods that will also help pay 
for the necessary treatments.64 The National Association of State Foresters said the 
Cohesive Strategy relied too heavily on prescribed fire and fire use, that increasing these 
practices in themselves increased the risk of catastrophic widlfire and that the strategy, as 
with other ecosystem efforts such as the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project (SNEP) and 
                                                          
64 A Real Cohesive Strategy, The Quincy Library Group’s Response to the GAO Report and the Forest 
Service’s Response, (2000). Available at http://www.qlg.org/pub/miscdoc/cohesivestrategy.htm. Last 
accessed March, 2009. 
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the ICBEMP did not emphasize thinning strongly enough. 65 It was in this atmosphere of 
political problem framing and blaming that the National Fire Plan emerged. 
 
In August of 2000, as this blame game and the fires themselves were at their 
height, President Clinton ordered the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to come up 
with a plan to respond to the “problem of catastrophic wildfires.” Their plan, Managing 
the Impact of Wildfires on Communities and the Environment: A Report to the President 
in Response to the Wildfires of 2000 (Babbit and Glickman, 2000, hereafter: Report to the 
President), was delivered a month later. The Report to the President set the stage for the 
National Fire Plan when Congress acted on its recommendations in fiscal year 2001 
appropriations. 
 
The Report to the President was vague on specifics, reiterating many of the 
themes raised in the Federal Fire Policy and the as yet unreleased Forest Service 
Cohesive Strategy from which it adopted many of its recommendations, such as the need 
to increase funding for fuels management; integrating fire and fuels management within 
land management more broadly; prioritization on the wildland urban interface (WUI) and 
ecosystems at risk. The report emphasized the need for collaboration between agencies 
and with local communities and that this would be carried out in the context of ecosystem 
management and the Federal Fire Policy, all of which will, the report suggested, 
contribute to greater accountability in the use of the requested funding increase. It was, in 
short, a plug for ecosystem management and the Federal Fire Policy - “Building on the 
forest policies of the past eight years, the wildland fire policy, and the concepts of 
                                                          
65 See NASF (2000) National Association of State Foresters, Resolution No. 2000-7: Forest Service 
Cohesive Strategy for Reducing Wildland Fire Hazards Available at 
http://www.stateforesters.org/node/577 Last accessed September, 2009. 
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ecosystem management, the Departments should establish a collaborative effort to 
expedite and expand landscape-level fuel treatments” (p. 2). 
 
 While vague, however, the Report to the President fell clearly on one side of the 
logging-for-risk reduction shouting match. The report reiterated the problems raised by 
the GAO (1999) over the use of the timber program due to its conflicting incentives and 
also responded to the problem of functionalism and lack of participation in the 
establishment of project objectives and the design of treatments. It also responded to the 
critiques raised in the Forest Service’s Fire Management Review (USDA Forest Service, 
2000) describing a culture of functionalism within the agency where fuels management 
objectives are often subsumed by other resource program objectives during project 
planning. The Report stated that “the Administration’s wildland fire policy does not rely 
on commercial logging or new road building to reduce fire risks” noting further that: 
…the removal of large, merchantable trees from forests does not reduce 
fire risk and may, in fact, increase such risk. Fire ecologists note that large 
trees are ‘insurance for the future – they are critical to ecosystem 
resilience.’ Targeting smaller trees and leaving both large trees and snags 
standing addresses the core of the fuels problem (Babbit and Glickman, 
2000, p. 7). 
 
This was to be accomplished by the establishment of a cadre of “experienced 
personnel…dedicated full time to this activity” (p. 14) as recommended in the Fire 
Management Review (USDA Forest Service, 2000). Expediting increased fuels 
treatments by this dedicated cadre was to be accomplished through additional funding “to 
support non-fire disciplines (biology, wildlife, hydrologists, etc.) necessary to conduct 
planning and assessment activities” (p. 19) and “cabinet level oversight to ensure that the 
environmental reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act, and all other 
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environmental requirements, are undertaken and completed on a timely basis” (p. 3) and 
“to support Endangered Species Act consultation work by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service” (p. 14). 
 
Also in its proposed budget for fiscal year 2001, Chief Dombeck and Under 
Secretary Lyons proposed numerous changes in Forest service program budgeting. It 
proposed replacing several of the Forest Service’s permanent and trust fund accounts, 
including those presenting the most egregious perverse incentives to focus on timber 
production at the expense of ecosystem management goals – the Salvage Sale Fund and 
Knutson-Vandenberg (KV) – with a new mandatory appropriation called Healthy 
Investments in Rural Environments (HIRE). Under the HIRE initiative, all receipts from 
timber harvesting would be returned to the national treasury rather than a portion of the 
receipts being kept at the national forest where harvesting takes place and the Forest 
Service Washington Office would allocate funding from the HIRE account back to the 
forests using transparent allocation criteria. Chief Dombeck and Secretary Lyons also 
proposed changes to its budget structure giving it more flexibility in how it allocates 
appropriations to its various resource management programs. This change from 
“benefiting function” to “primary purpose” allocation was supposed to make the pursuit 
of large scale ecosystem management easier. According to the Congressional Research 
Service (2000a) it would reduce the information available for oversight and congressional 
control of how funds were spent. At the same time, however, this increased flexibility 
was to be accompanied by clarified performance measures for each program, developed 
as part of the agency’s update to its strategic plan under GPRA. Together these structural 
changes to Forest Service budget allocation was rationalized as provided greater 
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accountability for what is actually done on the ground than the current system, 
particularly for fuels management, which until then, had remained largely focused on 
slash disposal following timber harvesting. 
 
Congressional response in its fiscal year 2001 appropriations later that fall 
provided for some of the Secretaries’ recommendation in its proposed budget and the 
Report to the President but also reflected some of the sentiment expressed in the shouting 
match over fire and logging. Congress substantially increased funding for fuels 
treatments and, in a conference report, directed the agencies to work with the Western 
Governors Association (WGA), tribal and local governments and others to develop a 
collaborative fire and fuels management strategy. Congress also directed the secretary of 
Agriculture to publish the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy  (USDA Forest Service, 
2000b) response to the GAO in the Federal Register as well as directing the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Interior to publish in the Federal Register (within 60 days of enactment) 
a list of “all urban wildland interface communities” as defined by them, in consultation 
with state and local fire-fighting agencies.  
 
Congress did not however accept the recommendation in the Report to the 
President to establish a dedicated fuels management work force in lieu of the timber 
program. Rather, it simply stated that “all contracting and hiring authorities may be used” 
(114 STAT. 1009) and that funding for hazardous fuel reduction may be used for “post-
burn treatment” e.g. salvage logging. It accepted the proposed structural changes to 
Forest Service budget allocation from “benefiting function” to “primary purpose” 
providing greater flexibility but less oversight. However, Congress did not approve the 
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HIRE initiative to reform the incentive system for timber harvesting represented by the 
trust accounts (such as Salvage Sale Fund and Knutson-Vandenberg). In addition, rather 
than providing resources for and supporting the establishment of additional offices to 
ensure expeditious compliance with environmental regulations such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Congress 
directed the agency’s to “…evaluate the need for revised or expedited environmental 
compliance procedures including expedited procedures for the preparation of 
documentation required by section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy…[and] 
may accord priority as appropriate to consultation or conferencing under section 7 [of the 
Endangered Species Act]…” (Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114 STAT. 1010 (2000)) 
 
This Congressional response to the Report to the President became known as the 
National Fire Plan. There is no plan as such, however. There is no single document or set 
of formal agreed upon principles, goals or objectives with the title National Fire Plan that 
can be referred to. In later references, as time goes on, the Report to the President will be 
cited as initiating the National Fire Plan.66 Since the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy 
was ordered published in this appropriation, and the two agencies (Department of 
Agriculture and Interior) were ordered to work collaboratively with the states, the 
Cohesive Strategy and the collaborative efforts developed under the auspices of the 
Western Governors Association (WGA) are together often referred to as the National Fire 
Plan. That is, the National Fire Plan was – initially - considered the loose amalgamation 
of: 
 The Report to the President (Babbit and Glickman, 2000) 
 FY 2001 appropriations directions 
                                                          
66 See for example the official website http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/reports/index.shtml.  
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 The Forest Service Cohesive Strategy (USDA Forest Service, 2000b) 
 Interagency collaborative efforts under the WGA (the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy (WGA, 2001) and its Implementation Plan 
(WGA, 2002)) 
 
 
Precisely what the National Fire Plan entails is not exactly clear. Nor is it clear 
how the National Fire Plan relates to interagency fire policy, or to individual federal 
agencies fire management programs that are supposed to be adopting the principles and 
implementing the Action Items of the Federal Fire Policy. The many policy documents 
are themselves vague and often contradictory. The “supplementary information” in the 
Federal Register in which the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy was released, for 
example, describes the Report to the President as providing “an overall framework for 
forest health and fire management.”67 In January, 2001 the Review and update of the 
1995 Federal Wildland Fire Policy (USDA and USDOI, 2001, hereafter 2001 Federal 
Fire Policy), was released. This review was initiated the previous spring following the 
Cerro Grande fire.68 The Executive Summary of the 2001 Federal Fire Policy describes 
the combination of the Report to the President and the Congressional direction in its 2001 
appropriations together as comprising the National Fire Plan. However, rather than 
describing the National Fire Plan as providing the “overall framework for forest health 
and fire management,” as the Federal Register does, the 2001 Federal Fire Policy states 
that: 
While this Review and Update supports and complements the National 
Fire Plan, the two efforts are different. This Review and Update, with its 
findings and recommendations, provides a broad philosophical and policy 
foundation for federal agency fire management programs and activities, 
                                                          
67 65 Fed. Reg. 67479 (November 9, 2000). 
68 There is one document but, technically, the policy revisions are contained in chapter 3 of the review and 
the new policy is variously called the Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management 
Policy or the 2001Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy. 
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including those conducted under the National Fire Plan. In contrast, the 
National Fire Plan and similar interagency activities, focus on operational 
and implementation activities. A major feature of the National Fire Plan is 
the interagency (especially between federal and non federal entities) 
aspect of risk reduction planning and implementation. In summary, the 
2001 Federal Fire Policy contained in this report is focused on internal 
federal agency strategic direction for a broad range of fire management 
related activities while the National Fire Plan is a more narrowly focused 
and tactical undertaking involving both federal and non-federal entities 
(USDA and USDOI, 2001, p. i-ii). 
 
3.4     From Ecosystem Management to the Healthy Forest Initiative 
 
While the relationship between the Federal Fire Policy and the National Fire Plan 
were unclear in the immediate aftermath of the 2000 fires, there was a great deal of 
convergence of basic concepts and overall direction. The 2001 Federal Fire Policy 
committed the interagency fire management to “continue ongoing efforts to jointly 
develop compatible, ecosystem-based, multiple-scale, interagency land management 
plans that involve all interested parties and facilitate adaptive management” (Zimmerman 
and Bunnell, 2000). The efforts led by the Western Governors Association (WGA), 
initiated under President Clinton’s Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior, resulted in A 
Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildfire Risks to Communities and the 
Environment: A 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, released in August 2001 (WGA, 
2001), followed by an Implementation Plan in May, 2002 (WGA, 2002). The three 
principles and four goals of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy became the core 
concepts of the National Fire Plan and they are based on many of the elements within the 
Report to the President and the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy, such as the emphasis 
on developing landscape-scale plans focusing treatment on risk in the Wildland Urban 
Interface (WUI) and employing fire regime condition class (FRCC) classification system 
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for assessment, prioritization and design of forest ecosystem restoration projects. Thus, as 
initially developed, the National Fire Plan corresponded rather closely with the Federal 
Fire Policy’s emphasis on developing collaborative landscape-scale planning efforts that 
attempt to balance risk reduction and the ecological role of fire. 
 
These initiatives, however, never went beyond general conceptual outlines for the 
development of future, more detailed and prescriptive policies, strategies and plans. The 
envisioned ecosystem management based approach to integrated landscape-scale fire 
management planning never materialized. The 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy (WGA, 
2001) and its Implementation Plan (WGA, 2002) were developed just as the newly 
elected President Bush was reorganizing Forest Service leadership and began to 
implement his land management policy agenda that went in a very different direction to 
the previous administrations push for ecosystem management. 
 
 In August, 2002 President Bush announced the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI). 
While the administrative and statutory enactments of the HFI were billed as 
“implementing” the National Fire Plan69 they represented a  “modification” of the 
process, purpose and its core concepts and action items (in the diplomatic words of by 
then retired Forest Service Chief Dombeck,70). It would perhaps be more accurate to 
describe the enactments of Healthy Forest Initiative as ignoring the National Fire Plan 
and the Federal Fire Policy along with it. 
 
                                                          
69 Sometime in 2006 the official websites for the National fire plan (www.fireplan.gov) and the Healthy 
Forest Initiative were merged into one, the current http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/. 
70 “In 2002 President Bush’s Healthy Forests Initiative called for modifications to the National Fire Plan 
that would expedite fuel-reduction projects by reducing environmental impact analysis, public involvement, 
and appeals and litigation associated with the National Environmental Policy Act (Office of the President 
2002).” (Dombeck et al., 2003, p. 887). 
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The HFI was predicated on reducing analysis and planning. It was part of a larger 
effort to transform land management policy in general, efforts that included the 
suspension of the 2000 forest planning regulations (to which the Cohesive Strategy was 
linked) and the development of radically different forest planning rule that made 
ecological assessments such as FRCC discretionary. This larger effort essentially ended 
ecosystem management and the multi-scale assessment and planning efforts upon which 
it was predicated. Congressional appropriations have, for the most part, funded the 
National Fire Plan as “modified by the HFI.  
 
To explain the diverging trajectories of these various policy initiatives since the 
fire season of 2000 requires explaining their development slightly out of sequence. 
Thematically and politically, the Federal Fire Policy 2001 update and the development 
of the Western Governors Association’s 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy that provides 
the core principles and goals of the National Fire Plan lie along one general trajectory. 
These will be described first. This will be followed by a description of the Bush 
administration’s institutional changes to the Forest Service and forest policy initiatives as 
they affect fire and fuels management. 
 
3.4.1 The 2001 Federal Fire Policy 
 
The 2001 Federal Fire Policy reiterated (yet again) the same basic themes and 
critiques of past reports and reviews and recommended similar solutions. As with the 
policy review following the fires of 1988, this review found that the policy itself was 
generally sound but poorly implemented and in many respects not implemented at all. 
The overriding goal and principle of the 1995 Federal Fire policy, one that was 
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successfully implemented according to the review, was firefighter and public safety. The 
principle critique of the review mirrored that of the Forest Services Fire Management 
Review released a year earlier noting that “…the role and influence of fire have not been 
adequately considered in the planning process” (p. 11). The review states that: 
[w]hen there was organizational will and commitment about an element of 
the 1995 Federal Fire Policy, that element was successfully 
implemented…Those most successfully implemented were those 
exclusively in the domain of the traditional fire management 
organizations. Implementation was least successful in areas requiring 
coordination and agreement among agencies or across disciplines within 
agencies…and there is little evidence that managers have been held 
accountable for implementation (USDA and USDOI, 2001, p. 11). 
 
 
Repeating the finding from a 1999 large fire cost review the 2001 Federal Fire 
Policy noted “…the failure of most units to adopt Fire Management Plans that meet the 
requirements of the 1995 Federal Fire Policy...Of particular concern is the lack of 
consequences for failure to resolve differences among…disciplines, and for failing to 
ensure integration among disciplines…Nor are there significant incentives or rewards for 
efforts at implementation” (p. 17). The 2001 Federal Fire Policy provides several 
“Implementation Actions” that it said were key to overcoming these persistent problems 
and ensuring successful fire management, the first of which is titled “Fire Management & 
Ecosystem Sustainability.” This implementation action begins by noting that currently 
“[t]he relationship between fire management activities and other efforts to achieve 
ecosystem sustainability is unclear” but states that “Fire Management Plans and land 
management plans will…contribute to ecosystem sustainability” and specifies the 
following actions to be taken by federal agencies: 
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a. Develop a comprehensive, interagency strategy for fire management to 
help achieve ecosystem sustainability. 
 
b. Fire Management Plans and land management plans will appropriately 
incorporate mitigation, burned-area rehabilitation, and fuels reduction and 
restoration activities that contribute to ecosystem sustainability. 
 
 
 The 2001 Federal Fire Policy, in other words, explicitly reaffirmed and 
strengthened its linkage to sustainability as articulated by agency leadership under the 
Clinton Administration, attempting to institutionalize ecosystem management in resource 
management planning. After all, the 2000 finale forest planning rules were released only 
two months earlier. As with the 1995 Federal Fire Policy, which was released coincident 
with a proposed forest planning rule in 1995, there was an expectation that forest plan 
revisions would commence forthwith. Thus the 2001 Federal Fire Policy, noting the 
release of the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy two months earlier, recommended the 
coordination of such efforts under Action Item (a). Work began on action item (a) in 
early 2001. This became known as the Interagency Cohesive Strategy intended to “help 
provide Federal land management agencies with a unified approach to meet the goals of 
the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy” (WGA, 2002, p. 22).71 
 
3.4.2 The National Fire Plan’s 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy 
 
 The Report to the President of August 2000 (Babbit and Glickman, 2000) had 
reiterated the recommendations of past fire policies (1990, 1995) for broad based 
collaboration across jurisdictions to deal with the complex problem of the ever increasing 
wildland urban interface (WUI). In Mid September, 2000 the Secretaries of Agriculture 
                                                          
71 The draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy has also been referred to as the combined Cohesive Strategy, the 
2002 Cohesive Strategy and the Integrated Strategy. 
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and Interior met with members of the Western Governors Association (WGA) and 
sketched out the broad outlines of a collaborative response and Congress’ fiscal year 
2001 appropriations direction largely reflected these agreements.72 The result was “A 
Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildfire Risks to Communities and the 
Environment: A 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy released in August 2001 followed by 
an Implementation Plan in May, 2002.73 The emphasis and sensibility of the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy follows directly from that of the 2001Federal Fire Policy and 
the Forest Service Cohesive Strategy, stating in the preface that: 
The purpose of a long-term strategy for reducing wildland fire risks to 
communities and the environment is meant, in part, to correct problems 
associated with the long-term disruption in natural fire cycles. This 
disruption has increased the risk of severe wildland fires on some fire-
prone ecosystems (WGA, 2001, pg 4). 
 
 
 There are three “core principles” and four “goals” to the strategy laid out in the 
10-Year Comprehensive Strategy and they reflect the priorities outlined in the Report to 
the President and Forest Service Cohesive Strategy. The core Principles are: 
Collaboration – Facilitate a collaborative approach at the local, regional, 
and national levels. 
 
Priority Setting – Emphasize the protection of communities, municipal, 
and other high-priority watersheds at risk. Long term emphasis is to 
maintain and restore fire prone ecosystems at a landscape scale. 
 
Accountability – Establish uniform and cost-effective measures, standards, 
reporting processes, and budget information in implementation plans that 
will fold into the Government Performance and Results Act process. 
 
                                                          
72 Described in 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy (WGA, 2001, pg 5) as leading to the directions given to 
the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior in the FY 2001 appropriations. 
73 The 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy was co-developed at a series of workshops by the secretaries of 
Agriculture and Interior, the Western Governors Association, the National Association of State Foresters, 
the National Association of Counties and the Intertribal Timber Council as well as representatives of 
several non-governmental conservation and industry organizations. 
 - 103 -  
The four goals of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy are: 
1) Improve Prevention and Suppression; 
2) Reduce Hazardous Fuels; 
3) Restore Fire Adapted Ecosystems and; 
4) Promote Community Assistance. 
 
 
In between the release of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy in August, 2001 
and its Implementation Plan in May, 2002, the draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy 
(USDA and USDOI, 2002a) had apparently been completed sufficiently for use in 
formulating an outline of how the principles and goals of the 10-Year Comprehensive 
Strategy were to be met.74 The FRCC concept played a central role. The Implementation 
Plan describes generic “Implementation Outcomes,” “Performance Measures” and 
“Implementation Tasks” for each of the four goals. The Implementation Outcome for 
Goal Two - Hazardous Fuels Reduction, for example is: 
Hazardous fuels are treated, using appropriate tools, to reduce the risk of 
unplanned and unwanted wildland fire to communities and to the 
environment. 
 
The first “Performance Measures” is: 
 
Number of acres treated that are 1) in the Wildland Urban Interface or 2) 
in condition classes 2 or 3 in fire regimes I, II, or III outside the wildland 
urban interface, and are identified as high priority through collaboration 
consistent with the Implementation Plan… 
 
                                                          
74The interagency Cohesive Strategy was titled Restoring Fire-Adapted Ecosystems on Federal Lands, A 
Cohesive Strategy for Protecting People and Sustaining Natural Resources. The 10-Year Implementation 
Plan (WGA, 2002), Appendix A, describes it as “a combined effort between the Federal land management 
agencies to coordinate an aggressive, collaborative strategy for reducing fuel and restoring land health 
within fire-adapted areas. The Cohesive Strategy was developed to help provide Federal land management 
agencies with a unified approach to meet the goals of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy.” It is also 
referenced in a Forest Service report on potential responses to the western bark beetle epidemic 
(http://www.fs.fed.us/foresthealth/publications/WesternBarkBeetleReport.pdf of 2002). 
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It is significant that the goals of hazardous fuels reduction (Goal Two) and 
restoring fire adapted ecosystems (Goal Three) are distinct.75 It is an implicit appreciation 
or recognition that the goals and objectives of hazardous fuels reduction may not 
necessarily be the same as those of restoring fire adapted ecosystems.76 The terms – 
‘restoration’, ‘integrity’ and ‘fire prone ecosystems’ – are defined in the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy by reference to the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy (USDA 
Forest Service, 2000b), with its conceptual roots in landscape ecology aligned with the 
agency’s policy of implementing ecosystem management.77 “Severe wildland fire” and 
“catastrophic fire” are defined together as fire “that burns more intensely than the natural 
or historical range of variability, thereby fundamentally changing the ecosystem…” (p. 
16) As the FRCC classification makes clear, mixed and high severity fire is characteristic 
of many ecosystems (fire regimes II, III, IV & V). Reducing the potential for severe fire 
behavior and effects through hazardous fuels reduction in these fire regimes, in other 
words, may increase the departure from the historic range of variability of certain 
ecosystem components and processes and thus, according to the logic of the historic 
                                                          
75 The first Performance Measure for Goal Three is the “number of acres in fire regimes I, II, or III moved 
to a better condition class, that were identified as high priority through collaboration consistent with the 
Implementation Plan…” 
76 Indeed, restoring fire adapted ecosystems encompasses a broader set of goals, objectives and activities 
than restoring the ecological role of fire – the second principle of the Federal Fire Policy – and the even 
more narrow goal, specific to operational the responsibilities of fire management, of returning fire to the 
landscape which simply means any kind of fire regardless of fire history.  
77 The 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy (WGA, 2001) defines these terms thus, citing the Forest Service 
Cohesive Strategy (USDA Forest Service, 2000b): Ecosystem Integrity – “The completeness of an 
ecosystem that at geographic and temporal scales maintains its characteristic diversity of biological and 
physical components, composition, structure, and function (Cohesive Strategy, 2000).” Fire-prone 
ecosystem – “Ecosystems that historically burned intensely at low frequencies (stand replacing fires), those 
that burned with low intensity at a high frequency (understory fires), and those that burned very 
infrequently historically, but are now subject to much more frequent fires because of changed conditions. 
These include fire-influenced and fire adapted ecosystems (Cohesive Strategy, 2000).” Restoration – “The 
active or passive management of an ecosystem or habitat toward its original structure, natural compliment 
of species, and natural functions or ecological processes (Cohesive Strategy, 2000).” 
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range of variability concept, increase the risk to the ecological integrity of these 
ecosystems. 
 
The 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy (WGA, 2001) does not address in any detail 
how the tradeoffs inherent in this tension will be adjudicated, if not reconciled. The 
generally accepted prioritization of people over natural resources represented by the 
ordering of the first to principles of the Federal Fire Policy – safety first, ecology second 
- and in the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy’s ordering of WUI first and ecologically 
degraded areas outside the WUI second (in condition classes 2 or 3 in fire regimes I, II, 
or III). The spatial and temporal complexities of determining risk to these two areas and 
how they interact are elided. The 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy and its 
Implementation Plan are long on principles, goals and generic “action items”78 or 
“implementation tasks”79 but rather vague on how all this is to be synched up and 
integrated into a cohesive and comprehensive strategy. Like the Federal Fire Policy, the 
Cohesive Strategy and the Report to the President from which it draws, the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy and its Implementation Plan read more like strategies and plans 
to develop strategies and plans. These documents all look to the future. They are 
conceptual frameworks composed of lists of broad and reasonable sounding yet 
undefined terms and concepts that should (and presumably can) be further refined with 
more precision and operational utility in future strategies and plans relevant for 
decisionmaking at multiple organizational levels. The Forest Service Cohesive Strategy 
of 2000 (USDA Forest Service, 2000b), for example, states that:  
 
                                                          
78 As they are called in the Federal Fire Policy. 
79 As they are called in the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy and its Implementation Plan. 
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At a national level, we are working to integrate information on human 
development, watershed condition, species and ecosystems of concern, 
noxious weeds, insects and disease, roadless areas, and plant 
community/ecosystem conditions by fire regimes….A standard process for 
integrating and interpreting this information needs to be developed. In 
assessing risk at the regional level, we need to integrate information 
including, but not limited to: human development, historic disturbance 
regimes, watershed condition, species and ecosystems of concern, invasive 
weeds, insects and disease, roadless areas, plant community/ecosystem 
conditions by fire regimes. This will require compilation of appropriate 
information at finer scales of resolution than that compiled for the national 
risk assessments. Based on regional assessments, priorities for landscape 
scale analyses and management action can be developed. On-the-ground 
treatment priorities are then identified by the goals, objectives, and 
strategies that are linked up through the agency to GPRA strategic goal for 
restoring and maintaining ecosystem health (USDA Forest Service, 2000b, 
p. 77). 
 
 
Integrated multi-scale assessment and planning, such as described above, are 
presented as the framework within which to develop more detailed and prescriptive 
policies, plans and strategies. It is within such a framework that the tensions and tradeoffs 
between fuels reduction and restoration, between risk to people (loosely represented by 
the WUI concept) and risk to ecosystem integrity (represented by the FRCC concept) 
were to be addressed. It is how the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy and its 
Implementation Plan’s recommendations were to be accomplished , recommendations to 
“[e]xpand and improve integration of the hazardous fuels management program” and 
“[d]evelop strategies to address fire-prone ecosystem problems that augment fire risk or 
threaten sustainability of these areas”. One of the hazardous fuels reduction 
Implementation Tasks specifies “utilizing as appropriate” the Interagency Cohesive 
Strategy being jointly developed by the fire management staff from the Department of 
Interior agencies and the Forest Service. At the time the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy 
Implementation Plan was developed, however, it was still in draft form. This Interagency 
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Cohesive Strategy, however, went the furthest in detailing what integrated landscape-
scale fire risk assessment and planning under the Federal Fire Policy and the National 
Fire Plan was to entail. It is thus worth discussion in further detail. 
 
3.4.3 The Interagency Cohesive Strategy 
 
The Interagency Cohesive Strategy (USDA and USDOI, 2002a) was initiated in 
early 2001 following the release of the 2001 Federal Fire Policy review and 
Congressional funding initiating the National Fire Plan. It was intended in part to bridge 
the gap and clarify the uncertain relationship between the two and because the initial 
Cohesive Strategy was specific to the Forest Service and both the Federal Fire Policy 
(USDA and USDIO, 2001) and the National Fire Plan are interagency in scope. It was 
developed by many of the same fire management staff from the Forest Service that 
developed the Cohesive Strategy response to the GAO and fire management staff from 
the Departments of Interior agencies and was based largely on the concepts and 
principles outlined in initial effort. Its general aims were to provide a framework by 
which interagency and intergovernmental fire management agencies could develop 
collaborative plans for fire and fuels management across jurisdictional boundaries that 
integrated mitigating risk from fire while allowing fire to play its ecological role across 
the landscape, including its role in reducing fuels, within the new ecosystem management 
paradigm. Its specific aims were to produce a range of “strategic options” and their 
associated costs within this overall framework, as requested by the GAO, in order for 
Congress to make informed decisions for funding the National Fire Plan. 
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As the 2001 Federal Fire Policy review noted, the relationship between fire 
management and ecosystem management and/or sustainability is unclear. One of the 
reason the Federal Fire Policy (2001), the Forest Service’s Cohesive Strategy and the 10-
Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation Plan (2002) appear more as conceptual 
outlines for the development of future, more prescriptive policies, strategies and plans 
rather than actual policies, strategies and plans in themselves is that the concept of 
integrated multi-scale assessment and planning is only a concept. Like ecosystem 
management, to which it is closely linked, it is not well defined and has few precedents 
(e.g. the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT) and Interior 
Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project (ICBEMP) experiments). For the most 
part, integrated multi-scale assessment and planning described negatively by what it is 
not – traditional single resource, single scale management and planning - and by what it 
is intended to remedy – the unintended consequences of traditional planning, what Odum 
(1982) called “the Tyranny of small decisions.” Hann and Bunnell (2001, p. 360), in the 
research conducted for the initial Forest Service Cohesive Strategy of 200080 list three 
fundamental issues with “traditional planning” that lead failure to achieve resource 
management objectives in general and fire management in particular: 
1. Differences in scale of ecological processes and key ecosystem components 
are not addressed. Thus, management or mitigation not designed for the scale 
of the ecological or socioeconomic process may not be successful or may have 
unintended consequences on other ecological processes or components; 
 
2. Key ecological processes of change and disturbance (for example succession, 
wildfire, and timber harvest) are not integrated with their effects on key 
ecosystem components (for example old forest dependent species, old forests, 
and timber to mills); therefore, managers are often unable to articulate the full 
range of risks that may follow from traditional independent management 
                                                          
80 An overview of the results from the analysis presented in Hann and Bunnell (2001) discussed here was 
included as Appendix D of the Forest Service Cohesive Strategy of 2000. 
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practices, and consequently may not design projects aligned with the 
operation of natural ecological processes and maintenance of key ecosystem 
components; and 
 
3. The traditional approach relies on the local administrative unit to understand 
temporal and spatial changes in conditions and does not provide a system to 
monitor or summarize changes across larger areas. Therefore, local managers 
are often unable to articulate the range of cumulative effects and regional and 
national managers are often unaware of the consequences or benefits of these 
effects. 
 
Integrated multi-scale assessment and planning 
 
Integrated multi-scale assessment and planning is described as the means to 
overcome the shortcomings of traditional resource planning by linking broad scale 
assessments and the plans with site specific assessments and project plans (often referred 
to as fine-scale or project-scale) at local management unit levels such as a national forest 
or district. This, apparently, is especially the case in fire and fuels management since 
wildfire is widely understood by both fire researchers and managers as a quintessential 
multi-scale phenomenon. The underlying premise behind the landscape approach is that 
fire behavior and effects occur at multiple scales such that fuels reduction or restoration 
treatments, which are necessarily conducted at the local level, must integrate their site 
specific prescriptions to these broader scales. 
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Figure 2 Conceptual framework for multi-scale assessment and planning (From Hann and 
Bunnell, 2001).  
 
 
The draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy of 2002 (USDA and USDOI, 2002a) was 
based on this concept of integrated, multi-scale assessment and planning. It proposed 
using a consistent set or core variables and methods. It was intended to fit on the top ring 
in figure 2 representing the national level of assessment and planning using the core 
variables of FRCC and a coarse delineation of the wildland urban interface (WUI) 
defined in the Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology81 employed in the10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy – “the line, area, or zone where structures and other human 
development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuel.” Course-
scale fire regime and condition class (FRCC) data for the continental United States came 
from the Forest Service’s Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station in 
                                                          
81National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology is available at 
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/glossary/index.htm. 
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Missoula, Montana, data that was not complete when the initial Cohesive Strategy was 
developed. 
 
The draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy of 2002, in other words, was an attempt 
to elucidate only a general framework for fuels management assessment and planning at a 
broad scale (the upper tier in figure 1) using the basic WUI and FRCC concepts and 
coarse data. Assessment and planning efforts at regional and local levels are intended to 
tier to this broad framework, as outlined in the Wildland and Prescribed Fire 
Management Policy: Implementation Procedures Reference Guide (USDA and USDOI, 
1998), which, recall from table 1 above, outlined the basic contents and linkage between 
land management plans, fire management plans and project level plans. For example, the 
Reference Guide specified that parameters for risk would be established in land 
management plans; that risk analysis processes would be established in the annually 
updated fire management plans and these procedures would be employed in developing 
site specific project level assessments and planning. 
 
The draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy developed eight “strategic options based 
on classifying the landscape into three types: WUI landscapes; non-WUI landscapes 
adjacent to WUI landscapes; and non-WUI landscapes (often wilderness areas) buffered 
from WUI landscapes by adjacent non-WUI landscapes.82 The general idea being that 
closer to and within WUI areas, where economic values are most concentrated, there will 
be greater emphasis on mechanical and prescribed fire treatments to reduce the severity 
                                                          
82 Dividing managed lands into these three general classes is not uncommon. Arno and Brown (1989) 
proposed three zones of fuels management objectives in response to the failures revealed by the review of 
fires of 1988. The middle zone or class is often the most difficult to delimit ecologically or socially. Pyne 
(2004, p. 11) describes this middle class as “the lands in between” while Arno and Allison-Bunnell (2002, 
p. 133) use the term “general forest.” 
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of wildfire while in the non-WUI landscapes buffered from WUI there would be greater 
reliance on allowing wildfires to burn for resource benefit (wildland fire use or WFU). 
FRCC was used to provide a relative measure of change in ecological conditions in order 
to determine where allowing a fire to burn may provide benefit or pose a risk to the 
various attributes that define the ecosystem. FRCC is intended to help prioritize and 
determine where and what kinds of treatments may be necessary in the non-WUI areas in 
order to allow fires to burn for resource benefit (WFU) and where such treatments are not 
necessary. In WUI areas FRCC was used to provide basic information to help determine 
what kinds of treatments may or may not be aligned with the ecological role of fire (e.g. 
reducing the potential for high severity fire in a fire regime historically characterized by 
high severity fire). That is, where reducing risk to the WUI increases risk to ecological 
sustainability. As the National Interagency Fuels Coordination Group, established 2001 
within the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) puts it: “[i]t is the goal of each fire 
management program within each agency to assist in the effort of ensuring public and 
firefighter safety in reducing risks to communities while improving and maintaining 
ecosystem health.”83 
 
The key to a multi-scale landscape strategy, according to Hann et al. (2003), is 
agreement on and use of consistent definitions, methods and data for describing the core 
variables of the landscape or ecosystem. This assertion must be understood in two ways; 
a multi-scale landscape strategy requires consistent definitions, methods and data in order 
to coordinate actions across space and time at the different levels of planning. At the 
same time such a strategy is also intended as framework within which such agreement 
                                                          
83 http://www.nifc.gov/fuels/overview/overview.html. Last accessed March 18, 2008. 
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may be reached on establishing the necessary consistent definitions, methods and data for 
describing the core variables (e.g. parameters for risk assessment at sub-regional levels in 
land management plans and a risk analysis process used for developing fire management 
plans and individual project plans and incident response called for in the Prescribed Fire 
Management Policy and Implementation Procedures Reference Guide). This is crucial 
because fire behavior and ecology is so complex there is currently no agreement on the 
relevant set of core variables, their definition or methods of data collection and analysis 
and hence no political or scientific consensus over how to conceptualize risk, either to 
people and economic values from fire or the risks and benefits of fire to ecosystems (e.g. 
the ecological role of fire and ecosystem sustainability). There is no consistent use of key 
terms, such as landscape, risk, fire frequency or severity because there is no consensus on 
how to measure them. And there is considerable debate and uncertainty over the efficacy 
of fuels treatments not only for modifying fire behavior but especially as a component of 
ecological restoration because fuels are so variable and are only one component of fire 
behavior and ecology. Moreover, the relevant components and effects change with the 
scale. As Wiens (1999) notes: “We can no longer...cling to the belief that the scale on 
which we view systems does not affect what we see.... This is quite a different way of 
viewing the world than that which was in vogue a decade ago, and it is by no means yet 
widely embraced by everyone.”  
 
Risk assessment, however, and multi-scale risk assessment in particular, does not 
require clearly specified goals and objectives, objects of analysis, analytical techniques or 
data collection methods. Rather, risk assessment is a process through which these 
elements of the process are operationally defined in order to allow formal analysis to 
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precede and inform decisions over various alternative courses of action. The Interagency 
Cohesive Strategy did not specify a risk assessment process, however. What is meant 
must be inferred. The use of the general concepts of the wildland urban interface (WUI) 
and fire regime condition class (FRCC) to represent two forms of risk resemble the two 
prominent conceptions of risk assessment in current use – that of risk to people and 
economic values from natural hazards characteristic of guidance from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and that of risk to ecological systems from 
people’s activities characteristic of guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). According to FEMA guidance (US FEMA, 2001, p. iii) “risk assessment is the 
process of measuring the potential loss of life, personal injury, economic injury and 
property damage resulting from natural hazards by assessing the vulnerability of people, 
buildings and infrastructure to natural hazards.” According to the EPA’s Guidelines for 
Ecological Risk Assessment (US EPA, 1998, p. 1) ecological risk assessment is “a 
process that evaluates the likelihood that adverse ecological effects may occur or are 
occurring as a result of exposure to one or more stressors…generated or influenced by 
anthropogenic activity.”  
 
Both forms of risk assessment (FEMA’s to people from nature and EPA’s to 
nature from people), involve the same basic steps: 1) problem formulation; 2) analysis 
and 3) risk characterization. Problem formulation involves three phases; 1a) the clear 
articulation of management goals, 1b) the identification of specific objects of 
management (called objectives in the FEMA model and assessment endpoints in the EPA 
model e.g. species habitat protection or WUI protection) broken down into explicit 
(qualitatively or quantitatively) measurable attributes and 1c) the development of a 
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conceptual model that explicitly links the management goals to the measurable attributes 
of the object of management. Analysis involves two steps; 2a) characterization of sources 
and level of exposure to change agents to the identified attributes and 2b) the 
characterization of the effects upon these attributes from exposure to these change agents. 
The last step, risk characterization, is the integration and summary of exposure and effect 
relationships, ensuring that the conceptual model adequately captures the necessary 
relationships calculating or estimating degree of exposure to degree of effects to 
formulate an overall description of risk with an explicit discussion of uncertainty, 
assumptions and qualifiers. These are then compared against the decisions made in the 
three phases of step 1, problem formulation, to ensure that the right questions were asked 
in the first place – does the solution match the goals. This last step is crucial. Risk 
assessment is intended to highlight assumptions and sources of uncertainty. It is as much 
a process of communication, fostering mutual understanding between various 
perspectives and disciplinary expertise as it is a process of objectifying risk. It is also 
crucial to point out that the risk assessment process, as outlined by both FEMA and EPA 
guides, includes those at risk, or those with a stake in ecological systems at risk. Neither 
is intended to be performed  
 
This above description is grossly oversimplified. It is in fact a very complicated 
process but the conceptual linkage between risk assessment and ecosystem management 
(as well as with compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) more 
generally) has been subject of a great deal of interest by interagency panels and research 
projects. The National Science and Technology Council released a report in 1999 (which 
included many Forest Service researchers and managers) noting that “The linking of 
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these two processes [ecosystem management and risk assessment] can bring improved 
organizational and analytical consistency to the assessment of information in support of 
multiple scales of resource planning and decision making needed for ecosystem 
management” (NSTC, 1999, p. 8-2).84 
 
The theoretical appeal of such an approach is that it provides a rational framework 
for dealing with the complexity of ecological systems and the multiple ways of 
conceiving of and measuring their components, the inter-relationships between these 
components and measurements and the resulting uncertainties inherent in their 
representation. Such an approach explicitly recognizes that perceptions of risk are highly 
subjective and that there is no consensus on what an ecosystem is or how it should be 
measured and nor how its “health” might be conceived and whether such a concept is 
even appropriate (Suter,1993a, 1993b; Vigerstad and McCarty, 2000). Without the 
benefit of systematic reassessment of the formulated problem and the conceptual model 
linking the components and measures to specified goals, these inconsistencies and their 
embedded assumptions are missed. “People have many automatic or routine ways of 
dealing with risk that can substitute for analyzing risks…Many still approach risk 
assessment as a way of justifying and documenting decisions that are already made. To 
these persons, a good risk assessment will be disappointing because it will expose many 
incorrect and unfounded assumptions” (NSTC, 1999, p. 8-26). Perhaps more important, 
Hann et al. (2003, p. 7) warn, without a landscape strategy based on consistent method 
                                                          
84 Dave Cleaves, who was one of the authors of the Fire Economics Assessment Report of 1995 that 
established the figure of 39 million acres at risk and found that fuel reduction efforts were, for the most part 
determined by the objectives of non-fire management resource management programs was one of the 
authors of chapter 8 of this report focused on ecosystem management from which the above quote is taken. 
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and data, un-integrated, ad-hoc planning and treatment design may not only fail to 
address all the relevant elements at or posing risk but may also be used to: 
…promote a hidden agenda, such as desire for road access, forest 
products, and more forage; or the reverse, such as reduced access, no 
mechanical equipment, and no products from public lands. From a 
landscape strategy perspective these agendas can be by-products of the 
prioritization and design, but should not take away from…risk reduction 
to people and ecosystems. 
 
 
The draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy (USDA and USDOI, 2002) was 
completed by July, 2002, just after the release of the Western Governors Association’s 
10-Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation Plan. It was never released however. 85 
The ambitious yet ill-defined goals of collaborative landscape-scale fire and fuels 
planning based on integrated multi-scale risk assessments have remained lofty and ill-
defined. These efforts to engage the complexities, uncertainties and lack of consensus 
over the meaning of and relationship between fire risk and the ecological role of fire were 
abandoned with the policy initiatives of the Bush administration and the Forest Service 
leadership he appointed. Instead, the complexities, uncertainties and lack of consensus 
are deployed against such an effort and many of the concepts and approaches proposed 
for dealing with these complexities, uncertainties and lack of consensus. 
 
                                                          
85 Since the Draft Strategy was never released it was unavailable for analysis for this research. The above 
discussion relies on the description provided in Hann et al. (2003), titled A Cohesive Strategy for Protecting 
People and Sustaining Natural Resources: Predicting Outcomes for Program Options 
that reports on the analysis conducted for the Interagency Cohesive Strategy. This report and its findings 
are also discussed in NAPA (2002), Hann and Strohm (2002), GAO (2002, 2005b, 2008 and 2009a). 
Curiously, Hann and Beighley et al. (2003) indicates that it was presented at a conference in 2002 titled 
“Fire, Fuels and Ecological Restoration” but it no longer appear in the proceedings indicated and can no 
longer be found on the internet using multiple search engines. See the conference proceedings at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_p029.html. Last accessed March, 2010.  
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The two central concepts of the strategy - wildland urban interface (WUI) and the 
fire regime condition class (FRCC) - have been redefined and misrepresented 
neutralizing their role as a means of pursuing landscape-scale assessment and planning. It 
will turn out to be significant in the years to follow that the 10-Year Comprehensive 
Strategy’s Implementation Plan employs the WUI  and FRCC concepts, in conjunction 
with acres-treated as the measure of accomplishment and accountability reporting. 
Because of this, the WUI and FRCC concepts are inscribed in the new policy initiatives 
such as the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI) but in a manner that entirely misrepresents and 
contradicts their functional role as part of a broad framework within which to develop 
integrated and collaborative fuels management assessment and planning procedures. To 
tell this story requires going back to the early days of the new administration of President 
Bush and the organizational and policy changes ushered in by the new Forest Service 
leadership. 
 
3.4.4 The End of Integrated Landscape-Scale Fire and Fuels 
Assessment and Planning 
 
As is common with new administrations, many federal initiatives were put on 
hold pending review by the new administration for consistency with its own policies. 
Interestingly, however, the 2001 Federal Fire Policy was not suspended or reviewed. 
Why it was not is uncertain, but perhaps it is because the policy is entirely discretionary 
and, as the 2001 Federal Fire Policy pointed out, went largely unimplemented anyway. 
While the Federal Fire Policy and the Forest Service’s specific fire management 
direction were not reviewed and revised by the new administration, the changes that were 
brought about by the new administration and agency leadership in the National Forest 
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System altered key elements upon which the Federal Fire Policy relied, as well as the 
Forest Service’s own fire policy outlined in the FAM Coarse to the Future of 1995. 
Ecosystem management, as the conceptual approach to land management, was not 
explicitly rejected. Nor was the Federal Fire Policy’s principle of restoring the ecological 
role of fire to the landscape, which was linked to the ecosystem management framework. 
The underlying planning and decisionmaking framework upon which both were 
predicated, however, and what linked the two together was abandoned - namely the 
collaborative development and implementing of multi-scale assessment and planning 
framework using a consistent set or core variables, data and methods. 
 
The back to basic proponents within the agency and Congress initiated an indirect 
campaign against assessment and analysis in general and NEPA in particular that 
dramatically affected fire and fuels management. This campaign was based on the 
framing of the problem of catastrophic fire due to declining forest health that coalesced 
after the report by the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters (established by 
Congress following the 1988 fires) that advocated “the application of needed silvicultural 
treatments within a fairly short time frame” (Sampson et al. 1994). The problem of 
hazardous fuels buildup due to the unintended consequences of decades of fire 
suppression remained in agency portrayals of the current fuels problem but the other 
causes of unintended consequences to forest health cited in earlier descriptions - logging 
and grazing – disappeared from official agency pronouncements. The problem of 
ecosystem sustainability requiring complex ecological restoration was reframed as a 
simple problem forest density. And the simple solution to forest density was forest 
thinning. Multi-scale planning and analysis in which Forest plans provide context and 
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broad scale baseline assessments to guide more detailed site specific planning efforts in 
each forest’s annual Fire Management Plan update which in turn were to guide individual 
project specific planning was reduced to a problem of analysis paralysis and the need to 
expedite treatments. 
 
Forest Planning Rules Withdrawn Again 
 
The 2000 forest planning rule was the principle land management policy put on 
hold for review and revision by the new administration that affected fuels management in 
the Forest Service. The other policy actions that directly affected fuels management 
include the Forest Service GPRA Strategic Plan updates and, more importantly, the 
Healthy Forest Initiative. With the review of the 2000 planning rule the silent resistance 
by the back to basics proponents within the agency, became vocal and overt, joining that 
of private commodity interests outside the agency and their allies in Congress. Thus 
began a general assault upon the core premises behind ecosystem management. The 2000 
rule, and the concepts upon which it was based, were controversial for many reasons and 
contested from many quarters. The political contest centered on the concept of 
sustainability linked to the need for considering the complex interconnectedness of 
ecosystems, the degree of uncertainty surrounding this complexity and the need for 
careful ecological risk assessment to guide collaborative, integrated multi-scale planning 
and decisionmaking. Jim Geisinger (1999, p. 24), president of the Northwest Forestry 
Association, for example, commenting on the Committee of Scientists report of 1997 
upon which the rule was largely based, stated that: 
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[m]any of the recommendations in the report are not based on existing 
science but rather on theory and intuition …Much of the report implies 
that the committee believes current management practices are 
diametrically opposed to the concept of sustainability. We strongly 
disagree with this. The interdisciplinary plans currently in place, based on 
the multiple-use concept as required by law, do take into account the 
sustainability of resources. 
 
 
Geisinger expressed a common sentiment that the problems facing the Forest 
Service were political interference from Washington and excessive appeals and litigation. 
The themes of fuzzy theories and inconsistency with professional forestry’s conceptions 
of sustainability coalesced with claims that the problems facing forest management and 
forest health resulted from over burdensome regulations and endless procedures. In a 
letter to Secretary of Agriculture in February, 2001 the Society of American Foresters 
(2001, p. 1) stated that: 
We are concerned about the regulation’s treatment of sustainability. The 
Society of American Foresters holds sustainability of forest resources as a 
core value…The Forest Service’s planning regulations place ecological 
values above social and economic values of sustainability. This is 
inherently unsustainable, inconsistent with the profession’s concepts of 
sustainability… our concern is that the regulation is overly burdensome, 
and not consistent with the concept of multiple use. 
 
 
The new administration had not yet made changes to top Forest Service positions 
but it was moving in the direction of its constituents in the forest products industry. An 
initial review by regional planners in February, 2001 found that the “intent of the new 
Rule is good” and “probably closer to what the public wants than the 1982 Rule” but 
“their ability to successfully implement these regulations in the short term raised many 
concerns” such as “the feasibility of implementing the analysis and monitoring 
requirements of the rule” (Larson et al., 2001, p. 2). Shortly thereafter, Forest Service 
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Chief Dombeck retired after being told the new administration intended to move “in a 
different direction” (Jehl, 2001). A “business process analysis” of the 2000 planning rule 
was then initiated. The results of this analysis, the NFMA Planning Rule Review, released 
in April, 200186, concluded that the planning rules: 
…do not appear to have been written with the objective of being 
implemented…even if the agency could acquire the skills and expertise 
needed for collaboration, social and economic and program management, 
it is unlikely that the budget or resources necessary to provide the policy 
and guidelines would exist. In addition, information management, 
landscape ecologists and geographic information systems skills necessary 
for implementation are not yet within the agency (Larson et al., 2001, p. 
3). 
 
 The first major topic of concern brought up in the NFMA Planning Rule Review 
was the “new terminology and standards for forest planning” created by the requirement 
in 2000 rule to “… provide for maintenance or restoration of the characteristics of 
ecosystem composition, and structure within the range of viability that would be expected 
to occur under natural disturbance regimes of the current climatic period…” The review 
notes that: 
…terms in the Rule such as “range of variability,” “natural disturbance 
regimes,” and “current climatic period” are interesting concepts for 
science to pursue but they are also vague, immeasurable concepts that will 
cause endless debate and litigation when used as benchmarks or standards 
for success (Larson et al., 2001, p. 4). 
 
Ecosystem Management Reduced to Rhetoric 
 
This was the beginning of the end for ecosystem management as anything more 
than political rhetoric. Along with the emaciation of the ecosystem management concept 
went the aspirations of fire and aviation management for the development of increased 
                                                          
86 Larson et al. (2001). This was conducted by the Forest Service’s Inventory and Monitoring Institute 
who contracted with the Rapid-e Corporation. 
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technical and ecological skills and knowledge among its workforce, skills and knowledge 
necessary for implementation of the Federal Fire Policy.  A month after the release of the 
NFMA Planning Rule Review the new Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, appointed 
Dale Bosworth as Chief of the Forest Service, returning to the tradition of appointing a 
forester from the ranks of the agency to its top position. 2000 planning rule was also 
formally suspended in May and the process of developing new forest planning rules 
began. This new effort focused on developing alternatives to the viability requirements in 
the 1982 and 2000 rules (e.g. alternatives to the “interesting scientific concepts” tied to 
sustainability). One of Chief Bosworth’s first initiatives was to appoint a team to review 
the factors negatively affecting forest management and planning. 
 
By July, Bosworth and the new Undersecretary for Natural Resources and the 
Environment, Mark Rey, had rallied the back to basics proponents within and outside the 
agency behind the charge “analysis paralysis” (barrowed from Representative Hansen) in 
a campaign to reorient agency policy back towards a focus on active management and 
utilitarian uses of forest resources associated with stand vigor and resistance to crown 
fire. The contest over the relationship between social and ecological values in the 
conception of sustainability led to the elision of the definitions of severe catastrophic 
wildfire as that which burns outside the historic range of variability, as employed in the 
Cohesive Strategy and the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, and the deployment of these 
loaded terms in ways that suggest any fire that has unwanted impacts upon utilitarian 
values may be considered severe and catastrophic, whether they are ecologically 
beneficial and characteristic or not. In June, 2002, less than a month after the 10-Year 
Implementation Plan was released, Chief Bosworth’s team investigating the factors 
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affecting Forest Service management and planning released their report titled “The 
Process Predicament: How Statutory, Regulatory, and Administrative Factors Affect 
National Forest Management” (USDA Forest Service, 2002a).87 The report was used to 
bolster the claims that gridlock and excessive analysis requirements were hampering 
critically needed forest management. The executive summary begins: 
Despite a century of devotion to conservationism, the Forest Service today 
faces a forest health crisis of tremendous proportions. 73 million acres of 
national forests are at risk from severe wildland fires that threaten human 
safety and ecosystem integrity…Unfortunately, the Forest Service 
operates within a statutory, regulatory, and administrative framework that 
has kept the agency from effectively addressing rapid declines in forest 
health USDA Forest Service, 2002a, p. 5). 
 
 
                                                          
87 NFMA (1976) requires the agency to “provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on 
the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives and 
within the multiple-use objectives of a land management plan” (16 USC §1604 (g)(3)(B) (2000). The 1982 
implementing regulations require the agency to manage fish and wildlife habitat “to maintain viable 
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area” (36 CFR 
§219.19 (1982)). The Process Predicament stated that the “’viable populations’ requirement is (1) 
responsible for much of the time and expense that goes into project planning, (2) far more time-consuming 
than the landscape-scale analyses of habitat diversity required by legislation, and (3) arguably more 
rigorous than any provision in the Endangered Species Act.” 
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The subtle irony88 of this statement is that this quoted figure of “73 million acres 
of national forests…at risk from severe wildland fires” was derived by summing up the 
area of National Forest land in condition class 2 and 3 in fire regimes I and II from the 
coarse-scale fire regime condition class mapping effort undertaken by the Missoula Fire 
Sciences Lab to support the development of the Forest Service Cohesive Strategy of 
2000.89 The same data and concepts used in developing the draft Interagency Cohesive 
Strategy. In other words, it was derived through calculating what the NFMA Planning 
Rule Review called “the interesting concepts” of fire regimes and historic range of 
variability (HRV) that would “cause endless debate and litigation when used as a 
benchmarks or standards for success.” The ironic logic seems to be that concepts and 
methods from which this expanded figure of 73 million acres at risk is derived will not be 
employed in a strategic planning framework but rather the figure itself indicates the 
                                                          
88 The not so subtle irony is that at the same time that claims of gridlock, analysis paralysis and process 
predicament are advanced, numerous long and arduous analysis and planning efforts, in addition to the 
2000 forest planning rule, were halted or brought in for review and substantially rewritten only to fail 
repeatedly in court just as the 2005 and 2008 forest planning rules eventually did. Such was the fate of the 
Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment aka the Sierra Nevada Framework, in California signed by Regional 
Foresters Brad Powell and Jack Blackwell in January, 2001 (USDA Forest Service, 2001). The Framework 
incorporated the finding s of the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project or SNEP (CERES, 1996) which included 
some of the most critical and explicit statements regarding the effects of past timber harvesting in 
exacerbating current severe fire behavior and ecology (Skinner and Chang, 1996). The Framework was 
substantially revised and re-released in January, 2004 leading to litigation, with some reports of agency 
biologists having been removed from the planning team - and their data from the plan – because, according 
to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS, No Date), they described the effects of fire as playing a 
maintenance role for, rather than a threat to, spotted owl habitat. (See 
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/spotted-owl.html). More recently, on August 
13, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the agency and forest products industry, who 
had appealed the previous District Court’s ruling, that the agency had acted illegally in its consideration of 
alternatives in the revised 2004 framework. (Sierra Forest Legacy v. 
Rey, 577 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2009). The case was remanded back to District Court. See 
http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/snfpa/ and 
http://www.sierraforestlegacy.org/FC_LawsPolicyRegulations/KFSP_FrameworkRevisions.php, last 
accessed June, 2009.  
89 The report cites the USDA Forest Service “Historical Fire Regimes by Current Condition Classes” 
Website (http://fs.fed.us/fire/fuelman/data_summery_tables.pdf). This weblink no longer works however. 
How this figure was derived is not explained in the Process Predicament report but it is explained in the 
Forest Service’s revised GPRA Strategic Plan for 2004-2008, citing Schmidt et al. (2002), the formal 
publication coarse scale FRCC mapping project. The Strategic Plan is available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/strategic/fs-sp-fy04-08.pdf, last accessed May, 2009. 
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magnitude of the crisis and is deployed to emphasize the need to reduce the analytical 
burden on local units that, from the perspective of the back to basic proponents within 
and outside the agency, already know what needs to be done. 
 
The Misrepresentation of Fire Regime Condition Class 
 
The Process Predicament report is the beginning of the misrepresentation and 
misapplication of the fire regime and HRV concepts embedded in FRCC. Henceforth, 
FRCC is employed by agency leadership as if it corresponds to a simple measure of fire 
hazard due to fuels buildup. Condition class, a generalized measure of ecosystem change 
derived from the summing of the relative departure from historic conditions of the three 
variables of fire frequency, fire severity and vegetation composition. FRCC does not 
include a measure of fuel loading or forest density. It becomes employed, however, as a 
classification of fire hazard or risk.90 Recall from the description of fire regimes (Table 2 
Historic Natural Fire Regimes) that fire regime II, which was included in the calculation 
to arrive at this new number of “73 million acres of national forests,” are not usually 
forests but found primarily in grass and shrublands.91 They have little to do with the 
political battle over thinning for forest health or hazard reduction. More importantly for 
understanding the obfuscation and confusion surrounding FRCC in particular and fire 
risk and ecosystem restoration more generally, however, is that fire regime II is 
characterized by a fire frequency of 0 to 35 years and by “stand replacement severity.” 
                                                          
90 See for example this statement by Senator Feinstien in 2002: “…the highest fire risk category [is] called 
class III. Of that class, 23 million acres have been designated by both the Forest Service and the 
Department of Interior as in vital need of emergency treatment. Those are the strategic areas that need 
hazardous fuels taken out of the forests to avoid catastrophic fire.” (Feinstien, 2002). Available at 
http://feinstein.senate.gov/03Speeches/Protecting%20America%27s%20Forests.htm. Last accessed August, 
2009. 
91 Note that according to this classification, fire regimes III, IV & V may occur in any vegetation cover type 
at this broad scale.  
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Stand replacement severity, according to this classification, are fires that historically 
“consume or kill more than 80 percent of the basal area or more than 90 percent of the 
overstory canopy cover” (Schmidt et al., 2002, p. 5).92 The threat to ecosystem 
components in fire regime II, in other words, may just as likely be not from severe fire 
but from the lack of severe fire which, along with other factors such as grazing, may have 
lead to a change in species composition.93 
 
Hereafter, statements made by agency leadership (outside of Forest Service 
research) and many others quote this figure of 73 million acres of national forests at risk 
from severe wildland fires.94 The earlier estimate 39 million acres disappears. Recall that 
this 1995 estimate of 39 million acres, though crude, was based on an estimate of fuels 
accumulation only, not broader ecosystem conditions and it was based on the assumption 
of fuels management’s traditional role of prescribed burning. This is what prompted the 
agency to propose the massive increase in treatments in 1995 while at the same time 
noting that not every acre required active treatment because many of these acres were to 
be treated through allowing more fires to burn for resource benefit (WFU). Recall that it 
was this assumption that prompted the GAO (1999a) to ask how many of the 39 million 
acres initially identified actually required active treatment, how these areas will be 
                                                          
92 Following the definition of Morgan et al. (1994). It should be noted that the scale dependent nature of 
this variable makes it important to be consistent when attempting to use it as a component of a measure of 
the Historical range of variability. 
93 It should be noted that a characteristically severe fire (90% overstory mortality) in an ecosystem 
characterized as fire regime III may indeed present a risk to its integrity if its high departure is such that 
little is left of its historic composition, such as due to invasive species, where characteristically severe fire 
could permanently reduce the remnant native species. Restoration in such a case likely has little to do with 
fuels reduction as traditionally conceived other than to prevent fire until species composition is restored.  
94 “Forest Service officials say 73 million acres, about 40 percent of all Forest Service land, are at risk of 
severe fires in coming years.” New York Times, August 23, 2002, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/20020624snapmonday.html, last accessed June, 2009. See 
also http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/policy-analysis/fire-and-fuels-position-paper.pdf, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/four-threats/documents/firefuels-fs.pdf 
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selected and how these treatments will be designed while at the same time fulfilling its 
other stewardship responsibilities, such as the species diversity/viability requirements 
under NFMA (1976). Ensuring diversity was a principle motivation behind employing 
the HRV concept within the 2000 planning rule and hence the rationale for its 
incorporation into the Cohesive Strategy (and then into the 2001 Federal Fire Policy) in 
the form of FRCC. The FRCC concept and assessment method was a means of 
prioritizing ecosystems for restoration not fuels reduction itself. Determining FRCC was 
intended as a means of performing ecological assessment in order to analyze tradeoffs 
between various treatments and their consequences to more thoroughly and efficiently 
comply with NEPA (1970), ESA (1973) and NFMA (1976) as well as identifying where 
treatments might yield merchantable timber – that is, as the GAO (1999a) inquired, in 
accordance with its myriad stewardship responsibilities. 
 
In a twist on Franklin‘s (1998) observation quoted earlier regarding the potential 
of new information and its application (e.g. ecology and ecosystem management) to pose 
difficult problems because it can “alter basic premises and undermine assumptions” held 
by managers and policy makers alike, it appears that the opposite can also result - new 
information and its application can be altered and undermined to fit basic premises and 
assumptions held by management and policy makers. The back to basic proponents 
within the agency, Congress and the new administration began to successfully deploy a 
misrepresentation of FRCC to advance their basic premises and assumptions of the need 
for traditional active forest management (encapsulated in the phrase “thinning”) and 
streamlined environmental regulation (encapsulated in the phrase “analysis paralysis”). In 
other words FRCC, a measure of departure from historic fire regimes was misrepresented 
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as fire risk and deployed against the need for assessing departure from historic fire 
regimes to inform fuels management planning. 
 
Demise of the Interagency Cohesive Strategy 
 
 While the FRCC concept was being transformed from a rough indicator of 
ecological change and sustainability into a misrepresentation of fire risk, the Interagency 
Cohesive Strategy was also being transformed and ultimately cast aside. That is, the 
framework within which consistent definitions, methods and data for describing the core 
variables of sustainability and wildfire risk assessment were to be developed and agreed 
upon in order to implement collaborative, multi-scale fuels management planning was 
discarded while key terms and concepts of risk, wildland urban interface (WUI) and fire 
regime condition class (FRCC) were diluted of consistent meaning and analytical value. 
 
In March, 2002 the director of the Forest Service’s new National Fire Plan Office 
and the Department of Interior’s new Office of Wildland Fire Coordination sent a 
memo95 to their bureau chiefs committing the agency’s to working with tribal, state and 
county agencies to develop coordinated fuel plans “consistent with the direction provided 
in” the Interagency Cohesive Strategy and the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy. In April, 
2002, however, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC), composed of the newly 
appointed heads of the federal land management agencies, was established and this new 
coordinating body would take the federal approach to fire and fuels management in a 
direction consistent with the new back to basics orientation of agency leadership. 
                                                          
95 USDA, USDOI, NASF and NAC (2002) Memorandum of Understanding: Development of a 
Collaborative Fuels Treatment Program. Available at 
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/resources/documents/10-22-en.pdf Last accessed January, 2010. 
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WFLC was established at the direction of Congress, on the recommendation of 
the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA, 2001) and the GAO (2002), to 
coordinate the many disparate strategies and plans that had been developed in wake of the 
2000 fires, specifically the many federal fire management programs and their attempts to 
integrate under the Federal Fire Policy, and the state and county efforts under 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy. The WFLC was supposed to oversee this coordination and the 
Congressional funding allocated to these efforts. The first meeting in May, 2002 Forest 
Service Chief Bosworth was elected Chair of WFLC and at the following meeting in 
June, 2002, the first operational meeting of WFLC, the draft Interagency Cohesive 
Strategy was discussed.96 Several modifications were made including the addition of an 
emphasis on “value added commercial activities” and elimination of the references to the 
eight alternative strategic options and their associated funding levels – elements explicitly 
requested by the GAO (1999a, 2000). The most effective program option in the 
interagency cohesive strategy, based on restoration rather than simply fuel reduction, 
recommended tripling the fuels budget. The modified strategy document was approved 
by WFLC at its July, 2002 meeting awaiting only the creation of a signature page. It was 
never released however.97 
                                                          
96 See WFLC minutes for June 4, 2002 are no longer available online. This author has a copy available 
upon request.  
97 The history of the draft Interagency Cohesive Strategies subsequently becomes murky and difficult to 
piece together. A subsequent memorandum of understanding on the development of a collaborative fuels 
treatment program (Hartzell and Leaverton, 2002), that was signed by the heads of WFLC and the 
signatories of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy in January, 2003, made no reference to the Interagency 
Cohesive Strategy. Available at http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/resources/documents/9-21-en.pdf 
Last accessed January, 2010. The January, 2003 MOU references the earlier March, 2002 memo 
committing to collaboration “consistent with the direction provided in” the Interagency Cohesive Strategy 
and the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy but states that it will “function independent of that process.” 
References to the strategy disappear from WFLC meeting minutes until the May, 2004 meeting at which 
point Lynn Scarlet, Deputy Secretary, Department of Interior, reported that “The Cohesive Strategy is not 
yet approved. There is a dichotomy between creating a national strategy and the need for strong 
collaborative efforts at the local level.”  The agencies released a joint “Cohesive Fuels Treatment Strategy” 
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The Healthy Forest Initiative 
 
The summer of 2002 saw another extraordinary fire season with 21 firefighter 
deaths, massive evacuations and over 7 million acres burned and 3,000 structures 
destroyed. As The Clinton Administration and agency leadership used the fires of 2000 to 
push their land management agenda, so too did the Bush administration and the new 
agency leadership use the sever fires of 2002. In August, President Bush, against the 
backdrop of the still burning Biscuit Fire in southern Oregon, announced the Healthy 
Forest Initiative (HFI). “We need to thin,” President Bush stated. "We need to make our 
forests healthy by using some common sense...We need to understand, if you let kindling 
build up and there's a lightning strike, you're going to get yourself a big fire…The forest 
policy of our government is misguided policy,” the President stated, characterized by 
“endless litigation” and “red tape.”98 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in 2006, which employed the misrepresentation of FRCC as a fuel loading and fire risk indicator. However, 
the GAO (2006, 2008) criticized this version for its lack of a strategic framework, that it provided no 
information upon which Congress or any interested party could discern how risk will be evaluated and what 
criteria will be used for prioritizing projects. The GAO (2006) reported that the Forest Service and Interior 
agencies said they have not released the Interagency Cohesive Strategy because the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) raised concerns about the accuracy of the data used to make budget projections for the 
eight alternatives presented. What is curious about this assertion is that these budget projections and 
alternatives are precisely what WFLC eliminated from the strategy in 2002. It should also be noted that the 
OMB had embarked on an initiative to rewrite federal agency standards for risk assessment, releasing its 
draft bulletin of technical guidance for review in January, 2006. This bulletin was roundly criticized for its 
industry bias, departure form accepted risk assessment standards and lack of scientific validity. The 
National Research Council was asked to conduct a review of the OMB risk assessment memo and in 
January, 2007 released its scathing conclusion that the guidelines should be withdrawn noting that “it 
adopts a new definition of risk assessment and ignores, without explaining, the important impact that risk 
assessment policies have on the process…agency risk assessments are [thus] more susceptible to being 
manipulated to achieve a predetermined result.” (National Research Council (2007) p. 107). Available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11811&page=107.) This is precisely what Hann et al. 
(2003) warned against regarding the promotion of “hidden agendas” in reporting the result of their analysis 
and options for the Interagency Cohesive Strategy. 
98 Cited from CNN.com, August 22, 2002. Available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/22/bush.timber/ Last accessed January, 2008. The 
announcement of HFI followed the initiation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) task force 
on May 20, 2002. The final report, Modernizing NEPA Implementation was not released until September, 
2003, after many of the HFI’s enactments were already put in place, but the elements of HFI announced in 
August appear to draw on the reports recommendations. Available at 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/totaldoc.html#executive Last accessed April, 2009. 
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The Healthy Forest Initiative had four basic components99 1) streamline 
administrative reviews of forest health projects that “enable priority forest thinning (fuels 
treatment) and forest restoration (reseeding and planting) projects to proceed quickly; 2) 
amend rules to expedite the appeals process; 3) expedite project review for Endangered 
Species Act compliance and 4) establish a streamlined Environmental Assessment 
process for national Environmental Policy Act compliance. Back to basic proponents 
were thrilled. Montana Governor Judy Martz, in her state of the state address of 2003,100 
noted that: 
…we are working closely with President Bush to bring common sense 
back to forest management. We must manage our forests to reduce the risk 
of catastrophic fires. We will achieve that goal by giving the right tools to 
the forest managers and private businesses. In the process, we will bring 
back good logging jobs to communities like Hamilton and Stevensville, 
Seeley Lake and Frenchtown (Martz, 2003, no page). 
 
 
Environmental groups and fire researchers were aghast. In September several 
academic fire researchers published an open letter to President Bush and Member of 
Congress stating: 
As fire researchers and ecologists, we are writing to you concerning the 
scientific basis for efforts to reduce risks from the kinds of forest fires that 
have attracted so much media and political attention in the western United 
States this year…responding effectively to this fire situation requires 
thoughtfulness and care. The fires are traceable to differing factors in 
different regions and forest types. Some have burned in forests where fire 
exclusion and land use have created unnatural accumulations of fuels 
while others have burned in a relatively natural manner. The most debated 
response to alleviating destructive fires in the future – mechanically 
thinning trees – has had limited study, and that has been conducted 
primarily in dry forest types. Thinning of overstory trees, like building 
new roads, can often exacerbate the situation and damage forest 
                                                          
99 Executive Office of the President (2002) HFI Factsheet. Available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/ceq/hfi_12-02_wh_fact_sheet.pdf. Last accessed January, 2008. 
100 Martz (2003). Available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/speech?contentId=16161 Last accessed 
January, 2009. 
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health…No single cause can explain the variety and number of fires 
occurring this year in western forests. In some drier forest types, such as 
the semi-arid ponderosa pine ecosystems, fire exclusion aided by grazing 
and logging has produced accumulations of highly flammable fuel well 
outside historical norms. However, in many western forests, including 
parts of the Siskiyou (mountains of the Biscuit fire), Sierra Nevada, 
Cascades, and Central Rockies, much of the undergrowth is primarily the 
product of succession from past logging and other disturbance, rather than 
fire exclusion alone. In other settings, like southwestern chaparral and the 
lodgepole pine forests of the Rockies, succession naturally produces 
highly flammable communities, and periodic crown killing fires are 
inevitable and ecologically desirable. Drought conditions such as those 
seen across much of the West this year can produce extensive fires even in 
areas where fuel loads are “normal (Franklin et al., 2002, p. 1). 
 
3.4.5 A New Forest Planning Rule: Integrated Assessments Optional 
 
When a new proposed forest planning rule was released in December, 2002101 the 
disturbance regime and HRV concepts were rehabilitated somewhat from their earlier 
disparagement in Chief Bosworth’s NFMA Planning Rule Review as interesting scientific 
concepts irrelevant to forest planning and management. Two options were proposed in 
the 2002 rule for complying with species diversity requirements of NFMA, neither of 
which “specifically requires use of the concept of the range of variability under the 
natural disturbance regime of the current climatic period, but Option 1 identifies range of 
variability as being among the approaches that may be used to evaluate ecosystem 
diversity.” When the final rule was released in January, 2005 it was described as 
“aspirational” in nature. The rule stated that it is “less detailed than either Options 1 or 2 
with respect to specific ecosystem analysis requirements” and does not explicitly require 
“analysis of ecosystem diversity at multiple temporal and spatial scales, analysis of 
disturbance regimes, or analysis of the landscape context.”102 Unlike the 2000 forest 
                                                          
101 67 Fed. Reg. 72769 (December 6 2002). 
102 70 Fed. Reg. 1021 (January 5, 2005). 
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planning rules with its proposed multi-scale planning using a single analysis framework 
(based in large part on disturbance regimes and their historic range of variability (HRV) 
to which the initial Forest Service Cohesive Strategy was linked via the FRCC concept) 
the 2005 rules directed analysis solely at project level and even monitoring of their 
effects was discretionary. In place of requiring ecological assessments and the 
development of tiered planning framework, as well as part of the agency’s argument that 
the 2005 rules did not themselves require NEPA analysis, the 2005 rule introduced 
Environmental Management System (EMS). EMS does not specify how legal obligations 
and agency directions are to be achieved but rather establishes a process for documenting 
how planning is done and what assessments procedures are used (if any since this is 
discretionary under the new planning rule) by forest planning teams in developing their 
plans that specify how laws and directions will be addressed. Direction for analysis was 
to be provided in Forest Service Manual and Handbook but since the 2005 rules were 
successfully challenged in court, as were the revised rule of 2008 this remains a moot 
point.103 
 
3.4.6 Removing the Strategy from the GPRA Strategic Plan 
 
In 2003 the Forest Service revised its Strategic Plan FY 2004-2008 as required by 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA, 1993) releasing its report in 
November, 2004. The new strategic goal number one was changed from “Ensure 
Sustainable Ecosystems” to “Reduce the Risk of Catastrophic Wildland Fire.” The 
                                                          
103 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Citizens for a better Forestry v. USDA, 
567 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2009) ordered the Forest Service to cease implementation and use of the 2008 rules, in June, 
2009. The 2000 rule, as amended, is now in affect. The new Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack, has initiated 
new forest planning rule development process. 
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description of this goal begins by restating the four goals of the 10-Year Comprehensive 
Strategy but also repeating the misrepresentation of FRCC as fire risk, citing “…73 
million acres of NFS lands…at high risk of ecologically destructive wildland fire 
(Condition Classes 2 and 3, Fire Regime I and II)” in the same manner as in the Process 
Predicament (2002) initiating the misrepresentation of FRCC and the rollback of 
ecosystem management. The new Strategic Plan retained the acres treated metric, 
ignoring the recommendations made by the GAO (1999a) and in initial Forest Service 
Cohesive Strategy (2000) for replacing GPRA performance measures with a measure of 
ecosystem restoration. The Cohesive Strategy (2000) is not mentioned and nothing even 
remotely resembling it’s recommended “institutional” and “program management” 
changes to strategic planning are discussed, such as the recommendations in the Cohesive 
Strategy (2000) for: 
 The establishment of assessment procedures that integrates current ecosystem 
condition, probability of degradation from disturbance and alternatives to reduce 
the probability of degradation or improve degraded conditions; 
 
 Design and implement systematic methods for landscape scale assessments of the 
history, status, and trajectory of ecosystem conditions. 
 
 
Though citing the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy as the source of its goals and 
objectives (which, recall, were adopted from the Cohesive Strategy), the new Forest 
Service GPRA Strategic Plan does not define catastrophic wildland fire as the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy does - wildfire “that burns more intensely than the natural or 
historical range of variability, thereby fundamentally changing the ecosystem…” It does 
not, in fact, define any terms at all. In place of any definitions of the objects towards 
which the strategy is aimed, or any program management changes to implement this 
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strategy, there is a vague recitation of sustainability and management actions even more 
vacuous and disconnected than the 1998 Strategic Plan criticized by the GAO (1998b) 
specifically for its lack of clarity and explanation of how the accomplishment metrics 
adopted provide any kind of linkage between the proposed strategy and the management 
actions that are supposed to achieve its goals. The 2004-2008 Strategic Plan states: 
In considering the Nation’s and the Forest Service’s future courses of 
action, the agency cannot say with certainty that any particular set of 
conditions for the Nation’s forests and grasslands would have long-term 
sustainability. Sustainability is a dynamic target because environmental, 
economic, and social conditions (and the Forest Service’s understanding 
of these three elements and their interrelationships) are always changing. 
Thus, sustainability is a journey that may have a range of acceptable 
outcomes, as well as a range of potential courses to achieve those 
outcomes…Future assessments will monitor indicator trends and provide a 
scientific basis for evaluating progress in achieving our mission (USDA 
Forest Service, 2004c, p. 25).104 
 
                                                          
104 The USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited the Forest Service for GPRA compliance in 2005 
and their report begins by stating that “The Forest Service has not effectively implemented a 
comprehensive strategy for collecting and reporting performance data, as it agreed to do in response to a 
June 2000 Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit.” The report continues by noting that agency “has a 
long-standing history of not being able to provide Congress or the public with a clear understanding of 
what employees accomplish with a multi-billion dollar budget ($4.8 billion in FY 2004)” and specifically 
criticized the agency for failing to provide the leadership necessary to develop a cohesive strategy as called 
for the GAO. The USDA OIG report Forest Service Implementation of the Government Performance and 
Results Act is available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/08601-01-HY.pdf. Last accessed March, 
2009. The Strategic plan was eventually updated earlier than required. The current GPRA Strategic Plan for 
FY 2007 – 2012 (USDA Forest Service, 2007) is even more ambiguous. It begins by stating guiding 
principles which include “Forest and grassland restoration will help reestablish structural characteristics, 
native species, and ecological processes…The agency’s commitment to restoring the functional resiliency 
of forests and grasslands to resist disturbance and change is the foundation of its management” (p. 4) The 
GPRA requires a statement of goals, outcomes and performance measures. Goal One now reads “Restore 
sustain, and enhance the nation’s Forests and Grasslands.” The Outcome is “Forests and grasslands with the 
capacity to maintain their health, productivity, diversity, and resistance to unnaturally severe disturbance,” 
while the Performance Measure is the “Number and percentage of acres treated to restore fire-adapted 
ecosystems that are (1) moved toward desired conditions and (2) maintained in desired conditions” (p. 9). 
FRCC has been dropped all together. There is no alternative for defining or determining “desired 
condition” or “unnaturally severe disturbance” let alone some means of trying to reconcile the contradiction 
in the above stated principle of restoration ecological processes to be resistant to disturbance and change 
since disturbance and change are fundamental to ecological processes. Available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/strategic/fs-sp-fy07-12.pdf Last accessed January, 2009. 
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3.4.7 The End of Landscape-Scale Fuels Management 
 
There were several actions following the announcement of the Healthy Forest 
Initiative to implement its stated objectives. The new Categorical Exclusions (CE) from 
NEPA analysis for fuels reduction projects (enacted in June, 2003) and the Healthy 
Forest Restoration Act (HFRA, PL 108-148, December, 2003) arguably had the most 
impact on fuels management.105 Both the CE and the HFRA have the stated objective of 
reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires to communities and other values by restoring 
forest health. Both the CE and HFRA employ the FRCC concept attached to the same 
values to be protected as employed in the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy. However, as 
in The Process Predicament (USDA Forest Service, 2002a) that initiated the back to 
basics backlash against ecosystem management, the CE and HFRA employ the now 
familiar misrepresentation of FRCC as a measure of fire risk put forth in the Process 
Predicament and GPRA Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2008 eliding the distinction between 
fire hazard due to fuels buildup and a relative measure of change in fire’s historic role 
and ecological effects. The CE and HFRA represent an elision of the multiple pathways 
or components of departure from historic conditions, only some of which are amenable to 
                                                          
105 Other actions enacted under HFI are: 
 Exemptions of CEs from citizen administrative appeals which normally automatically trigger an 
administrative review. This was overturned by a Federal District Court decision (Earth Island v. 
Pengelly, 376 F.Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) and subsequently upheld in Earth Island v. Ruthenbeck, 
459 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.2006). 
 Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations (68 Fed. Reg. 68254 
(December 8, 2003)) which established special training courses for local managers who, once certified 
and with appropriate plans in place, could make determinations that proposed projects would “not 
likely adversely effect” threatened and endangered (T&E) species for National Fire Plan projects. 
Previously, and still for non NFP projects, such determinations must be made by consultants from the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries). Additionally, USFWS and NOAA were instructed to weigh the 
short term negative effects against the long term benefits to T&E species of NFP projects. 
 A streamlined Environmental Assessment (EA) process amounted to a template with directions to be 
concise. 
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fuels reduction and only some of these may be amenable to thinning. Perhaps more 
importantly, FRCC is employed solely as a criterion for the application of these new 
hazardous fuels project authorities – not as a means of gathering information on the 
causes of departure in order to develop and prioritize ecosystem restoration projects. In 
short, all fuels reduction is characterized as restoration and are reported as such in 
National Fire Plan accomplishment reports.106 
 
There are two new CEs for hazardous fuels reduction activities that resulted form 
the HFI; CE #10 for mechanical treatment and prescribed fire, and CE #11 for post-fire 
rehabilitation treatment. CE #10 may be used for mechanical treatment of up to 1,000 
acres and prescribed burning up to 4,500 acres, while CE #11 may be used on up to 4,500 
acres of post-fire rehabilitation of habitat, heritage or infrastructure.107 The sale of timber 
is allowed under both CEs but the stated objective of the project must be fuels reduction. 
CE # 11 is restricted to burn in wildfires areas while CE # 10 may be applied to areas: 
 
1. in the wildland urban interface (WUI) or; 
 
2. Condition Classes 2 or 3 in Fire Regime I, II, or III, outside the WUI or; 
 
3. projects identified in community wildfire protection plans (CWPP). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 See for example Healthy Forest Reports on the National Fire Plan Website available at 
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/reports/documents/healthyforests/2008/healthy_forests_report_fy200
8.pdf Last accessed Last accessed May, 2009. 
107 Neither CE #10 or #11 may be conducted in wilderness or impair suitability for wilderness, use 
herbicides, pesticides or require permanent roads. 
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The HFRA, while intended to streamline project development, is nonetheless a 
complex piece of legislation covering several forest management issues.108 Title I, 
covering hazardous fuels management, is to be used to “reduce wildfire risk to 
communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk Federal land through a 
collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel 
reduction projects.” The criteria for HFRA authorized projects are similar to the CE. 
They may be conducted on: 
1. Federal land in WUI; 
 
2. Federal land in condition class 3 “in such proximity to a municipal water 
supply system or a stream feeding such a system within a municipal 
watershed that a significant risk exists that a fire disturbance event would 
have adverse effects on the water quality of the municipal water supply or 
the maintenance of the system, including a risk to water quality posed by 
erosion following such a fire disturbance event”; 
 
3. Federal land in condition class 2 located within fire regime I, II or III with 
similar criteria regarding proximity to a municipal water supply systems or 
streams as above.109 
 
 
                                                          
108 There are 6 other parts to the HFRA: Title 1 Hazardous Fuels on Federal Land; Title II Biomass 
(utilization and research); Title III Watershed Forestry Assistance, Title IV Insect Infestation and Related 
Diseases;  Title V Healthy Forest Reserve Program and; Title VI Miscellaneous, dealing with national 
monitoring of environmental threats.  Projects carried out under HFRA authority replaced the post-decision 
appeals process with a pre-decision objection process (section 105) and established alternative judicial 
review procedures (sect 106) for projects by limiting the number of alternatives analyzed under NEPA 
depending on various combinations of the criteria under which HFRA applies such as whether project is 
covered in a Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) and whether it is within or outside the Wildland 
Urban Interface (WUI) and or within or outside 1.5 miles of an “At-Risk Community.” See below for 
definitions. 
109 Also for: 4) windthrow, storm damage that threaten fire spread or insect and disease spread into adjacent 
ecosystems or threaten forest or rangland resources (undefined but usually understood as timber stands and 
grazing land) as well as 5) Federal land not covered in paragraph 1 through 4 that contain threatened or 
endangered species habitat if the natural fire regime is important or wildfire is identified as a threat to these 
species. The HFRA also included ideas not in the HFI or the initial McInnis bill (H.R. 1904) adopted by the 
House of Representatives in May, 2003 but included in the final bill after Senate debate. These include 
requirements for maintaining and restoring old-growth forest stands, requiring that HFRA authorized 
projects maximize retention of larger trees in areas other than old-growth forest stands and requiring that at 
least 50% of the dollars allocated for HFRA projects be used for at-risk community protection. 
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It should be noted that, like the successive Forest Planning rule revisions (USDA 
Forest Service, 2005, 2008), the categorical exclusion for fuels reduction projects was 
eventually found to be in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the promulgation of the CE was arbitrary 
and capricious and thus a violation of NEPA in December, 2007.110 Among the reasons 
given the court found that the CE as written lacked the specificity that would allow the 
significance of effects of activities carried out under its authority to be assessed in any 
meaningful way.111 However, at the time data was collected for this research the CE was 
still in effect. 
 
Having been initiated as part of a campaign against conducting assessment for 
fuels reduction and forest health restoration under the rhetoric of “analysis paralysis,” 
these enactments of the Healthy Forest Initiative contain no discussion of how either fire 
risk or the ecological role of fire are to be characterized and analyzed. And they do not 
specify how this determination is to inform project planning and decisionmaking.112 Nor 
are key terms such as restoration; forest health; resilience; ecosystem; or watershed 
defined in either the CE or HFRA.113 The terms “at-risk community” and WUI are 
                                                          
110 Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 510 F.3d 1016-1027 (9th Cir. 2007). 
111 In addition, the court found, the information used by the agencies to demonstrate that actions carried out 
under the CE’s provision would not individually or cumulatively have significant impacts on the 
environment was collected after the CE was promulgated. Thus the court found that the agencies failed to 
properly assess its significance. Following the Ninth Circuits Ruling, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of California then enjoined the use of the CE in November, 2008. Forest Service Chief Kimbell 
issued a memo notifying all agency units to stop use of the CE a week later. The Forest Service Handbook 
(1909.15.30) was updated in April, 2009 with the fuels CE crossed out. Note that this occurred after the 
interviews for this research, presented in the next chapter, were conducted. 
112 There are provisions for a national risk assessment center however. 
113 Municipal water supplies are defined (Section 101) as the infrastructural components for water 
collection, storage and transport. Section 102 (authorized projects), however, also includes streams feeding 
such systems. All lands in the United States are classified into watersheds, the most common classification 
scheme used in the Forest Service is the USGS watershed classification system of hydrologic unit codes 
(HUC).  
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defined such that virtually any area may be considered at-risk and in the WUI114 similar 
to the list hastily gathered list, based on no specifications, published in the Federal 
Register at the direction of Congress in fiscal year 2001 appropriations consisting of 
11,000 communities ranging from several outbuildings to whole communities.115 
 
Unlike the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy the term catastrophic wildfire is not 
defined as fire that burns outside its natural range of variability. In fact (just as in the 
GPRA Strategic Plan (USDA Forest Service 2004c, 2007) the term catastrophic wildfire 
is not defined at all. FRCC is defined following the Cohesive Strategy, the Interagency 
Cohesive Strategy and the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, though its use as a measure 
of the ecological role of fire is obscured and not linked to the term catastrophic fire. Fuel 
reduction is defined as “methods for reducing hazardous fuels, including prescribed fire, 
wildland fire use, and various mechanical methods such as crushing, tractor and hand 
piling, thinning (to produce commercial or pre-commercial products), and pruning. They 
are selected on a site-specific case and are ecologically appropriate and cost effective.”116 
What constitutes ecologically appropriate is unspecified. Actually conducting FRCC 
assessments is discretionary - even though it is a criterion for employing CE or HFRA 
                                                          
114 The term “at-risk community” is defined (in section 101, Definitions) as an area comprised by any 
community that is a) on the list of communities submitted in response to FY 2001 appropriations (66 Fed. 
Reg. 753 (January 4, 2001)) - a list collected without any criteria of inclusion or exclusion); b) group of 
homes and other structures adjacent to Federal land; c) an area in which conditions are conducive to large-
scale wildfire disturbance and d) areas for which there is significant threat to human life or property.  
Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) is defined as any plan developed for the protection of an at-
risk community. The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) is defined as an area within or adjacent to an at-risk 
community identified in a CWPP. For areas without CWPPs, WUI is defined as a half-mile buffer around 
an at-risk community or an area within one and half miles of an at-risk community with steep slopes that 
create dangerous fire behavior or with other geographic features that can aid in fire control or is in 
Condition Class III as documented in project-specific environmental analysis. 
115 Urban Wildland Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk 
From Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 751, 754 (January 4. 2001).  
116 The actual term used is “authorized hazardous fuels reduction project” and refers to the definition of 
“appropriate tools” provided in the Glossary of the 10-Year Comprehensive strategy Implementation Plan. 
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authorities for projects in specific areas. The HFRA treats both monitoring and 
assessment as similar activities, both occurring after treatment. It calls for “periodic 
monitoring” (within 5 years) of a representative sample of projects using the FRCC 
Guidebook for “comparing end results to: (A) pretreatment conditions; (B) historical fire 
regimes; and (C) any applicable watershed or landscape goals or objectives in the 
resource management plan or other relevant direction.”117 Assessing FRCC post 
treatment defeats the specific purpose of prescribing FRCC as a criterion for employing 
CE or HFRA decisionmaking authority as well as the more general purpose of employing 
information on fire behavior and ecology to inform planning and decisionmaking. 
Moreover, results of FRCC Guidebook assessments are critically sensitive to the spatial 
and temporal extent of the area analyzed such that HFRA’s direction for “comparing end 
results to: (A) pretreatment conditions; (B) historical fire regimes” cannot be achieved 
with any validity unless conditions were assessed prior to treatment and the follow-up 
monitoring was conducted in the same way at the same spatial and temporal scale.118 
 
While legislation is often argued to be the inappropriate venue for prescribing 
detailed, site specific requirements, the HFRA includes objectives as well as criteria 
under which its authority may be employed without requiring any procedures to 
determine whether these objectives or criteria are met. There are, for example, no 
requirements or provisions that local units (such as a national forest) must formulate and 
                                                          
117 HFRA Section 102 (g) (4). The HFI/HFRA Interim Field Guide (USDA and USDOI, 2004) does state 
that managers “should” conduct assessments at the appropriate scale using the FRCC Guidebook protocols. 
The first version of the FRCC Guidebook protocols for conducting “project-scale” assessments was 
released in the fall of 2003. The current version (1.3.0) was revised in 2008 (USDA et al. 2008). 
118 The FRCC Guidebook discusses the issue of scale and pre and post treatment comparison at length. It 
should also be noted the entire procedure results in information that is intended to inform the process of 
prioritizing locations and the design of treatments called “restoration context.” 
 - 143 -  
employ consistent definitions of what constitutes wildfire risk, poor forest health and 
ecologically appropriate treatments on their particular landscapes. There are no 
requirements or provisions to collect information on fuels conditions that affect fire 
behavior or the ecological role of fire. There are no requirements or provisions to specify 
how fuel reduction relates to fire behavior or the ecological role of fire, including its role 
in reducing fuels, and thus what constitutes risk reduction or forest health restoration. 
There are no requirements or provisions for identifying tradeoffs between the various 
means of achieving the objectives of community protection on the one hand and forest 
health restoration on the other. 
 
The categorical exclusion (CE) from NEPA analysis requirements for fuels 
reduction projects and the Healthy Forest Restoration Act represent the antithesis of 
strategic multi-scale fuels management and planning. The purpose of categorical 
exclusions, their very definition, is that they are to be used when it can be demonstrated 
that there are no negative cumulative impacts thus allowing a project to go forward with 
minimal analysis. However, the whole point of the strategic, multi-scale planning is 
precisely to produce cumulative impacts across the landscape. This requires consistent 
broad-scale analysis to identify and prioritize areas for different types and sizes of 
treatment. 
 
With FRCC misrepresented as fire hazard, the CE and HFRA provide maximum 
discretion to local managers to define “catastrophic fire,” “fire risk,” “forest health” and 
“ecological restoration” and to identify and prioritize fuel treatment location and type on 
an ad-hoc basis, unencumbered by a guiding strategy and a formal prioritization process. 
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With key terms undefined and assessment of the conditions these undefined terms 
supposedly refer to being optional, virtually any kind of treatment in any location may 
count as risk reduction and restoration. The USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG), in 
a 2006 audit of Forest Service implementation of the Healthy Forest Initiative, echoed the 
GAOs criticism of the agency’s continuing failure to develop a cohesive fire and fuels 
management strategy and for failing to develop “specific national guidance for weighing 
the risks against the benefits of fuels treatment and restoration projects” noting that “the 
identification and prioritization of projects is performed by and at the discretion of 
individual field units” (USDA OIG, 2006, p. i-ii). “The emphasis on achieving acres 
treated,” the OIG concluded, “is overriding the need to accomplish more effective and 
better-integrated treatments that achieve the desired fuel and restoration outcomes” 
(ibid.). According to yet another critical GAO (2007) report on the failure to develop a 
cohesive and integrated strategy or a requirement to consistently employ any kind of 
formal risk assessment process “virtually any project can qualify as high priority” (GAO, 
2007, p. 65).119 
 
3.5 Summary: Whither Fuels Management Policy? 
 
In testimony before a Congressional Oversight Hearing in 2005 on the Forest 
Service and DOI’s implementation of the HFRA and the GAOs five year update report120 
on the agencies’ progress in developing and issuing a cohesive strategy, Governor Janet 
Napolitano of Arizona, Vice-Chair of the Western Governors Association (WGA) gave 
testimony on the implementation of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy. Governor 
                                                          
119 The GAO subsequently released two additional reports on the same topic in 2008 and 2009a. 
120 GAO (2005), Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain 
to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147. 
 - 145 -  
Nepolitano stated that “there is a need for a clarified vision of restoring fire-adapted 
ecosystems, including landscape contexts that emphasize the use of fire as a management 
tool” (Napolitano, 2005, p. 3) Included in her testimony were findings from a report 
prepared for the WGA by an independent panel which recommended the completion of 
the Interagency Cohesive Strategy in order for the promise of the National Fire Plan to be 
realized. The report found that: 
The institution of new directives related to the Healthy Forests Initiative 
(HFI) and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) over the past year 
has made certain collaborative efforts more complicated. Further, the 
strong emphasis on fuels (Goal Two) under HFI/HFRA comes at the 
expense of other 10-Year Strategy goals, most notably restoration (Goal 
Three) and community assistance (Goal Four)… Clarity on how 
stakeholders can effectively participate in the federal planning process, 
particularly in incorporating non-federal concerns, is needed. Enhancing 
the collaborative selection of fuel treatment projects is also needed to 
improve implementation of Goal Two. A lack of understanding of the 
collaborative process, consistency in implementation and differing 
interpretation of fire regime condition class (FRCC) were given as major 
stumbling blocks. Cumbersome budgeting processes, fuel target pressures 
and confusion of definitions impede working across jurisdictional 
boundaries (WGA, 2004, p. 2-4).121 
 
  
The independent panel’s report to the Western Governors Association also stated 
that the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) “does not provide for meaningful 
participation by non-federal stakeholders and tends to pre-determine outcomes prior to its 
meetings” (WGA, 2004, p. 2). Recall that the Interagency Cohesive Strategy was initiated 
precisely to provide the clarified vision Governor Napolitano called for and provided the 
basis for the distinction between fuels reduction and restoration (Goals Two & Three) 
                                                          
121 The Report to the Western Governors on the Implementation of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, prepared 
by the WGAs Forest Health Advisory Committee (FHAC). Available at 
http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/fire/tempe-report04.pdf Last accessed January, 2009. The text of the 
Oversight Hearing is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:98808.pdf. Last accessed January, 2009. 
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employed in the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy. It was to be the basis for developing 
mutual understanding of key concepts and the consistent use of terms denoting these 
concepts as well as the methods for analyzing them, such as FRCC and fire risk, and 
incorporating the results into a collaborative planning process. In June, 2004, however, 
WFLC gave the reason for not releasing the Interagency Cohesive Strategy as “a 
dichotomy between creating a national strategy and the need for strong collaborative 
efforts at the local level.”122  
 
The increasing cost of fire suppression has led to a series of large fire cost reviews 
highly critical of the failure of the Forest Service to implement core elements of the 2001 
Federal Fire Policy.123 Many have reached similar conclusions and made similar 
recommendations regarding the need for strategic and integrated planning across 
jurisdictions to the report for the fire season of 1999 (USDA Forest Service, 2000d) that, 
together with the Cerro Grand fire investigations (USDOI BLM et al., 2000), prompted 
the 2001 update to the 1995 Federal Fire Policy.124 A 2004 large fire cost review 
conducted for the Wildland Fire Leadership Council itself125 noted that while hazardous 
                                                          
122 See the minutes of the WFLC meeting for May, 2004. Available at 
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/leadership/meetings/meetingnote05182004.shtml Last accessed 
January, 2009. 
123 These large fire cost reviews are conducted by independent panels, usually with the assistance of retired 
agency personnel, whenever fires exceed $10 million. The large fire cost review process has been 
undergoing revision with the increasing frequency of large expensive fires since 2002. The National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) was tasked with developing an interagency guide for conducting 
such reviews in 2007. 
124 USDA Forest Service (2000) Policy Implications of Large Fire Management: A Strategic Assessment of 
Factors Influencing Costs. This is the review that revealed that only 5% land management units, such as 
national forests, had developed fire management plans as required by the 1995 Federal Fire Policy. 
Available at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/management/Large_Fire_Mgt.pdf Last accessed January, 2009. 
125 Large Fire Suppression Costs: Strategies for Cost Containment: A Report to the Wildland Fire 
Leadership Council From the Strategic Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs (WFLC, 2004). Available 
at http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/reports/documents/2004/costmanagement.pdf Last accessed 
August, 2009. 
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fuels treatments have significantly increased since the initiation of the National Fire Plan, 
this increase is uncoordinated and inadequate noting that: 
…a paradigm shift in thinking about hazardous fuels reduction 
effectiveness is required and can be started by ceasing to use acres treated 
as a results measurement for program accomplishments…Federal agencies 
must move beyond current hazardous fuels reduction strategies toward a 
more holistic wildland fire management program…it is apparent that 
current fuels reduction strategies are not able to address the full magnitude 
and scope of the fuels problem (WFLC, 2004, p. 26-7). 
 
 
A large fire cost review of the fires of 2007 conducted by the Brookings Institute, 
found that none of the 21 land management plans or fire management plans it reviewed 
included what the panel considered to be the necessary guidance and direction or the 
requisite data and information that would allow for implementation of a collaborative and 
integrated strategy across jurisdictions and as called for in the 2001 Federal Fire 
Policy.126 In response to these many critical reviews and the Federal Fire Policy’s 
requirement for periodic review of progress towards implementation, the National Fire 
and Aviation Executive Board (NFAEB), which oversees all interagency fire 
management policy, initiated a review in 2004 of fire and fuels management modeled 
after the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QFR). The resulting 
report (called the Quadrennial Fire and Fuels Review – QFFR) released in 2005, like the 
many reviews before it, reiterated the need to develop a process within which integrated 
and collaborative multi-scale, cross jurisdictional plans could be developed: 
                                                          
126 Brookings Institution (2008) Assessing Progress Towards an Integrated Risk and Cost Fire 
Management Strategy. The list of elements the panel considered in reaching this conclusion were 1) fire 
history and past fire behavior; 2) types and levels of fuels and type, age and location of fuels treatments; 3) 
communities and structures; 4) WFU objectives and; 5) direction for Appropriate Management Response 
(AMR). It is interesting to note that the panel had to develop its own review criteria because such a list of 
elements is not explicitly stated in any policy direction or guidance. Such elements are merely suggested. 
This and other large fire cost reviews are available at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/publications/ Last accessed 
February, 2009. 
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Broad-scale landscape management planning with ecosystem emphasis 
will set the stage for informed decisions on the prioritization and location 
of fuel treatments…Interagency, interdisciplinary planning teams will 
need to focus on landscape, fire planning unit or other large scale 
endeavors, to plan and establish objectives for ecosystem management and 
fire’s role (NWCG, 2005 p. 35). 
 
 
The QFFR cited the draft Interagency Cohesive Strategy (languishing in the hands 
of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council since 2002) as a “landmark step” in laying the 
foundation for “refocusing” fuels management at the landscape-scale. While praising 
efforts such as the Healthy Forest Initiative, the QFFR also provided an oblique rebuke to 
the notion of “analysis paralysis” reducing the role of environmental analysis in 
decisionmaking, particularly at the forest planning level, stating that “Satisfying NEPA at 
the highest level reduces the amount of NEPA work done on a project-by-project basis, 
saving time and more fully addressing important ecosystem issues” (NWCG, 2005 p. 27). 
The cover of the QFFR report notes, however, that the panel’s analysis and 
recommendations “does not purport to represent any official policy or program decision 
by the NFAEB and the federal agencies.”127 The status of the QFFR, in other words, is 
that of recommendations for policy. No follow-up has been reported however. 
 
The core mission strategies outlined in the 2005 QFFR and the organizational 
capabilities that must be developed in order to implement them were again reiterated in 
                                                          
127 Note that the report is the product of a panel of federal agency and external experts convened by the Fire 
and Aviation Executive Board (NFAEB). Though the report was released and available on many agency 
websites, including the National Fire Plan site noted above, there has not been an official statement 
endorsing or rejecting the report’s findings. While this review process was underway, however, the GAO 
(2005b, p. 16) reported that “the Quadrennial Fire and Fuels Review is intended to result in an overall 
federal interagency strategic planning document for wildland fire management and risk reduction and to 
provide a blueprint for developing affordable and integrated fire preparedness, fuels reduction, and fire 
suppression programs. Because of this effort’s consideration of affordability, it may provide a useful 
framework for developing a cohesive strategy…” 
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the subsequent quadrennial review of 2009.128 Interagency fire management leadership, 
in other words, continues to insist on the need for collaborative, multi-scale assessment in 
fire and fuels management planning and for the objectives of fire management to be 
incorporated into land management planning more generally. As with the scathing Fire 
Management Review (USDA Forest Service, 2000a), that accompanied the Forest 
Service’s initial Cohesive Strategy (USDA Forest Service, 2000b), pointing out that 
review after review reveal the same institutional failures and proposes the same 
institutional solutions it becomes apparent that fire and fuels management policy 
implementation remains captive to other agency interests and political forces. 
 
The 2001 Federal Fire Policy and the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy remain in 
place, in other words, but their stated goals and objectives remain unrealized – that is, 
collaboratively developing strategic landscape-scale planning processes within which key 
terms and concepts are defined, the ecological role of fire (including its role in reducing 
fuels) and the risk posed to communities by fire are analyzed, their tradeoffs assessed and 
the results incorporated into the decisionmaking process. These disparate policies and 
strategies moreover, are listed or referenced in one form or another in many formal 
venues, including the agency directives, such as the Forest Service Manual for Fire 
Management (FSM 5100) or the Fire Management Analysis and Planning Handbook 
(FSH 5109.19) along with direction (in other handbook chapters) for complying with the 
categorical exclusion and the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. There is no guidance 
whatsoever as to how all these directions are to be interpreted or reconciled. The FSH 
simply states, for example, that local forests must develop goals for their fire 
                                                          
128 This review was titled Quadrennial Fire Review (QFR). Available at 
http://www.nifc.gov/QFR/QFR2009Final.pdf Last accessed September, 2009. 
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management program and “Discuss how these goals contribute to accomplishing regional 
or national strategic plans such as the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, National Fire 
Plan, Cohesive Strategy, and Forest Service Strategic Plan, as well as wildland fire 
policy” FSH 5109.19.52.2 (2003).129 The Interagency Strategy for the Implementation of 
the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, released in 2003, obliquely summed up 
the problems facing federal fire management in the current political climate thus: 
Fundamentally, however, wildland fire policy improvements are 
attempting to marginalize a much deeper, much more systemic, and more 
problematic public lands policy dilemma. Until larger, overarching 
land/resource policy issues are reconciled, wildland fire policy evolution 
can only inch forward on the heels of undesirable outcomes in firefighting 
and fire use…Record-setting wildfires beg the need to explore the extent 
to which land/resource management objectives…continue to “fuel” - 
however inadvertently - unacceptably high suppression costs, resource 
losses, and disruption to local economies (USDA USDOI, 2003, p. 13). 
 
 
There is no comprehensive and rational fire and fuels management policy 
(Franklin and Agee 2003; Stephens and Ruth, 2005). With the Forest Service’s GPRA 
Strategic Plan reflecting nothing more than a vacuous aspirational journey and efforts to 
develop an Interagency Cohesive Strategy steadfastly resisted by agency leadership 
(outside of Fire and Aviation Management), there is no clear articulation of the role of 
fire and fuels management within the Forest Service land management more generally. 
With Forest planning under NFMA (1976) in limbo, after the 2000 proposed rules for 
plan revisions were withdrawn and two subsequent rules overturned by the courts (2005 
and 2008) direction for fire and fuels management in forest plans remain as they were 
                                                          
129 This is the latest version of this handbook. Recall the Fire Management Review (2000) that 
accompanied the Forest Service’s initial Cohesive Strategy (2000) criticizing the functionalism within the 
agency discussed earlier. This review specifically pointed out the disparate nature of fire and fuels direction 
spread throughout the FSM and FSH and recommended that integration of direction should accompany 
integration of programs and their funding. 
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specified in the first round of forest plans developed in the 1980’s, which is to say largely 
absent or suppression oriented. With the enactments of the Healthy Forest Initiative 
(particularly the Categorical Exclusion and HFRA) with no definition of key terms and 
concepts and it’s emphasize on expedited implementation over assessment and analysis, 
all fuels treatments, regardless of type, size and location, count as risk reduction and 
forest health restoration. The de facto fuels management policy is achieving annual 
acreage targets, conducting only as much analysis as necessary in order to get projects 
implemented as quickly as possible within budget. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF FUELS 
MANAGEMENT PROJECT PLANNING IN THE U.S. 
FOREST SERVICE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Recall from chapter three that the very purpose and objectives of fire management 
have been debated and contested since the Forest Service policy and program name was 
changed from fire control to fire management in the mid-1970s. Despite a lively and 
long-running debate among professionals, researchers and program managers over the 
nature of what was then called “fire knowledge” or “fire management considerations” 
and the proper role of this knowledge and these considerations in the formulation and 
implementation of land management policy and objectives, fire management has 
remained largely focused on fire preparedness and incident response. Successive wildfire 
seasons of unprecedented cost and magnitude continue to strain the agency’s ability to 
manage the social and ecological impacts of wildfire. Integrating fuels management into 
land management planning has been proposed for decades as a means reducing these 
impacts. Following the fires of 2000, fuels management received significant attention and 
funding from Congress such that fuels managers now participate in project planning at a 
historically unprecedented level. Yet fuels management remains disconnected from fire 
management and land management more generally. 
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Wildfire is an archetypal landscape phenomenon that does not recognize 
administrative boundaries, whether those of federal agencies, states or private lands, nor 
the internal boundaries within them such as Forest Service management areas, districts or 
project boundaries. Because of the perceived fuels and forest health problem and its 
perceived linkage to the increased incidence of large, destructive and costly wildfire 
events, numerous policies and strategies have been formulated over the years by 
interagency Fire and Aviation leadership (e.g. the Federal Fire Policy of 1995 and 2001, 
the Cohesive Strategy of 2000) as well as other authorities (e.g. the states and counties in 
the National Fire Plan). These policies and strategies attempt to address the lack of 
integration between incident management, fuels management and land management 
across jurisdictional boundaries. All of these policies, strategies and plans have, in one 
form or another, stressed the need to move beyond the current “stand-scale” or “project-
level” focus of fuels management, what Joy (1999) and the GAO (2005ab) called “ad-
hoc” planning, and adopt “strategic landscape-scale” fire and fuels management planning. 
 
Because the fuels and forest health problem is perceived to be so vast and 
interconnected, these policies and strategies emphasize prioritization based on risk. Fuel 
reduction and forest restoration treatments should be conducted in the areas at highest 
risk from negative consequence fire. These policies and strategies thus call for a “risk 
management-based approach” to the assessment of fire risk and the ecological role of 
fire. The definition of what constitutes fire risk and negative ecological consequences of 
fire depend on how a person defines and places value on forest health and a host of 
ecological conditions. There is no consensus on the definitions values. This risk 
management based approach was intended to be embedded in collaborative planning 
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efforts to characterize risk and forest restoration in an effort to help build consensus. This 
risk assessment process is supposed to inform fuels management decisionmaking and 
project planning, such as the choice of fuels treatments options and their tradeoffs, in 
order to develop the “strategic” aspect of “landscape-scale” fuels management. This has 
not occurred. 
 
Numerous internal audits and critical reviews by a host of different agencies have 
pointed out that these recent fire policies and strategies have not been implemented. The 
Forest Service’s continued failure to develop forest planning rules and the Bush 
administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative and Congresses’ annual appropriations have 
discouraged the development of landscape strategies or comprehensive fire and fuels 
assessments and planning. Fuels management project planning is “ad-hoc” (Joy, 1999, 
GAO, 2005ab). The increased levels of fuels treatments is carried out at the local forest 
level with little overall guidance or strategic plan. No definitions or criteria have been 
established to determine what constitutes fire risk or the ecological role of fire or 
restoration. The new emphasis on and increased funding for fuels management has in 
effect been appended to the extant project planning and decisionmaking structures and 
processes of each national forest. To understand the gap between fuels management 
policy and practice requires understanding the actual practice of fuels management. This 
chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
 How are fuels management projects identified, prioritized and developed 
into project proposals? Or, more simply, how are fuels management 
projects planned? 
 
 What are the key factors that affect fuels management project planning? 
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This chapter is composed of four sections. Section 4.2 describes the new role that 
fuels management now plays in project planning and decision making. Section 4.3 
provides an overview of the project planning process, the key factors that affect the 
development of fuels management projects and the structure and process within which 
this process takes place. This overview is followed by a more in-depth discussion of these 
two components that make up the practice of project planning; Section 4.4 describes in 
depth the two sets of key factors reported by participants that most directly affect fuels 
management project planning. Section 4.5 describes the organizational structure of 
NFMA analysis. This chapter provides the background for chapter five which describes 
in detail the practice of fuels management project development and planning and the 
process of addressing these two key factors. 
 
4.2 The New Role of Fuels Management in Forest Service Project 
Planning 
 
When Congress initiated the National Fire Plan and substantially increased 
funding for fire and fuels management with fiscal year 2001 appropriations, the role of 
fuels management changed dramatically. “The big impetus was in 2000 when it gained 
that much more national attention” noted one forest Assistant Fire Management Officer 
(AFMO). “The National Fire Plan and those things that came out of the National Fire 
Plan, people said, ‘whoa, yeah, we really need to take another look at this and how we’re 
doing business.’” (KDR6) This funding increase led to what several local managers 
referred to as “the big fire hire.” This hiring boom increased the permanent workforce of 
fuels management employees at the district level. As one district AFMO described it “In 
the past everyone used to mostly be seasonal…but then post-2000, with the shift in 
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emphasis and the shift in funding, [we had] an opportunity to get some people on board 
that that’s going to be their focus” (KNH16). 
 
This new attention on fuels and new thinking about how fuels management was 
“doing business” shifted the focus to a different kind of fuels reduction activity than had 
been practiced previously. “[W]e had targets to reduce fuels generated from the timber 
harvest [and] wildlife habitat improvement” noted one Forest AFMO, “I think that was 
more what people’s idea of fuels reduction was…‘yes, we can burn that unit post harvest, 
no, we can’t burn that one, we need to pile that one’…the role was to do the BD plan, the 
brush disposal plan…Community protection, whatever, we really weren’t looking at that” 
(KDR6). A fuels specialist put it most succinctly stating simply, “we were the janitors, 
the cleanup guys” (HRM13). “Now it’s shifted,” noted one assistant Forest Planner, “to 
how we can manipulate the fuels in a stand to change the fire behavior.” (KJG28). 
 
This shift from janitors in support of other program activities, principally timber 
sales and wildlife habitat management, has also put fuels specialists in the new more 
active role of initiating projects for the purpose of modifying fire behavior. “Now they’re 
in that arena of identifying and proposing projects” (HDH17) noted one forest planner. 
This transition to a more active role in project planning and decision making, however, 
has not been without its challenges because no real policy or guidelines have been passed 
down to the local level. Fuels management has more or less been thrown into the 
complex and ill-defined process of project planning in the Forest Service. As one forest 
planner described it: 
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…part of the experience that some of the fire folks have had is that…they 
were asked to go out and identify some fuel treatment projects. ‘We need 
acres. Go find me some acres and draw me some polygons and we’ll come 
up and have a proposal’…[A] lot of those folks were thrown into that 
assignment not having had a lot of previous NEPA experience in terms of 
program activities and forest plan requirements…[T]hey had experience 
identifying, obviously from a fuels point of view, here’s some areas that 
need treatment [but then] coming back and finding that they had to do 
some significant modification…or even drop some because there were 
other resource considerations being applied that they weren’t aware of at 
the time…those interdisciplinary things are probably more apparent to 
them now… there’s a lot of other factors that come into play…(HDH17). 
 
Along with fuels manager’s new role in project planning are a whole new set of 
expectations and requirements – legal compliance requirements and the “interdisciplinary 
things” they entail. In their previous role of supporting other natural resource program 
activities, specialists from these other programs were responsible for ensuring 
compliance with laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1970) and 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA, 1976). These acts require the use of 
interdisciplinary (ID) teams of resource specialists to analyze project proposals. One 
AFMO noted that “[w]hen I first started, fire wasn’t really involved in the ID team 
much…” (KDR6). Participation on interdisciplinary teams is now considered crucial for 
fuels management project planning for two principle and interrelated reasons. One is the 
myriad of issues surrounding legal and regulatory compliance. As one assistant forest 
planner put it  “NEPA-wise, fire’s shifting from support, reacting to other actions to 
being the highlighted action which needs more information from the NFMA side of 
planning, more detail because that is your purpose and need, the driver for action in 
NEPA” (BKB30). Another reason that participation on interdisciplinary teams is now 
more important is because compliance requirements of laws and regulations such as 
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NEPA and NFMA are closely linked to the types of activities conducted. The types of 
activities conducted are themselves linked to different sources of project funding such as 
brush disposal (BD) or Knutson-Vandenberg (KV) trust accounts, or the Wildland Fire 
Hazardous Fuels (WFHF) budget line item appropriated annually from Congress. The 
2006 Fire Management Plan for Kootenai National Forest, for example, illustrates the 
importance these interconnected aspects of fuels managers new role when it states: 
…participation and interaction in identifying issues, concerns and 
opportunities as a member of an interdisciplinary team is crucial to the 
success of the project from a fuels standpoint. Determination of funding 
(BD, KV, WFHF, etc) mixes with realistic costs…is crucial in achieving 
the desired benefits.…fuels projects should be identified as management 
opportunities during the NFMA phase of planning.130 
 
 
 This brief discussion of to fuels managers’ new more active role in project 
planning provides a glimpse into the process into which they have been inserted and the 
key factors that must be negotiated as a result. What is referred to in the passage above as 
the “NFMA phase of planning” is the term used in the Forest Service to describe the 
process of developing a project proposal. The following section provides a brief overview 
of the project planning process called NFMA analysis that fuels management now finds 
itself engaged in. It also provides a brief introduction to the key factors that affect the 
process of developing fuels management project proposals and the organizational 
structure within which this process takes place. This process, these factors and this 
structure are intricately intertwined. This overview sets the stage for a more in-depth 
discussion of these two key factors and their to the Forest Service’s organizational 
structure within which project planning takes place. 
                                                          
130 Kootenai National Forest Fire Management Plan (2006) Section IV, p. 88. 
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4.3 Overview of NFMA Analysis 
 
Project planning is dynamic and fluid and the factors that influence it are complex 
and interconnected such that understanding one aspect entails understanding another. In 
its most generic sense, planning refers to a set of decisions and actions that establish 
guidelines for future decisions and actions (Forester, 1989). The first step in project 
planning is deciding what the project is.  A project does not exist “out there” on the 
landscape waiting to be picked up, its costs and environmental impacts readily apparent 
and analyzable for compliance. Projects have to be constructed and developed. The term 
planning as used by managers is really a catch all term that includes this construction. 
The final objectives and mix of treatments of the project is never certain at the outset. All 
participants in this research in one way or another described project planning as a process 
of refining an initial, very general conception of a project, what one district Assistant Fire 
Management Officer (AFMO) called a “glimmer of an idea” (BLM3), into a well-defined 
and implementable project proposal called a proposed action. This construction and 
refinement of a well defined proposed action is achieved through an intense process of 
negotiation between many actors, such as the AFMO, their district ranger and other 
resource management specialists. 
 
In the Forest Service, this dynamic series of negotiations through which a 
glimmer of an idea for a project is transformed into a well defined and implementable 
proposed action is described using a concept called the NEPA Triangle (figure 1). This 
concept comes from the Forest Service’s NEPA/NFMA Forest Plan Implementation 
Training Course (1900-01) (hereafter 1900-01 Course). The 1900-01 Course employs the 
concept of the NEPA triangle to provide a conceptual framework and set of terms for 
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making sense of the dynamic process of project planning in the Forest Service. At the top 
of the NEPA triangle is an ideal rational planning and decisionmaking instrument called a 
proposed action. The proposed action is a document that contains a well-defined problem 
(referred to as the purpose and need for action), the project’s objectives and the proposed 
set of management activities to achieve these objectives. Thus, NFMA analysis, on the 
left side of the NEPA triangle, represents all the activities and decisions that go into the 
construction of a proposed action. The term NFMA analysis and the set of activities it 
designates thus has less to do with the actual National Forest Management Act (NFMA 
1976) legislation, from which it takes its name, than it does with differentiating the 
activities and decisions leading up to a proposed action from those that take place 
afterward. 
 
 
Figure 3 The NEPA Triangle 
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 The statutory and regulatory requirements of National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA 1970) begin once a proposed action is released. NEPA analysis, on the right side 
of the NEPA triangle, represents all the activities and decisions that go into compliance 
with NEPA. NEPA stipulates three levels of analysis that correspond to what is formally 
referred to as the nature and complexity of a proposed project. NEPA compliance differs 
between small, relatively discrete projects carried out under a categorical exclusion (CE) 
to large and complex projects carried out under an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS). Small CE projects cost substantially less then large EIS projects and take much 
less time from project initiation to the signing of a decision document and 
implementation. Between the CE and EIS, in terms of compliance requirements and thus 
both time and money allocated, is the Environmental Assessment (EA). Since all projects 
must comply with NEPA, it is primarily through meeting NEPA requirements that 
managers comply with other laws, such as the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) 
and the Endangered Species Act (ESA, 1973) as well as agency direction and guidance. 
Providing guidance on the development of projects that meet the myriad compliance 
requirements is, in fact, the function of the NEPA triangle concept and the purpose of the 
1900-01 Course. 
 
NFMA analysis is intended to lead to efficient development of project proposals 
that are as implementable as possible, that is, projects that are budgetarily and 
administratively feasible, statutorily compliant and as litigation-proof as possible. As one 
forest planner put it, “…our hope is that by the time you get to a proposed action, you 
have something that is pretty well defined and laid out that if you were to make the 
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decision today that you could implement that and be in compliance with laws and 
regulations and Forest Plan standards” (HDH17). While it is through NFMA analysis that 
projects are developed in anticipation of compliance requirements, setting the stage for 
formal compliance evaluation during NEPA scoping of a proposed action on the left side 
of the triangle, NFMA analysis itself is extremely ill-defined. There are no formal 
requirements or direction for its conduct. The Forest Service Handbook, in fact, does not 
even discuss it. This lack of explicit direction appears deliberate. It allows all the 
decisions made in the construction of a project proposal to be characterized as non-
decision. “Why conduct NFMA analysis,” the 1900-01 Course work book asks 
rhetorically, “if it is not required and there is no decision?” The answer provided is 
“flexibility” to “narrow the scope of consideration” of a proposed action but “no decision 
means…generally no laws or regulations to obey.”131 
 
There are two important interrelated consequences of this effort towards efficient 
development of proposed actions that are in compliance and ready for a decision and 
implementation. One consequence is that NFMA analysis is an exercise in anticipation, 
an attempt to determine the compliance requirements of a proposed action in advance of 
the formal NEPA scoping process. The second consequence is that this effort to 
determine compliance requirements takes place as the proposed action is being 
developed. This entails that determination is not simply a matter of anticipation but also a 
matter of choice. The different levels of NEPA compliance (CE, EA and EIS) are used to 
help define a project. Put more simply, projects are constructed to fit within these 
compliance requirements – especially in the case of the new CE for fuels reduction. 
                                                          
131 Forest Plan Implementation Course 1900-1 Notebook and Class Exercise, p. 3-Unit 5, 10/30/2007 
edition. 
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Although formal decisions as to the type and extent of activities involved and the 
level of NEPA analysis employed, are not formally made until after NEPA scoping of a 
proposed action, the decisions that actually determine the nature and complexity of a 
project are made when developing the proposed action during NFMA analysis. The 
fundamental nature and underlying assumptions of a project, its purpose and need, 
objectives and suite of treatments employed to meet these needs and objectives, are rarely 
altered as a consequence of NEPA scoping. Rather, they are merely altered in extent to 
some degree. The alterations that occur to a project after a proposed action is released 
essentially amounts to tinkering around the margins. The real work of project 
development occurs during the flexible and ill-defined process of NFMA analysis. 
Therefore, understanding the process of NFMA analysis requires understanding the 
factors that are the primary focus of manager’s attention during NFMA analysis and how 
these factors relate to the organizational structure of Forest Service planning and 
decisionmaking is the key to understanding the developments of fuels management 
projects. The myriad of interrelated issues and considerations discussed most by 
managers interviewed for this research may be grouped into two closely interrelated sets 
of factors: 1) targets and funding and 2) compliance with law, regulation and agency 
policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of data collection and analysis determined to 
be necessary for compliance and to mitigate the threat of litigation. Each of these sets of 
factors is described briefly below in order to set the stage for a discussion of how they 
relate to the organizational structure of Forest Service planning and decisionmaking that 
follows. 
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Targets and Funding 
 
The Forest Service is organized around several distinct but overlapping types of 
activities such as timber management, vegetation and wildlife management, and fire and 
fuels management. These are referred to as resource management programs. Each 
resource management program, such as hazardous fuels, timber or watershed and wildlife 
management, receives an annual budget allocation to meet its target. While each resource 
management program is responsible for meeting its program target, the forest as a whole, 
is responsible for achieving the targets of all resource management programs, called 
integrated accomplishments. Individual resource management programs do not control 
the allocation of their program budgets. The Forest Leadership Team controls program 
budgets and the Forest Leadership Team is responsible for meeting all program targets on 
the forest, a target called an integrated accomplishment. The Forest Leadership Team 
allocates funds from individual programs to specific projects. The cost of project 
development and planning is directly tied to the second key factor - compliance with law, 
regulation and agency policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of analysis.. 
 
Compliance with Law, Regulation and Agency Policy, the Threat of Litigation 
and the Cost of Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Determining compliance with federal law, regulation and agency direction is 
difficult. Different combinations of activities to meet the targets of the different resource 
management programs lead to different kinds and degrees of environmental impacts. 
These different levels of impacts determine what is required for statutory, regulatory and 
agency policy compliance. These impacts also affect the level of controversy and thus the 
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threat of litigation – especially if the project involves timber harvesting. As one District 
AFMO noted “if it involves logs on trucks you can bet it will be challenged” (HDL5).132 
Projects are planned and implemented under what are referred to in the Forest Service as 
decision authorities. When managers discuss the costs of compliance they talk almost 
exclusively in terms of the increasing requirements of the three levels of NEPA 
decisionmaking authority – CE, EA and EIS – because, as described above, all projects 
must comply with NEPA. These different levels of NEPA have different restrictions on 
the kind and extent of activities that may be undertaken with them. They also require 
different levels of analysis to be in compliance.  
 
The Organizational Structure of NFMA Analysis 
 
The development of a proposed action during NFMA analysis is principally a 
process of negotiation between specialists from different resource management programs 
and members of the Forest Leadership Team, principally the district ranger on whose 
district a proposed project is located. These negotiations are aimed at aligning these 
myriad elements of program objectives and targets, funding sources and costs, and a 
resource specialist’s time required to perform analysis and design for mitigation measures 
so that a proposed action will meet the legal requirements associated with the selected 
level of NEPA compliance, either a CE, EA or an EIS. This process of negotiation 
transforms an initial glimmer of an idea for a project into a proposed action within budget 
                                                          
132 Laband et al. (2006) analyzed data collected by the GAO on fuels reduction project appeals from 2001-
2002 found that 90% of appealable projects (NEPA EA and EIS) that included fuels reduction objectives 
were appealed in Forest Service Region One, 13% higher than any other region and that projects that 
included timber production were 13% more likely to be appealed than projects without timber production. 
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constraints and help meet individual program targets as well as the forests integrated 
accomplishment requirements.  
 
These negotiations take place within an organizational structure and division of 
assessment, planning and decisionmaking responsibilities that long preceded the passage 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (1970) and National Forest Management Act 
(1976). The invention of the 1900-01 Course and the concept of the NEPA triangle in 
many ways appears to be an attempt to adapt the requirements of these laws into this 
structure.133 This organizational structure in turn provides what little structure there is to 
the purposefully flexible and ill-defined non-requirement of NFMA analysis. National 
Forests are divided into districts. Each forest is headed by a forest supervisor and the 
districts are run by district rangers. The forest supervisor, their staff and the district 
rangers make up the Forest Leadership Team. It is the Forest Leadership Team that 
develops the annual budget, prioritizes projects and allocates funding and resource 
specialist’s time to the various projects on the forest. This list of prioritized and funded 
projects is called the program of work. Project ideas are brought by the district ranger and 
presented to the Forest Leadership Team as a management opportunity to meet the 
various program objectives of the forest. If they are funded and included on the annual 
program of work, they are passed back to the districts for further refinement into a 
proposed action by a group of resource specialists called an Interdisciplinary Team (ID 
team), under the supervision of the district ranger. It is during this later refinement into a 
proposed action that the ID team, following the broad parameters established by the 
                                                          
133 I was unable to determine the precise date when the 1900-01 course and the concept of the NEPA 
triangle was first developed. Instructors for the Course that I attended indicated it was developed in the late 
1980s, soon after the first round of forest plans were established.  
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Leadership Team, attempts to construct project proposals that are compliant with law, 
regulation and agency direction.  The following section provides a more detailed 
discussion of the two sets of factors that are the principle focus of negotiation during 
NFMA analysis: targets and funding and legal compliance & the threat of litigation.  
 
4.4 Key Factors of Project Planning 
 
 When managers describe the process of planning fuels reduction projects and the 
things that most affect the development of a proposed action their descriptions revolved 
around two sets of key factors: 1) targets and funding and 2) compliance with law, 
regulation and agency policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of data collection and 
analysis determined necessary for compliance and to mitigate the threat of litigation. The 
term “factor” is used here in the same way that it was used by managers when describing 
what takes most of their attention and most affects project planning. However, the term 
factor denotes a sense of sharp distinctness that is belied by manager’s actual description 
of the interrelatedness of these topics. 
 
4.4.1 Key Factor One: Targets & Funding 
 
As described earlier, the Forest Service is organized around several distinct but 
overlapping types of activities such as timber management, vegetation and wildlife 
management and fire and fuels management. These are referred to as resource 
management programs or simply programs. Each program has different metrics by which 
its accomplishments are accounted and these accomplishments are tied to its budget. This 
is called a program target. For fuels management, the program target is acres of 
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hazardous fuels treated. The Forest Service allocates funding to each resource 
management program by budget line item (BLI) each with a unique Fund Code. WFHF is 
the Fund Code for the hazardous fuels reduction program.134 Each fall every National 
Forest must formulate its budget request to the Regional Office (RO). These proposed 
budgets are composed of the sum of what each program estimates can be accomplished 
for a given level of funding. Sometime in the spring the RO disperses the actual funding 
level, along with any changes to the funding and target levels. Because of this linkage 
between targets and budgets, achieving annual targets has a profound impact all planning 
activity conducted on the forest. As one Assistant Forest Planner described: 
It’s kind of like this, I’m not sure how to put it to be politically correct, but 
it’s basically a funding-needs driven target…when it comes down to brass 
tacks, we’re talking about forest level targets which in essence promises 
funding…[If] we promise X amount of acres, whether it’s in timber and/or 
fuels reduction, then we get a certain level of funding promised by the 
Regional Office through the WO [Washington Office] because it’s 
contributing to the overall target…It’s kind of like this little numbers 
game (BJG30). 
 
 
According to Kaufman (1960 and 2006), accomplishment targets represent a 
“special kind of direction,” and have a long history in the Forest Service. Targets mesh 
well with and reinforce the agency’s bias towards action, what Kaufman described as its 
“can-do” attitude, an attitude that remains alive and well in the Forest Service today. 
“The agency has a history of producing outputs,” noted one fuels specialists, “it’s a 
                                                          
134 WFHF stands for Wildland Fire Hazardous Fuels. Fund Codes are also referred to as Program Codes. 
Fire Management within the Forest Service is comprised of several programs, the three main ones being 
Wildland Fire Suppression (WFSU), Wildland Fire Preparedness (WFPR) and Wildland Fire Hazardous 
Fuels (WFHF). Under certain circumstances WFSU and WFPR funds may also be used for fuels reduction 
work and count towards the fuels target. Acres burned in a Wildland Fire Use (WFU) fire may count 
towards acreage targets only if WFHF funds have been expended on planning efforts for those acres. This 
policy, or rather what is formally called policy implementation, will change beginning in 2009 with the 
elimination of the distinction between wildfire suppression and WFU. The policy governing the counting of 
acres for target accomplishment has not yet been released at the time of this writing. 
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project driven culture and every fuels project feels pressure to get the job done”(HGJ19). 
Targets also fit well into the decentralized hierarchy of the Forest Service’s 
organizational structure. Each organizational level of the organization is given a great 
deal of discretion as to how they meet their targets. This provides a great deal of 
flexibility for the local units to work within the biophysical, bureaucratic and legal issues 
encountered in developing and implementing project proposals. As one District AFMO 
described it: 
…you get a regional target, what the region wants. They give that to the 
respective Forests to breakout, they’ll say how many acres. ‘Here’s your 
baseline. You need to get something done…They divvy it up at the SO but 
then it’s up to each respective district to kind of do what they want to do 
with it…It’s a game I think (KMM31). 
 
 
Although managers are given a great deal of discretion as to how they meet 
targets, the funding attached to each program’s target does entail constraints that must be 
navigated during project planning. “Targets do not always reflect what the forest feels it 
needs to be doing” noted one Forest Planner (BSH9). This is because the combined 
funding appropriated for each program’s annual target is rarely sufficient to cover the 
costs of meeting the combined targets and objectives of all resource management 
programs on a forest. This forces managers’ attention to the costs per unit of 
accomplishment, such as acres treated for fuels management, and how to mix and match 
different program funds to meet multiple program targets, which makes this allocation of 
funding seem like a “little numbers game.” As one District AFMO bluntly stated: 
…it comes down to a function of cost per acre…it’s a function of being 
able to hide dollars or offset [costs] through other disciplines, timber being 
an example…If you can offset it by different Fund Codes, it makes it look 
like you’re doing it for cheaper costs per acre…because timber paid $150 
an acre we offset Hazardous Fuels [by] $150…Or link up to Rocky 
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Mountain Elk Foundation or some other, you know, offset your costs that 
way, through grants and stuff,…but was it still $300 to treat? Probably so. 
(BJP29). 
 
 
Each of program’s Fund Code has constraints upon the kinds of activities  it can 
fund. These constraints are governed by what are called Primary Purpose rules135 and are 
described in the Forest Service Handbook and in the Program Direction that accompanies 
each resource management program’s annual allocation (e.g. its Budget Line Item). 
These rules are rather vague, but generally state that funding from any particular 
program’s Fund Code should be spent on planning and implementing projects that 
accomplish the targets and objectives of that program. The fiscal year 2007 Program 
Direction for Wildland Fire Management, for example, states that WFHF funds may be 
used for project planning or implementation “only if the reduction of hazardous fuels is 
included in the purpose and need statement of the environmental analysis document.” 136 
The Forest Service Handbook states that “[w]hen the primary purpose of fuel treatments 
                                                          
135 This began in fiscal year 2001. Previously the budget was allocated according to what was called the 
“benefiting function” in which funds were allocated to several line items. According to the Congressional 
Research Service (2000) this new allocation process “would give the agency more flexibility in how it 
spends appropriations. However, it would reduce available information about how the agency spends 
money, and thus could reduce Congress's control over agency spending on specific activities.”  Available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/forests/for-29.cfm Last accessed January, 2008. 
136 The 2007 Program Direction also states that 50% of WFHF funds are to be spent in the Wildland Urban 
Interface (WUI), as defined in the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA)The definition of WUI in the 
HFRA, however, is not clear cut. It depends on how it has been defined in a local Community Wildfire 
Protection Plan as well as the proximity to what is called an at risk community. HFRA Title I defines an at 
risk community as: “(A) that is comprised of - (i) an interface community as defined in the notice entitled 
‘‘Wildland Urban Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From 
Wildfire’’ issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with title 
IV of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001 (114 Stat. 1009) (66 
Fed. Reg. 753, January 4, 2001); or (ii) a group of homes and other structures with basic infrastructure and 
services (such as utilities and collectively maintained transportation routes) within or adjacent to Federal 
land; (B) in which conditions are conducive to a large-scale wildland fire disturbance event; and (C) for 
which a significant threat to human life or property exists as a result of a wildland fire disturbance event.” 
The List of list of communities defined in the Federal Register of 2001 mentioned above was the result of a 
“data call” in which forests across the west were asked for a list of communities at risk with no specific 
criteria given. Also, community wildfire protection plans, as called for in the 10-year Comprehensive 
Strategy of the National Fire Plan, may also be used for determining the applicability of HFRA authority 
and such plans may designate what constitutes WUI and communities at risk. 
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is the accomplishment of [other] resource objectives, and not fuel reduction, finance the 
treatment of work with program funds determined by applying the Primary Purpose 
principle.”137 
 
The mixing and matching of funds from different program Fund Codes, 
particularly aligning fuels projects with timber sales to reduce the costs charged to each 
individual program is in fact encouraged as part of Forest Service leaderships’s 
interpretation of “integration” and “accountability” required by the National Fire Plan. 
The 2007 Program Direction defines integration as “[c]oordinated planning and/or 
implementation that accomplishes multiple outputs, outcomes, goals, and/or objectives.” 
In addition, line officers (forest supervisors and district rangers) are evaluated on the 
extent to which they “accomplish multiple outputs, outcomes, goals,” what the Program 
Direction refers to as a unified target. This interpretation of integration and accountability 
is another reason the mixing and matching of program targets and funding is perceived as 
a little numbers game.138 
 
The 2007 Program Direction describes a “set of integrated and structured 
principles to motivate and measure successful integration.” These principles take the 
form of four types of target accomplishments that must be reported by each resource 
                                                          
137 FSH 6509.11g.51.3 – Wildland Fire Management. The Primary Purpose principle (FSH 1909.13.33.43) 
simply states that the “primary need, rather than actual work performance, influences appropriation and 
functional responsibility for certain expenses.” Need refers to objective as in the relationship between 
project objectives and project purpose and need in a proposed action. 
138 Essentially, integration through mixing and matching funding sources results in a lack of accountability. 
Forest Service program budgeting has been the source of ongoing criticism and scrutiny for decades 
because the agency has been unable to account for actual project costs and the actual expenditures from 
each program’s BLI. The Congressional Research Service (2000d) noted the Forest Service’s 
administration of the BD and KV funds “have been widely criticized both for alleged misuse of the funds 
and for the agency's poor accounting of their performance.” See also GAO (1997b), Forest Service: 
Unauthorized Use of the National Forest Fund GAO/RCED-97-216 and GAO (1998a), Forest Service: 
Better Procedures and Oversight Needed to Address Indirect Expenditures GAO/RCED-98-258. 
 - 172 -  
management program: Core; Integrated; Contributed; and In-Kind Accomplishments.139 
These four types of accomplishment are built into the new accomplishment reporting 
database called FACTS (Forest Service ACtivity Tracking System) within which the 
activities and funding sources of all projects for all resource management programs 
within the agency must be entered.140 
 
A good example of the types of activities carried out by each resource 
management program and how it is determined if a treatment meets the Primary Purpose 
Principle is illustrated by what are called Activity Codes. Activity Codes are used for 
reporting the four types of target accomplishments in FACTS described above.141 There 
are 52 Activity Codes for fuels management, divided between treatments of activity fuels 
and natural fuels. Activity fuels are those materials that result from timber and vegetation 
management program activities usually referred to as slash. Natural fuels are any live or 
dead vegetation not directly resulting from timber or vegetation management activity. 
Activities range from passive to intensive, such as “natural abatement,” which is not 
                                                          
139 The 2007 Program Direction describes these four types of accomplishments as follows: 
1. Core Accomplishment(s) – Accomplishment achieved through direct expenditure of Forest 
Service funds. Core accomplishments are typically the performance measures in the same resource 
as the specific budget line item (BLI). 
2. Integrated Accomplishment(s) – Results of integrated projects that achieve multiple goals and 
objectives. Integrated accomplishments are typically the performance measures not tied to the 
resource area of the BLI funding the work. In other words, integrated accomplishments are those 
that were achieved using funds from one or more BLI that are not associated with the resource 
program tied to that particular accomplishment measure. 
3. Contributed Accomplishment(s) – Accomplishment achieved throught [sic] the application and 
expenditure of dollars contributed by partners and non-Forest Service cooperators. Contributed 
accomplishments are typically any performance measures tied specifically to collected partnership 
funds. 
4. In-kind (or Volunteer) Accomplishment(s) – Accomplishments achieved through the application 
of non-monetary contributions (material, supplies, services, labor). (p. 14-22 & 23) 
140 FACTS reporting was phased in beginning in 2005 and required for all programs beginning in fiscal 
year 2007. Fuels management accomplishment entries in FACTS are automatically uploaded into the 
interagency database for tracking fuels management accomplishments called NFPORS established by the 
National Fire Plan.  
141 See FACTS Appendix B: Activity Codes. Available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/r1/kootenai/maps/gis/documents/facts_app_b.pdf Last accessed November, 2009. 
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really an activity but simply letting the material decompose naturally, to thinning 
resulting in merchantable timber. Many wildlife habitat activities also overlap with fuels 
and vegetation management activities, such as wildlife habitat prescribed burning and 
wildlife habitat precommercial thinning. However, many more activity codes do not 
overlap. The mixing and matching of different program Fund Codes entails mixing and 
matching different types of program activities and objectives as defined (loosely) by the 
primary purpose principle of each resource management program’s budget. The more 
closely the activity codes match up the easier it is to make the case that a primary purpose 
principle of one program’s budget overlaps with the objectives of another. 
 
The most common sources of funding mixes for fuels reduction projects outside 
of the WFHF fuels budget, according to managers, comes from the Forest Products 
program responsible for timber sales (Fund Code NFTM)142 and from non-appropriated 
trust accounts that are funded by retaining a portion of the receipts from timber sales. The 
two most important are the Brush Disposal (BD) and Knutson-Vandenberg (KV) trust 
accounts.143 Forest Products funds (NFTM), as the name implies, can only be used for 
activities that result in timber sales (measured in board-feet for which each Forest’s 
timber program has a target specified in its NFTM budget line item direction). BD funds 
(Fund Code: BDBD) are restricted to treating activity fuels resulting from timber 
harvesting. KV funds (Fund Codes CWKV and CWK2) were historically restricted to 
reforestation of the timber sale area or subsequent timber management activities that do 
                                                          
142 This used to be called Timber Management, hence TM in the Fund Code. 
143 The Forest Service has 18 such permanently appropriated accounts independent of annual appropriations 
including the Timber Salvage Fund, the Payments to States fund, the Recreation Fee Demonstration 
Program and the national Forest Roads and Trails Fund. 
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not immediately result in timber sales called timber stand improvement (TSI).144 The 
allowed uses of KV trust monies was expanded in 2005, however, so that they may now 
be used outside the sale area that generated the funds and for a variety of other activities 
such as “watershed restoration, wildlife habitat improvement, control of insects, disease, 
and noxious weeds, community protection activities, and the maintenance of forest roads 
within the Forest Service region in which the timber sale occurred: Provided that such 
activities may be performed through the use of contracts, forest product sales, and 
cooperative agreements.”145 Fuels treated with KV funds, in other words, are not 
supposed to be the result of timber harvesting activity (activity fuels, that may be paid for 
with BD funds) but may be used for natural fuels resulting from wildlife habitat 
improvement or control of insects or activity fuels produced through timber stand 
improvement treatments. 
 
Annually appropriated funds such as Hazardous fuels (WFHF) must be spent in 
the fiscal year they are allocated such that, as one District AFMO put it “at the end of the 
year you, well, use it or lose it” (KMM31). Unlike hazardous fuels and other annually 
                                                          
144 Both reforestation and timber stand improvement, according to the GAO (2005a), are two of the many 
management activities that have been chronically underfunded and for which there is growing backlog of 
required work. Replanting is required within five years of harvesting while timber stand improvement has 
no statutory timetable and is thus often deferred. Following this report KV was amended in (FY 2006 
appropriations, Public Law 109-54) creating the two funds within KV described above - CWKV 
(Cooperative work, Knutson-Vandenberg, sale area projects) and CWK2 (Cooperative work, Knutson-
Vandenberg, regional projects). These chronically underfunded activities have been reorganized under new 
Fund Codes – Wildlife, Fisheries & Habitat Management (NFWF) and Vegetation & Watershed 
Management (NFVW) respectively. The activities carried out with these Fund Codes (which receive budget 
line item (BLI) appropriations every year) are now also eligible for funding from these reorganized KV 
accounts. As the names imply, CWCK funds are available to the forest generating the revenue while 
CWK2 may be used anywhere within the Forest Service Region that the timber revenues were collected. 
Prior to this amendment, KV funds were restricted to use on the Forest in which the revenues were 
generated and only for reforestation, timber stand improvement and other “enhancements” of resource 
values in the area. It is also interesting to note that reforestation and timber stand improvement activities 
used to have their own program codes but were combined, along with range, watershed improvement and 
noxious weed management into the current NFVW program yet only some of these activities may be paid 
for with KV funds. 
145 FSH 2409.19 Zero Code (2008). 
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appropriated funds, however, BD and KV funds  rollover from year to year, thus making 
them more predictable than WFHF or NFTM funds. BD and KV funds also do not have 
targets attached to them. The funding available from BD and KV accounts in any given 
year depends on the amount of timber sold on that particular forest or region.146 The 
generation of revenue from timber sales to add revenue to the BD and KV trust accounts, 
together with the annual timber target for the Forest Products program introduces a large 
incentive to align timber projects with fuels management projects.147 As one district 
AFMO described it: 
…there’s a lot of money that comes with [timber sales], but also a lot of 
pressure for a district ranger or a forest supervisor to “get the cut out,” you 
know…[I]t’s a pretty heavily used factor on how things are 
determined…most likely isn’t, the driving factor on why we do a project 
but it will, you know, everything else equal…let’s treat this stand but not 
that stand, treat this area and do this type of treatment but not over there 
because there’s nothing to pay for it. (KNH16) 
 
 
For fuels managers to achieve annual targets within budget, they must figure out 
how to align some fuels projects with timber production in order to use (and generate 
revenue for) the BD and KV accounts so that WFHF funds can be used where timber 
revenue is low or not an option. As one district AFMO described it: “…at FACTS 
training they said you can’t spend BD or KV on this or that…it’s like, well, we have 
to…You just have to get work done that’s associated with a timber sale. You have to be 
able to split between your [BD and KV] trust funds and to pick up any extra stuff out of 
[WFHF] hazardous fuels” (KMM31). Not all fuels management acres are met through 
                                                          
146 A portion of these trust account funds not used, however, must be returned to the treasury at the end of 
the fiscal year. Managers gave the figure of 30% of unallocated receipts must be passed on to the Regional 
Office. There is thus a different kind of incentive to “use-it-or-lose-it” at play with trust account funds.  
147 See CRS (1994, 2000cd and 2004). The GAO (2007) also notes that congressional committee reports 
have consistently emphasized putting priority on fuel reduction projects in the WUI, which are more 
expensive, as well as projects using mechanical treatments, which, unlike prescribed burning, may result in 
merchantable timber or may be contracted out providing jobs to the local community. 
 - 176 -  
aligning with timber management objectives and funding offsets or with funding sources 
from outside partners, such as the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. 
Fuel managers also report the need to balance the cost of individual projects with 
the overall fuels program budget. In any given year, more expensive projects must be 
balanced with what they call “easy acres.” These are treatments with minimal costs per 
acre148 accomplished by identifying and developing projects using WFHF funds that 
overlaps with the targets and objectives of other programs such as wildlife but are less 
expensive to carry out. For example, prescribed fire  may be used for what is referred to 
as maintenance underburning but it also benefits wildlife browsing habitat.149 Such 
treatments are generally cheaper to implement because they, as one District AFMO 
described it “usually mean no [mechanical] pre-treatment and require minimal [fire] line 
construction by using landscape features for [line] holding” (BLM3). As another District 
AFMO described it: 
[Projects X and Y are] not part of the timber target, strictly a hazardous 
fuels target…just doing maintenance underburning… the urban interface 
has got like $800, $1,000, $1,500 an acre to treat…You need a balance of 
easy acres to maintain your program cost…The Region still says [our 
Forest] needs to be down to [an average] $200 an acre…Hence, we’re 
going after some easy acres on [Projects X and Y]… It’s not just lower 
cost per acre. I mean, wildlife’s going to have some benefit with the 
habitat improvement. (BJP29). 
 
 
Some acres are easier than others not just because they are composed of activities 
that are cheaper to implement per acre in certain areas. They are also easier because of 
                                                          
148 Also reported by the USDA Office of the Inspector General (2006. Hartsough et al (2008) note that 
estimates of the actual cost of treatments vary widely and are notoriously subjective with little consistency 
in their calculation. And due to the structure of the reporting databases, such as FACTS, along with the 
loose procedural controls governing how these databases are populated, the resulting data provides only a 
very rough estimate of actual expenditures. 
149 Natural Fuels Underburn (FACTS Activity Code 1113) which overlaps with Wildlife Habitat Prescribed 
Fire (FACTS Activity Code 6101). Maintenance underburning used to be called ecosystem underburning. 
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the level of planning required and thus the cost of analysis. Target accomplishment is 
measured in acres treated, however, not acres planned for treatment.150 Though program 
funds spent on planning and analysis are tracked in the FACTS database, project planning 
and analysis does not count towards target accomplishment. This leads to a distinction in 
the effort to balance program costs to meet acreage targets within budget between the 
costs of planning and analysis, on the one hand, and cost of implementation on the other. 
As one District AFMO described it “…for us, out on the field, we’re trying to accomplish 
two things; one is implementation …the next is planning for the next set of projects.” 
(BJP29). Fuels managers refer to the current set of projects that have gone through 
planning and analysis and are ready to be but have not yet been implemented as “shelf 
stock.”151 This shelf stock allows managers to estimate their targets when formulating 
program budget requests submitted to the Regional Office each fall. As the AFMO put it 
“you try to get your shelf stocked up to par…try to kind of somewhat stay a year ahead of 
yourself in target acres…” (KMM31). However, he continues, “The more you spend on 
planning, the less you have for implementation… it’s just a juggle…it’s very hard to out-
year plan on other projects…” (KMM31). 
 
Out year planning is difficult for many reasons. Budgets are uncertain because 
budgets and targets proposed by each forest in the fall are rarely the same as the actual 
                                                          
150 If a treatment is to be carried out through a contract, however, the acres can be reported in FACTS as 
accomplished once the contract is awarded, whether or not the work has actually taken place. 
151 The term shelf stock is used loosely to refer to two kinds of projects. There are many treatment units 
within a project and that the actual site specific prescription for a treatment unit, such as a burn plan or a 
silvicultural prescription, is written after the NEPA decision document is signed. It refers to both the larger 
mix of signed proposed actions from which numerous unit prescriptions are written as well as to a mix of 
site specific unit prescriptions. This is especially important for prescribed burning where effort is made to 
write unit specific prescriptions that can be implemented under a variety of seasonal conditions known as 
prescription windows (e.g. early or late season, north or south aspect, high or low elevation etc. effected by 
weather, phonological and smoke dispersal conditions). 
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budget and target received from the Regional Office in spring, which is the beginning of 
prescribed burning season. The annual Program Direction that accompanies the annual 
budget also contains various directions from agency leadership responding to 
congressional committee reports regarding the types of program activities or locations 
that should be emphasized in expending funds to meet targets. In addition, the reporting 
of accomplishments in FACTS, for example, “is not dependent upon the funding 
source(s) used to complete NEPA planning.”152 That is, there are no primary purpose 
restrictions on how program funds are spent on planning. 
 
 Managers report that what makes out-year planning truly difficult is that the costs 
of planning and analysis is itself fraught with uncertainty. This is because the mix of 
different program activities and objectives included in a project (e.g. commercial thinning 
that meets both fuels and timber program targets or maintenance underburning that meets 
both fuels and wildlife program target) incur different types and degrees of ecological 
impacts. These different activities and their impacts in turn require different levels of 
planning and analysis to comply with various laws, regulations and agency policies as 
well as different levels of public controversy. One AFMO noted for example that: “as it is 
we’re fighting just to keep enough shelf-stock on the books, at least from a fuels planning 
standpoint, just to meet target, based on what they keep telling us we need to get every 
year. Well, the problem is that if projects get locked up in the courts…we’re screwed” 
(BJP29).  
 
 Fuels mangers describe the effort of balancing program costs between project 
implementation and planning as an effort to maintain a set of projects with different 
                                                          
152 USDA Forest Service FY 2007 Program Direction, p. 14-10. 
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levels of planning and analysis requirements and costs. This is expressed most often in 
terms of the different levels National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
associated increasing expense of complying with its requirements. Environmental Impact 
Statements (EIS), for example, are the most extensive and expensive; Environmental 
Assessment (EA) less extensive and expensive and; Categorical Exclusions (CE) the least 
extensive and cheapest to comply with. As the District AFMO quoted above continues 
“Some of them are EISs, some of them EAs, some of them are CEs to try and maintain 
that balance of specialist’s time, trying to effectively get targets done…have a rotation of 
projects in the mix…” (BJP29). It is the effort to balance program costs between 
implementation and planning that links the set of factors characterized by targets and 
budgets to the other set of interrelated factors most frequently discussed by managers: the 
compliance with law, regulation and policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of data 
collection and analysis. 
4.4.2 Key Factor Two: Compliance with Law, Regulation and Agency 
Policy, the Threat of Litigation and the Cost of Data Collection 
and Analysis 
 
The Forest Service has perhaps the most diverse and sweeping range of goals 
specified in an uncoordinated and fragmented welter of organic statutory provisions, site-
specific legislation, environmental protection mandates, appropriation riders and judicial 
decisions (Keiter, 2006; Biber, 2009). Of these many fragmented statutes, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA 1970), the Endangered Species Act (ESA 1973) and 
the National Forest Management Act (NFMA 1976), along with the regulatory guidelines 
and agency directions implementing them, receive the most attention in court and hence 
are given the most attention by mangers during NFMA analysis. These three statutes are 
 - 180 -  
intertwined by the Forest Services rules and procedures for complying with them. For 
example, the ESA’s purpose of conserving endangered and threatened species and their 
habitats has been inscribed into the NFMA’s diversity requirements and hence into forest 
plans. As described previously, it is through complying with NEPA that the fragmented 
welter of legal, regulatory and agency-specific direction is addressed. For example, the 
Forest Service incorporates biological evaluation procedures as part of its NEPA process 
to comply with the requirements for agency consultation with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service regarding the impacts of agency projects on threatened or endangered species and 
their habitat under the ESA’s section 7. 
 
In 2003, the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA, 2003), was added to 
patchwork of statutes along with the various other administrative enactments of the 
Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI), such as changes to the ESA’s section 7 consultation 
requirements. The changes brought about by HFI, initiated under the rubric of reducing 
“analysis paralysis,” had their principle effect on NEPA compliance. The determination 
of NEPA compliance is thus a principle focus when developing a proposed action during 
NFMA analysis. Thus a more detailed description of NEPA requirements, particularly 
those specific to fuels management brought about by HFI, is required to understanding 
how managers attempt to efficiently construct proposed actions during NFMA analysis. 
 
NEPA establishes three different levels of analysis and documentation of potential 
environmental impacts. These three levels are: Categorical Exclusions (CE), 
Environmental Assessments (EA) and Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). Which 
level of analysis and documentation must be employed depends on what is referred to as 
 - 181 -  
the “nature and complexity” of the proposed action and its potential effects. These effects 
are measured in three ways: direct, indirect and cumulative effects. CEs require the least 
analysis and are typically used for small projects and typically take one to two years to 
prepare. There are 17 categories of ground-disturbing actions that may be categorically 
excluded. CE #10 may be employed for fuels reduction and # 11 for post-fire 
rehabilitation and fuels management. These two CE categories are most relevant to fuels 
managers. EAs are conducted when a proposed agency action does not fit one of the 
categories of actions that may be categorically excluded but the level of potential effects 
are determined not to be significant and thus do not warrant a full EIS. An EA may thus 
be sufficient in itself, leading to a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) or it may 
indicate that potential impacts of a proposed action may be more significant than initially 
determined and thus require further analysis in an EIS. EISs require the most intensive 
analysis and documentation and can take several years to complete. 
 
Arguably, the most important source of compliance concerns that factor into the 
determination of the level of analysis and documentation required of a proposed action 
are proximity and level of potential effects upon what are called “extraordinary 
circumstances.” The Forest Service Handbook lists several conditions that should be 
considered in determining if extraordinary circumstances exit. If extraordinary 
circumstances are determined to exist the proposed action may not be categorically 
excluded and warrant analysis and documentation in an EA or EIS. Typical examples of 
extraordinary circumstances are threatened or endangered species or their habitat, 
wetlands and municipal watersheds, and Native American cultural sites.153 
                                                          
153 FSH 1909.15.30.4 (2004). The actual list of conditions is: 
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Interagency and public participation in the determination of the nature and 
complexity of a proposed action and its potential effects that determine the level NEPA 
analysis and documentation (CE, EA or EIS) are accomplished through a process called 
“scoping.” The scoping requirements under NEPA begin when a proposed action is 
released. 154 Though the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) does not require 
scoping of projects that are categorically excluded, in the Forest Service CEs also 
undergo scoping.155 It is through scoping that the issues and concerns raised by the public 
as well as those of other agencies’156 over the level and extent of potential effects of a 
proposed action are elicited. For EAs and EISs, the concerns and issues raised during 
scoping lead to the development of alternative sets of activities to meet the goals and 
objectives of the project. CEs do not require the development of alternatives, but issues 
and concerns raised during scoping are supposed to be taken into account in the design of 
the final project. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1. Federally listed threatened or endangered species or designated critical habitat, species proposed 
for Federal listing or proposed critical habitat, or Forest Service sensitive species; 
2. Flood plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds; 
3. Congressionally designated areas, such as wilderness, wilderness study areas, or national 
recreation areas; 
4. Inventoried roadless areas or potential wilderness areas; 
5. Research natural areas; 
6. American Indians and Alaska Native religious or cultural sites, and 
7. Archaeological sites, or historic properties or areas. 
154 According to the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, a proposal is said to exist when 
an agency is “at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the Act has a goal 
and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal 
and the effects can be meaningfully evaluated.” (40 CFR §1508.23, 1978). 
155 FSH 1909.15.30.5 (2004) noting that “Scoping is required for all FS proposed actions, including those 
that would appear to be categorically excluded (ch.10, sec. 11). Scoping is important to discover 
information that could point to the need for an EA or EIS versus a CE as well as to inform the public. 
Scoping complexity should be commensurate with project complexity.” 
156 Such as the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) consultation requirements under Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act. 
 - 183 -  
The regulations regarding scoping (40 CFR § 1501.7) and the interpretation these 
regulations in the Forest Service Handbook provide a great deal of discretion for how 
scoping is conducted. NEPA requires an interdisciplinary approach to scoping but it is 
left up to the responsible official who will eventually sign the finale decision document to 
select the leader and members of the interdisciplinary (ID) team that will conduct scoping 
and analysis and documentation that follow scoping.157 The responsible official also 
selects the set of concerns and issues raised during scoping that will receive consideration 
and be included in alternatives developed to achieve the goals and objectives of the 
project.158 In addition, the responsible official, in consultation with the ID team, to 
determine how to “identify and select data sources, analysis methods, and set standards of 
accuracy” and to “determine the depth or detail of the analysis.”159 
 
In addition to the standard regulations issued by the CEQ for NEPA compliance 
the legislative and administrative enactments of the Healthy Forest Initiative establish 
additional criteria that must be met. The new CE # 10 for fuels management may only be 
used for projects limited to 4,500 acres of prescribed fire and up to 1,000 acres of 
mechanical treatment (such as commercial or pre-commercial thinning) and may be 
employed in areas defined as: 1) in the wildland urban interface (WUI) or; 2) Condition 
Classes 2 or 3 in Fire Regime I, II, or III, outside the WUI or; 3) projects identified in 
community wildfire protection plans (CWPP). The HFRA streamlines NEPA compliance 
                                                          
157 The team “must have the expertise to identify and to evaluate the potential direct, indirect, and 
cumulative social, economic, physical, and biological effects of the proposed action and its alternatives” 
(FSH 1909.15.12.1(2004)). 
158 FSH 1909.15.12.32 & 33 (2004). 
159 FSH 1909.15.12.31 (2004). This direction also advises the responsible official that “When formulating 
analysis and evaluation criteria or standards, be sure to consider Forest Service objectives identified in 
legislation, policies, and plans, as well as issues raised by the public in the scoping process. Refine these 
criteria and standards, as necessary, during the course of the analysis.” 
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by requiring the analysis and documentation of fewer alternatives. It has similar criteria 
as the CE minus the acreage limitation.160 
 
These new statutory and administrative procedures brought about by the Healthy 
Forest Initiative were designed to streamline and expedite fuels management project 
planning. However they also introduce significant uncertainty over what compliance 
actually entails. The Healthy Forest Initiative and Healthy Forest Restoration Act: 
Interim Field Guide (USDA and USDOI, 2004), for example, notes that “[e]xcept for the 
[HFRA’s] authorization to analyze fewer NEPA alternatives (Sections 104(c) and (d)), 
most of the requirements of Section 104 are consistent with normal NEPA practices.”161 
While HFRA may be “consistent with normal NEPA practice,” the changes made to 
NEPA implementation under other elements of the HFI have altered what “normal NEPA 
practice” actually consists of. The new categorical exclusion for hazardous fuels 
reduction is a case in point.162 
                                                          
160 Reduced NEPA analysis requirements under HFRA may also be employed for projects in areas with two 
other sets of conditions 4) windthrow, storm damage that threaten fire spread or insect and disease spread 
into adjacent ecosystems or threaten forest or rangeland resources (undefined but usually understood as 
timber stands and grazing land) as well as 5) Federal land not covered in paragraph 1 through 4 that contain 
threatened or endangered species habitat if the natural fire regime is important or wildfire is identified as a 
threat to these species. The HFRA also included ideas not in the HFI or the initial McInnis bill (H.R. 1904) 
adopted by the House of Representatives in May, 2003 but included in the final bill after Senate debate. 
These include requirements for maintaining and restoring old-growth forest stands, requiring that HFRA 
authorized projects maximize retention of larger trees in areas other than old-growth forest stands and 
requiring that at least 50% of the dollars allocated for HFRA projects be used for at-risk community 
protection. 
161 USDA and USDOI (2004), p. 9. 
162 The CE is formally described as “revised procedures for implementing NEPA and CEQ regulations”. 
See 68 Fed. Reg. 33814 (June 5, 2003). Also as part of HFI new directives were issued by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 2002 requiring the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) to consider the potential 
long term benefits of fuels reduction when assessing potential effects on listed species from projects in the 
preparation of Environmental Assessments (EA) carried out under the National Fire Plan for “fuel 
reduction and fire-adapted ecosystem restoration” projects. New procedures for consultation with these 
agencies under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act also accompanied these new rules for fuels 
management activity. This took the form of special training courses for Forest Service personnel and the 
establishment plans and criteria for species and habitat protection approved by FWS or NOAA that allows 
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The direction for the use of CEs in the old Forest Service Handbook from 1992 
called for an EA when one or more resource conditions are present that might indicate the 
existence of extraordinary circumstance. In other words, the mere presence of these 
conditions precluded the use of a CE, making the decision between using CE or EA 
relatively straightforward. The direction in the Forest Service Handbook released in 
2004, after the changes brought by the Healthy Forest Initiative were enacted, states that 
these are “resource conditions that should be considered” but that “the mere presence of 
one or more of these resource conditions does not preclude use of the categorical 
exclusions. It is the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these resource 
conditions that determines whether extraordinary circumstances exist.”163 This chapter 
was updated again in 2007 changing this last sentence to read “It is (1) the existence of a 
cause-effect relationship between a proposed action and the potential effect on these 
resource conditions and (2) if such a relationship exists, the degree of the potential effect 
of a proposed action on these resource conditions that determines whether extraordinary 
circumstances exist.”164 These changes, moreover, pertain to all CEs not just the new one 
for fuels management. 
 
The Healthy Forest Initiative was ostensibly intended to streamline NEPA 
compliance. These changes to “normal NEPA practice,” however, in conjunction with the 
wide discretion granted the responsible official and the ID team to determine the type and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
these certified personnel to render biological opinions themselves, rather than FWS or NOAA personnel. 
Only one of the Forest Service personnel interviewed for this research was involved with these new 
procedures and reported recommending against them to his district ranger because they are predicated on 
establishing a plan with set procedures for protecting habitat and developing such a plan constituted more 
work than project by project consultations under the previous procedures.  
163 FSH 1909.15.30.3 (2) (2004).  
164 FSH 1909.15.30.3 (2) (2007). Recall, as noted previously, that the federal agencies were enjoined from 
using the fuels CE in November, 2008 and the Forest Service Handbook was again updated in April, 2009 
with the description of CE # 10 crossed out pending new rulemaking. 
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intensity of data collection and analysis necessary, paradoxically introduced a great deal 
of uncertainty over what is actually required for compliance.165 Managers still must 
provide evidence of reasoned decisionmaking and this now could be construed as 
ensuring the absence of cause and effect relationships between proposed actions and their 
potential effects. Because this uncertainty and because these changes were so 
controversial, the effective determinant of planning and analysis requirements essentially 
came down to the courts and the threat of litigation. As one Assistant Forest Planner from 
another Forest described it: 
 …it really is related to litigation what level of analysis we need to provide 
that the courts feel is adequate and that bar’s been changing….where [in 
the past] the courts gave a lot of deference to professional judgments of 
the specialists in the agency, now they’re wanting to see more analysis 
supported by research…So there is quite a bit of time expended back and 
forth when we’re working on more of the analysis of what’s going to be 
adequate if someone chooses to litigate, which they are frequently doing 
on our fuels projects anymore…you know, our appellants are always 
saying, hey, you need best science, best science, where is it? (KJG28). 
 
 
Several recent cases in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals involved projects in 
Region One, all of which employed “timber sales as the tool” to accomplish fuels 
reduction and forest health objectives.166 Each of these projects explicitly stated that such 
sales provided a means of funding the project. The Lands Council V. Powel decision of 
                                                          
165 Also adding to this uncertainty was that fact that the new fuels CE was preceded by changes to the 
Forest Service Decisionmaking Appeals Reform Act (ARA) of 1992 that required the agency to establish a 
notice and comment process for projects implementing forest plans established under NFMA (1976). In 
2002 the Forest Service enacted regulations limiting public comment and administrative appeal on 
categorically excluded projects (36 CFR §215.4(a) and 36 CFR §215.12(f)). These regulations were 
successfully challenged in Federal District Court in 2005 (Earth Island Institute v. Pengelly, 376 F.Supp. 2d 
994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) and upheld in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007 (Earth Island Institute v. 
Ruthenbeck, 459 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.2006) finding that “The exemption of categorically excluded Forest 
Service actions from notice, comment, and administrative appeal is manifestly contrary to both the 
language and the purpose of the ARA. Therefore, 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.12(f) and 36 C.F.R. 215.4(a) are 
invalid.”) This opened up categorical exclusions to a new level of scrutiny. 
166 Of all federal agencies, the Forest Service has had the most cases heard by the Ninth Circuit, losing nine 
of the thirteen cases between 1995 and 2004 (Smith, 2006). 
 - 187 -  
2005,167 over a project on the Idaho Panhandle National Forest (IPNF), known as the 
Iron Honey case (after the name of the project), is the most commonly referenced case
managers.
 by 
                                                          
168 Soon after Iron Honey, the Forest Service lost another case in the Ninth 
Circuit on similar grounds — Ecology Center V. Austin (2005) on the Lolo National 
Forest — and the court referenced the Iron Honey decision in its ruling. In both cases, the 
agency’s methodology and data were again found inadequate for similar reasons. One 
reason revolved around the lack of site specific data used in analysis. Another reason 
arose from the age of site specific data (15 years) that was used and the “spot sampling” 
method employed to ensure its representativeness of current conditions. In the Iron 
Honey ruling the court stated that “we are asked to trust the Forest Service’s internal 
conclusion” but found that “the Forest Service’s basic scientific methodology, to be 
reliable, required that the hypothesis and prediction…be verified with…on the ground 
observation...Was the Forest Service ‘dead on” or ‘dead wrong?’”169 In Ecology Center 
167 Filed August 13, 2004 and amended January 24, 2005 
168 Note that none of the court cases discussed here involved any of the three National Forests in this study. 
However the litigation these three Forest were involved in centered on similar issues. 
169 Lands Council v. Powell (379 F.3d 738, amended at 395 F.3d 1019), p. 1042. The issue of site specific 
data had to do with the soils analysis conducted for the project. The Court found this analysis inadequate 
(and therefore a violation of NFMA as well as NEPA) because it relied on inference from plots data at 
other locations of the forest, conducted for a different project, together with aerial photographs to identify 
geological similarity between the plot locations and the actual treatment sites. This comparison was used to 
develop a model of soil conditions of the treatment site but the validity of the model’s predictions were not 
verifying with data collected from the proposed treatment sites. The issue of old or “stale” data derives 
from the NFMA requirement that the Forest Service provide for the habitat necessary to maintain the 
viability of vertebrate species. NFMA allows the use of Management Indicator Species (MIS) in Forest 
Plans as a proxy for monitoring the effect of management activities on species viability more generally. A 
common method used by the agency for complying with this requirement when analyzing the effects of a 
project is to assume indicator species viability is maintained if their habitat is maintained. That is, analysis 
of an indicator species habitat is an indirect measure of its viability, a practice called “proxy on proxy.” For 
the Iron Honey analysis the Forest relied on data from its Timber Stand Management Reporting System 
(TSMRS) database that was 15 years old, contained inaccurate canopy closure estimates as well as 
insufficient data on snags (an important habitat component but an attribute not typically assessed in stand 
exams conducted to populate TSMRS). The Forest employed spot surveys to infer projections, count snags 
in order to conduct its proxy on proxy analysis of current indicator species habitat. The court found the 
TSMRS data unreliable making the proxy on proxy method unable to satisfy NFMA requirements and, 
because the spot surveys assessed different variables, they do not make up for the inaccurate and 
insufficient data in TSMRS and thus do not “rehabilitate” the proxy on proxy method. Thus the court found 
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V. Austin, t he court found that “[a]n agency’s choice of methodology is entitled to 
deference…However there are circumstances under which an agency’s choice of 
methodology, and any decision predicated on that methodology, are arbitrary and 
capricious.”170 
 
Agency managers, unsurprisingly, bristle at what they perceive as the court 
overstepping the bounds of deference to agency expertise. According to one Assistant 
Forest Planner “NEPA says when you have information with certain scientific accuracy 
and your information is ripe for a decision, it says in there you don’t have to resolve 
things, you have to address things…They’re getting away from NEPA I think, the law, 
and they’re getting into scientific protocol…” (BKB30) At the same time, however, 
despite the insistence on deference to agency expertise, it is acknowledged that lack of 
data is a significant problem that affects manager’s ability to perform adequate analysis. 
“Data is very expensive to collect and we just don’t have the budgets to go out and 
collect it on the ground anymore. It’s just really frustrating for us” (BSH9). The threat of 
litigation arises largely from the constant pressure to include timber harvesting activities 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the IPNF did not comply with its own Forest Plan, and therefore with the National Forest Management 
Act (NFMA). The issue of inadequate data and hence the assumptions and limitations of model outputs was 
also raised over the IPNFs analysis of impacts to fish and water quality. 
170 Ecology Center v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005), p. 16039. The court further noted that 
“…allowing the Forest Service to rely on expert opinion without hard data either vitiates a plaintiff’s ability 
to challenge an agency action or results in the courts second guessing an agency’s scientific conclusions. 
As both of these results are unacceptable, we conclude that NEPA requires that the public receive the 
underlying environmental data from which a Forest Service expert derived her opinion” (p. 16046). This 
legal drama over deference to agency methods and data continued with Lands Council v. McNair (494 F.3d 
771 (9th Cir. 2007)) when the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court’s denial of injunction on another 
forest restoration and fire risk reduction project on the Idaho Panhandle National Forest. This case which 
relied on the reasoning employed in the Iron Honey and Ecology Center V. Austin decisions. However, the 
Ninth Circuit then convened an en banc panel of eleven judges to revisit the case (Lands Council v. 
McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008)) and in July, 2008 overturned its previous ruling and affirmed the 
decision of the District Court. In the process the Court explicitly overruled its previous decisions regarding 
deference to agency methods and data made in Iron Honey and Ecology Center. See an overview at 
http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20080723-deference-to-agency-action. Last accessed January, 2009. 
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to offset costs and meet multiple program targets. However, including timber sales 
increases the threat of litigation and potentially drives up the costs of analysis. These 
situations force difficult decisions over how much data collection and analysis is 
necessary to supplementing specialist’s professional judgment in order to mitigate this 
threat. A Planner from another forest noted “…you may not have the time, money, or 
people to get that information, so you may focus on a different area or may drop an area 
because you have no data on it. You’re not able to collect any. So that could change your 
focus of the project” (KJG28).  
 
Attempts to reduce the uncertainty over compliance requirements brought about 
by the Healthy Forest Initiative appear to have had little effect. Six months after the Iron 
Honey decision the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ, 205) issued a guidance 
memorandum for cumulative effects analysis that essentially sanctioned the methods and 
data collection used by the IPNF in the Iron Honey project.171 The Ninth Circuit, 
however, ruled similar practices inadequate in two additional cases since the release of 
the CEQ memo.172 Thus despite the support of the CEQ and agency leadership for 
deference to agency expertise in the use of streamlined analysis methods and data 
collection, there remains great uncertainty among local managers as to what constitutes 
adequate data and analysis. As another Assistant Forest Planner noted: 
 
                                                          
171 CEQ (2005) Guidance on the Consideration of Past Actions in Cumulative Effects Analysis, issued by 
James Connaughton, Chairman of the CEQ, appointed by President Bush in 2001. Available at 
http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/Guidance_on_CE.pdf Last accessed January, 2009. These guidelines leave 
it to the discretion of the responsible official to determine whether to analyze and describe past actions 
individually or in the aggregate as part of the environmental baseline. 
172 See Grothaus (2007). The court held that for a cumulative impact analysis in an EIS to be valid it must 
describe the effects of past actions that have a cumulative impact and that simply listing past actions 
without describing their effects is insufficient. 
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…the more complex we show the world is, the harder it is to explain that 
we understand well enough to reach a reasoned decision. This isn’t rocket 
science. This is more complex than rocket science because its biological 
systems… [litigants have] gotten really good at, especially in our Ninth 
Circuit, at questioning everything…It puts us in a position of explaining 
complexity in an understandable way…but then your data becomes an 
issue, and they’ve gone ‘hey your data wasn’t good enough’…The Lands 
Council decision, the big one off the Panhandle, the Iron Honey case…It’s 
not necessarily that the data wasn’t good enough and you need more. I 
mean, that’s the question you always have to ask…do you think you got to 
run out and get more data or do we explain our use of it better and maybe 
the court will think that’s enough (BPZ25). 
 
4.4.3 Key Factors: Summary 
 
When managers describe the planning process and what most affects the 
development of a proposed action, their descriptions revolve around two sets of factors: 
1) targets and funding and 2) compliance with laws, regulations and agency direction 
mediated by the threat of litigation and the cost of data collection and analysis. The 
elements that compose these two sets of factors are inextricably bound and fold into each 
other in complex ways. Fuels management program targets determine program funding, 
but meeting program targets requires balancing program costs by combining fuels 
reduction activities with other resource management program activities, to either off-set 
costs (e.g. with timber production or use of trust accounts – BD and KV – financed with 
timber production) or by pursuing easy acres (aligned with wildlife program targets and 
potentially private funds from the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation). 
 
The overall costs to the fire management program must be balanced between 
implementing projects, which help meet targets and ensure funding, and the costs of 
planning to keep the shelf stocked with projects to implement in coming years. 
Determining the costs of planning, however, are anything but straightforward. 
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Determining planning costs is characterized by uncertainty and equivocality over these 
compliance requirements. There are two basic and interrelated sources of this uncertainty:  
one is that these requirements are themselves ill defined and subject to litigation in the 
courts. The second source of uncertainty derives from the fact that compliance 
requirements depend largely on nature and complexity of a proposed action and its 
potential impacts since it is the nature and complexity of a project and its potential 
impacts that determines the necessary level of data collection and analysis requirements. 
However, the nature and complexity of a project and its potential impacts depends on the 
combination of different program activities and objectives included in a proposed action 
and these are what are being negotiated. They are not agreed upon and finalized until the 
proposed action is complete. 
 
In a circular way, this uncertainty and equivocality over compliance requirements 
and the difficulty of determining planning costs is compounded by the high degree of 
discretion granted managers to determine the necessary level of data collection and 
analysis. On the one hand, this discretion is needed in order to piece together projects that 
balance program costs and accomplish targets within limited budgets. On the other hand, 
however, high profile court cases have constrained the exercise of this discretion 
regarding the sufficiency of data collection and analysis and thereby increasing the 
pressure for greater allocation of time and money to this endeavor. Estimates of these 
increased analysis costs must be factored into the overall program costs which in turn can 
influence the type, extent and location of treatments included in a project proposal and 
how many acres are accomplished. 
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These two sets of interrelated factors are the principle elements that shape the 
development of proposed actions. These factors are of key importance because they must 
be addressed and are at the forefront of manger’s discussions when developing a 
proposed action. They are also are of key importance because the planning and 
decisionmaking process within which proposed actions are developed is in large part 
structured around addressing them. Put another way, these two sets of interrelated factors 
— targets and budgets, and compliance, the threat of litigation and the cost of analysis — 
form part of the structure within which project planning and decisionmaking takes place 
in the Forest Service. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
4.5 Organizational Structure of Project Planning 
 
Recall that the NEPA triangle depicts NFMA analysis beginning with the forest 
plan as it is supposed to be the foundation of forest management. This is not quite the 
case however, particularly for fuels management which, as discussed in chapter three, 
was largely ignored in the first round of forest planning (and why the Federal Fire Policy 
of 1995 and 2001 as well as its various Implementation Strategies (USDA and USDOI, 
1998, 2003) and critical large fire cost reviews have called for the specification of fire 
and fuels direction in forest plan revisions).173 No participant interviewed for this 
research described the forest plan as the starting point of project planning. 
 
                                                          
173 The direction for fuels management in the Bitterroot National Forest, for example, consists solely of a 
“resource standard” which states that the “fuels treatment backlog will be eliminated by the end of the first 
decade. Priority for treatment will be given to high-risk stands with fuels exceeding 70 tons per acre.” Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, Bitterroot National Forest Plan (1987), pg II-28. This direction initially 
referred to the backlog of activity fuels resulting from timber management since funding for fuels reduction 
came solely from the Brush Disposal (BD) trust fund account until the mid 1990s. It is now interpreted to 
refer to activity fuels as well with the advent of a separate fuels management account (WFHF). 
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While forest plans are often referred to as providing direction, this direction is 
understood more as “sideboards” (BSH9) within which opportunities for management 
activities are identified and to which project proposals must be made to conform. The 
USDA Office of the General Counsel describes forest plans as “zoning ordinances under 
which future decisions are made… Projects and activities are proposed, analyzed and 
carried out within the framework of the LRMP.”174 Forest plans have many general goals 
and allow for many kinds of activities to meet these goals, but these often conflict. One 
forest planner described the situation this way: 
You know, our plan came out in the 1980s so its 20 years old. And some of the 
philosophy and thinking [has] evolved and changed and maybe some of our 
standards don’t quite mesh with the way we see the world today in terms of, well, 
one example that we’re running into is that we have some [forest] types here that 
are more…open-grown fire type regimes. On the other hand, you have existing 
conditions where you have an undergrowth in there that is providing some 
component for wildlife security, etc…so there’s an inherent conflict there in terms 
of, okay, what in this particular area, and it might not be the same across the 
forest, but area by area, which takes precedence? There’s a tradeoff and there’s 
winners and losers. Everything doesn’t fit nicely together…in developing the 
proposed action you look at those resource tradeoffs (HDH17). 
 
 
 These resource tradeoffs are more than tradeoffs between alternative potential 
impacts upon the biophysical characteristics of the resources themselves (e.g. the tradeoff 
between the wildlife security provided by undergrowth and the fire hazard this 
undergrowth represents). These tradeoffs also include the potential managerial impacts to 
the different resource management programs - principally their ability to accomplish their 
program specific targets, thus ensuring future funding. The fact that there are winners and 
losers resulting from these tradeoffs is taken very seriously. As one forest planner put it 
“the fundamental attitude is ‘what are you going to do for my program’ I mean, there’s 
                                                          
174 Overview of Forest Planning and Project Level Decisionmaking, USDA (2002b), p. 3. Available at: 
http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/overview.pdf. Last Accessed January, 2009. 
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some folks that really want to push the envelope” (BKB30). There is no established 
procedure for distinguishing between impacts to the biophysical and administrative 
dimensions of program objectives let alone for adjudicating tradeoffs between program 
objectives. According to one forest AFMO noted: 
[W]e have not done a good job prioritizing objectives. Each member of 
the ID team fights for 100% of their [program] objectives…A lot comes 
down to the Line Officer in the end. Successful [projects] have a strong 
Line Officer to balance or decide [between] competing objectives. Then 
we start arguing over what we are analyzing, say, [the wildlife biologists 
using] worst case weather for thermal cover while fire [staff] use average 
fire year…(KDR 6). 
 
 
In order to understand the process of developing a proposed action in the Forest 
Service it is necessary to understand the basic organizational structure within which 
NFMA analysis takes place and how the key factors of targets and budgets and the cost of 
analysis necessary for statutory, regulatory and policy compliance and mitigating the 
threat of litigation are inscribed within this structure. Kaufman (1960 and 2006) describes 
the organizational structure of the Forest Service as a decentralized hierarchy.  Each 
national forest is organized somewhat differently. Each forest is divided into districts but 
the number of districts and the number of specialists from each resource management 
programs is different on each national forest. National forests are headed by a Forest 
Supervisor who exercises authority over the whole forest while district rangers have 
authority over their district but are under the forest supervisor. Forest supervisors and 
district rangers (called line officers) each have a staff under them. The principle 
personnel involved in project planning are planners and the specialists from the various 
resource management programs, such as fuels management, timber management, 
vegetation management or wildlife and watershed management, etc. These specialists and 
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planners form the interdisciplinary teams, called ID teams, required for project planning 
and analysis by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA, 1976) and National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 1970).175 These ID teams are supervised by the 
district ranger on whose district a proposed action is being developed. 
                                                          
 
Each National Forest has a Forest Leadership Team that meets several times a 
year in the Supervisors Office.176 Each forest staffs the Forest Leadership Team how they 
want, but every FLT includes the line officers (the forest supervisor, the deputy forest 
supervisor and district rangers) and various other staff, such as the forest planner, at the 
discretion of the forest supervisor. The Forest Leadership Team serves many functions 
175 On the three Forests studied in this research, one had seven districts (the Kootenai) while one had four 
(the Bitterroot) and the other had three (the Helena). Fire and fuels management is unique among Forest 
Service resource programs. On the three forests studied for this research in having what may be called a full 
compliment of management and specialists on every district as a result of the “big fire hire” following the 
2000 fires. Every Forest investigated for this research has a Forest Fire Management Officer (Forest FMO), 
who handles suppression preparedness and operations and is supervised by the Forest Supervisor, and an 
Assistant Forest Fire Management Officer (Forest AFMO) responsible for fuels management supervised by 
the Forest FMO. District level Fire management is organized similarly with an FMO for operations and an 
AFMO for fuels. Each district has several full time and many seasonal specialists and technicians. Two of 
the fourteen Districts in this study had one individual filling the role of both FMO and AFMO due to staff 
turnover. At the time of this research two of the Forests were considering consolidation of several positions 
as part of “rethinking the wisdom of the massive hiring of 2001 with current budget realities” (BRF14). 
However, as with other resource program specialists, the district fire management staff is supervised by the 
district ranger not the forest FMO or AFMO even though they are the heads of the forest fire management 
program. Thus, when questions arise regarding interpreting direction and project planning and analysis, the 
district Ranger has the final say not the Forest FMO. Each Forest is organized somewhat differently 
regarding other resource program area specialists due to funding and size. Not every district has a full 
complement of resource specialists and thus not every district can field a full ID team for project planning. 
Many specialists are shared among the districts, such as the ecologist or fire ecologist, botanist or heritage 
resource specialist while other programs, such as Vegetation Management, may have multiple specialists 
(e.g. silviculturists) assigned to “zones” encompassing two or more districts. The Kootenai National Forest, 
for example has nearly a full ID team of resource specialists for each of its five districts while the Bitterroot 
National Forest has two ID teams each covering two of the Forests four districts. These are called North 
Zone and South Zone ID teams. The Helena National Forest has three districts and what they call “an ID 
Team and a half” denoting that there are duplicates of some specialists but not enough for two “full teams.” 
Even if specialists are shared among two or more districts, however, they are supervised by the district 
ranger on whose district project planning or implementation occurs. 
176 On the three forests studied for this research the Forest Leadership Team included the Supervisor’s staff, 
such as the Forest Planner, Public Affairs and the lead for Ecosystem Management (who is the Forest 
Planner on two of the Forests studied) as well as representatives from the different program areas as needed 
(e.g. the FMO and often the AFMO), silviculture, watershed or recreation etc.). 
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but the two principle functions of interest here are 1) the development of the annual 
budget and, from this budget, 2) the development of the annual program of work. 
 
The Annual Budget 
 
The Forest Leadership Team will meet sometime in the fall to develop the 
proposed budget for the forest which will be submitted to the Regional Office (RO) and 
from there up to the Washington Office. The proposed budget is made up of the 
combination of what each resource management program estimates it can accomplish in 
the given year for both planning and implementation. The estimate of implementation 
accomplishments becomes the program’s proposed target. For the fuels management 
program this is the purpose of shelf stock described previously. The estimate of 
implementation costs is based on the shelf stock of projects ready for implementation 
while planning costs are based on their estimates of what it will cost to keep this shelf 
stock of projects to implement in following years. 
 
 Funding for broad scale assessments, called Ecosystem Analysis at the Watershed 
Scale (EAWS), also plays an important role in a forest budget.177 Funding for EAWS is 
similar to the funding for other Forest Service programs and activities. Each forest 
submits an estimate of how many EAWS it can complete along with an estimate of their 
cost. Funding requests for EAWS are also referred to as a target but they do not put 
pressure on management the way other program targets do since they are not associated 
                                                          
177 The Federal guide for these assessments was developed in the early 1990s as part of the effort to 
institutionalize ecosystem management beyond Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team 
(FEMAT), and the large scale efforts associated with the Northwest Forest Plan or the Interior Columbia 
Basin Ecosystem Management Project (ICBEMP). The latest version 2.2 was revised in 1995. Available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/r6/frewin/projects/watershed/waguide.pdf. Last Accessed January, 2010. 
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with any particular resource management program and thus their accomplishment is not 
tracked. Rather, EAWS are important to the project planning process because they 
provide a source of funding for data collection and analysis outside specific resource 
management program budgets. They are broad in scope, typically encompassing a 5th 
code HUC watershed. EAWS analyses are conducted prior to the development of a 
proposed action but are reserved for projects that will undergo analysis and 
documentation under an EIS since these are the most expensive where, according to one 
forest planner its worth spending the money” (BSH27). “All EISs” one district AFMO 
noted “start out with an EAWS” (KMM31) though occasionally they may be used for an 
especially complex EA. The resulting analysis is used later after NEPA scoping in the 
analysis of cumulative effects and provides the bulk of information on the “affected 
environment” chapter of an EA or EIS.  
The Annual Program of Work 
 
The development of the forest’s annual budget and the associated resource 
management program targets and EAWS funding requests provide the leadership team 
with a rough estimate of what it must try to accomplish and how much money has to 
accomplish it. These are only rough estimates since the actual budget and program targets 
are not passed back down from the Regional Office until the spring. All funding is 
allocated to specific projects each a code through which its budget is tracked. In early 
winter the Leadership Team develops the annual program of work.178 The program of 
work lays out how the forest’s budget will be divided up among all new and ongoing 
                                                          
178 The acronym used, however is PWP. “We call it PWP. PWP was a project work plan system, a 
computer system that we used to have, that’s evolved into something else but our list of projects is called 
the program of work” (HDH17). 
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projects on the forest, in all phases of planning and implementation, as well as who is 
working on them. As one district AFMO described it “the program of work out of annual 
meetings details people and resources and funding for each project…It’s a budgeting 
mechanism” (BLM3). It is through its control of the program of work that the Leadership 
Team controls each resource management program’s overall budget and their activities. 
Additional Leadership Team meetings are often called throughout the year to address 
unexpected events that effect current project planning and implementation requiring 
adjustments to project budgets or management priorities.179 
 
Projects originate, for the most part, from the districts and submitted to the 
Leadership team for consideration. If accepted and placed on the program of work and 
funded, responsibility for their development into a proposed action is passed back to the 
districts who must work within the specified budget and time constraints allotted. The 
Leadership Team’s collective agreement on priorities and funding represents a kind of 
vetting in which these primary decisionmakers ensure agency policy and objectives are 
followed. However, as noted earlier, the districts are allowed substantial discretion to 
                                                          
179 Some managers made a distinction between Leadership Team meetings and NEPA Team meetings. For 
these managers, Leadership team meetings denote prioritization while NEPA Teams meetings denote what 
I have referred to above simply as additional Leadership Team meetings that deal with these changed 
priorities. The distinction is made because they often involve only a subset of the entire Leadership Team, 
those mostly affected by the issue being addressed. These additional meetings often include a wider 
representation of the specialists, those affected by the issue but may not be members of or formal 
participants in Leadership Team meetings. Unforeseen events take many forms but the common reasons for 
additional meetings reported by managers include what is referred to as “data creep” where a 
recommendation is made, usually by the Regional Office, for additional data collection and analysis due to 
the actual loss of a court case in the region or simply recognition of a pattern of specific issues the agency 
is being challenged on in court. The most common issues prompting “data creep” were over the adequacy 
of old growth, soils or fish and stream sedimentation analysis. Another common reason for calling 
additional Leadership Team meetings are what managers referred to as “surprise” projects. These are 
project ideas brought to the Forest Supervisor’s office, most often by private outside parties but 
occasionally by the Regional Office. These “surprise” projects are usually accompanied by additional 
funding such that they are always described as opportunities by leadership but often viewed as setback to 
those responsible for the projects that get dropped from the program of work. 
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shape management activity since proposals largely originate from the districts and, once 
on the program of work, the project is developed into a proposed action at the district 
level. One Forest Planner described the Leadership Team’s development of the program 
of work this way: 
…ideas for [fuels] projects come from the Fire Management Officers at 
the district. They, from their knowledge of their district come in with the 
areas that they think are important for us to treat. So there’s not a real 
formalized process for that piece…we take the fire projects and put them 
on the appropriate year’s list along with all the recreation projects, all the 
timber projects any other work that we have…We kind of prioritize based 
on expected budgets, what seems to give us the most on-the-ground 
benefit for the effort it’s going to take…Generally for smaller projects we 
wouldn’t be spending a lot of money on assessment…a pretty minor 
amount of work…if it’s large, you know ‘we think its time for us to do an 
EAWS of this area,’ which will lead to a fairly large planning project a 
year from now…part of that is, you know, which NEPA tool we can use, 
whether it’s a Cat Ex or whether it’s an EIS…that’s kind of how we 
prioritize the work. You know, sometimes things come up that changes the 
priorities …there’s no set process, It’ll be different probably for each 
Forest how they go about deciding priorities (BSH9). 
 
 
Individual programs are responsible for meeting their specific program targets but 
line officers are expected to meet integrated or unified targets. This is what underlies the 
Leadership Team’s efforts when developing the program of work. “On-the-ground 
benefit,” from the passage above, refers to a manager’s sense of good land stewardship. 
However, all land management activities depend on funding such that one of the primary 
“benefits” achieved are target accomplishments that ensure future funding. For fuels 
management, meeting targets and ensuring future funding requires maintaining shelf 
stock of projects ready to implement. One way this shelf stock is maintained is by 
spreading planning costs across projects of different costs and time frames. When 
districts submit projects to the leadership team for consideration the proposal includes the 
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estimated level of NEPA analysis required. In effect, the requirements and proscriptions 
for each of the three levels of NEPA function as guidelines that may be used to anticipate 
planning and analysis costs when the Leadership Team endeavors to calculate the 
“benefit for the effort it’s going to take” and to compare the “economic viability” of 
different projects in order to set priorities. 
 
 While internally selecting the level of NEPA as part of the process of developing 
a proposed action, rather than after the public scoping, contradicts the spirit of NEPA,180 
this practice is in fact inscribed in Forest Service direction for complying with NEPA’s 
scoping requirements. This early informal selection of the level of NEPA analysis helps 
managers determine compliance and analysis requirements as part of their efforts to 
efficiently develop proposed actions that are nearly ready for a decision. This also helps 
with the estimate of project planning costs the effort to balance overall annual program 
costs between planning (to maintain shelf stock) and implementation (to meet targets and 
ensure future funding). To understand how this works requires a brief description of the 
direction for NEPA compliance. 
NEPA Compliance 
 
The Forest Service Handbook (FSH) includes a diagram (Figure 4) called the 
“Overview of Process” which “illustrates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process and indicates the normal sequence of actions.”181  
 
                                                          
180 A longs standing critique of federal agency implementation of NEPA is that it represents a pro forma 
exercise with little meaning because the required analysis is conducted after an agency has internally 
committed to a project, a set of objectives and the activities to achieve these objectives. See for example 
Fairfax (1978); CEQ (1997); Karkkainen (2004). 
181 FSH 1909.15 Zero Code (2004). Note: this diagram does not appear in the 2008 update to this FSH. 
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Proposed Action
Implementation
Monitoring
May Fit in a Category 
for Exclusion
Fits USDA or Forest Service 
Category and There AreNno
Extraordinary Circumstances
(Chapter 30)
Categorically 
Excluded
Decision Memo
If Required
(Chapter 30)
Does Not Fit USDA or Forest 
Service Category or There Are 
Extraordinary Circumstances
(Chapter 30)
Scoping and
Environmental Analysis
Need for EIS 
Uncertain
Environmental 
Assessment
(Chapter 40)
Finding of No Significant 
Impact & Decision Notice
(Chapter 40)
Significant Effects 
May Occur
EIS Required
(Chapter 20)
Notice of Intent
Scoping
Environmental 
Analysis
Draft EIS
Final EIS
Record of Decision
(Chapter 20)
 
Figure 4 “Overview of Process” (Forest Service Handbook 1909.15 Zero Code, 2004). 
 
 
The diagram (and most descriptions of CEQ NEPA regulations182) gives the 
impression that the category of NEPA and the level of analysis conducted are selected 
after a proposed action exists. This implies that the proposed action is developed without 
considering the NEPA category or level of analysis required, that the proposed action is 
driven primarily by environmental conditions outlined in the purpose and need statement. 
However, this is not quite the case. The “Overview of Process” (Figure 4) does not, in 
fact, represent the normal sequence of actions. The normal sequence of actions is much 
less straightforward. Recall from the earlier discussion of NEPA that the formal 
                                                          
182 See CEQ Regulations for Implementing NEPA at http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/ceq/toc_ceq.htm 
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requirements of the law begin with the release of a proposed action document. While the 
decision as to the category and intensity of NEPA analysis is formally decided with the 
signing of a decision document after NEPA scoping of a proposed action, and the 
subsequent development and analysis of action alternative, proposed actions are in fact 
developed with a specific NEPA category  and level of analysis in mind. The Forest 
Service employs a process to provisionally select the level of NEPA analysis as part of 
the process of developing a proposed action prior to conducting formal NEPA scoping, a 
process referred to as informal notice. Informal notice is carried out through the Forest 
Service’s national database called the Schedule of Proposed Actions (SOPA). The 
purpose of the SOPA is “to give early informal notice of proposals so the public can 
become aware of FS activities and indicate their interest in specific proposals.”183 When 
projects are first entered into the SOPA, they specify the “expected type of analysis” 
pursuant to NEPA” (either CE, EA or EIS) and the projected release date of the proposed 
action, which then initiates the formal scoping required by the CEQ. The planning status 
at this early stage is listed in the SOPA as “developing proposal.”184 
 
In other words, while it is true that the category of NEPA (CE, EA or EIS) is 
formally decided in a decision document after public scoping of a proposed action, it is 
informally decided long before this point. Such informal assumptions are a common 
solution to circular reference problems whereby one parameter is assumed in order to 
determine the other followed by an iterative process of resolving the discrepancy between 
them. In the case of the Forest Service and the development of the program of work, the 
                                                          
183 FSH 1909.15 Zero Code (06). Emphasis added. 
184 http://www.fs.fed.us/sopa/ “The responsible official shall ensure the SOPA is updated and notify the 
public of the availability of the SOPA” (36 CFR §220.4(d)). 
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decision to pursue a project as an EIS is made based on the calculation that it provides the 
most on-the-ground benefit to warrant the time and cost. Such decisions are made early in 
order to, for example, commit the limited funding and specialist time to conduct an 
EAWS that always precedes large EIS projects. 
 
This circular reference problem appears to arise from the tension between the 
different, yet inextricably linked meanings of the verb determine and the practices 
associated with these meanings – determination as process of choice and selection, on the 
one hand, and determination as a process of investigation and discovery on the other – as 
the verb is employed in the definition of scoping provided by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) as interpreted in the FSH. The CEQ defines scoping as a 
“process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the 
significant issues related to a proposed action.”185 The “objectives of scoping” according 
to the FSH are to “Determine the nature and complexity of the proposed action” 186 yet in 
the very next paragraph the FSH directs managers to “Conduct the scoping actions set 
forth in this chapter commensurate with the nature and complexity of the proposed 
action.”187 In other words, the activities of scoping are to be determined according to that 
which the activities of scoping are supposed to reveal – the nature and complexity of the 
proposed action. Moreover, it is the nature and complexity of a proposed action that is 
supposed to be used to “Identify environmental issues related to the proposed action”; 
                                                          
185 40 CFR §1501.7. 
186 FSH 1909.15.10.2 (2004). The other objectives of scoping listed are: “Determine the disciplines 
required to guide environmental analysis and documentation” and “Determine the type and level of public 
participation.” 
187 FSH 1909.15.10.3 (2004). 
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“Determine how much analysis is necessary” and “Achieve effective use of time and 
money in conducting environmental analysis.”188 
 
Many managers in fact described NFMA analysis as a process of “internal 
scoping” (HDH17) following the description of NFMA analysis in the NEPA/NFMA 
Forest Plan Implementation Training Course (1900-01) (USDA Forest Service, 2006c) 
as a flexible means of narrowing the “scope of consideration” of a proposal, a flexibility 
that derives from the fact that there are “generally no laws or regulations to obey” prior to 
the release of a proposal.189 It is nonetheless a process that involves as much choice and 
decision as it does investigation and discovery in determining the nature and complexity 
of a proposed action. The process of NFMA analysis is fluid and ill-defined owing to the 
purposeful lack of specific direction. But it is precisely this lack of direction that gives 
managers the necessary flexibility to engage this circular reference problem of 
determining the nature and complexity of a project.  
 
Though NFMA analysis is flexible and ill-defined there is a distinct sequence to 
the process of developing a proposed action that results from the manner in which the 
two key factors are addressed within the Forest Service’s organizational structure. This 
sequence derives from the important role played by the Forest Leadership Team’s 
development of the program of work in organizing resource management specialists and 
funding from their individual programs for the assessment of current conditions and the 
development of a proposed action. This suggests that the process of developing a 
proposed action takes place in three more or less distinct phases: 
                                                          
188 FSH 1909.15.10.2 (2004). 
189 Forest Plan Implementation Course 1900-1 Notebook and Class Exercise, p. 3-Unit 5 (10/30/2006 
edition). 
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Phase One - The generation of initial project ideas and their refinement 
into a proposal for consideration by the Forest Leadership Team for 
inclusion on the annual program of work; 
 
Phase Two - The Forest Leadership Team’s development of the annual 
program of work and its selection and prioritization of which projects to 
pursue, their tentative level NEPA analysis and documentation required 
and the allocation of funding and resource specialists’ time for 
determination of resource conditions and the development of a proposed 
action; 
 
Phase Three - The subsequent determination and development of a formal 
proposed action document by the assigned team of resource specialist.  
 
4.6 Summary 
  
This chapter described the structure and process of project planning and 
decisionmaking takes place in the U.S Forest Service. Since the Fires of 2000, the 
initiation of the National Fire Plan and the massive increase in fuels management funding 
that resulted from these events, fuels managers have come to play a new more active role 
in the project planning process. Prior to 2000 fuels managers conducted treatments driven 
predominantly by the objectives of other resource management programs, primarily 
timber and vegetation management (for slash disposal and site preparation for tree 
planting) and wildlife management (for big game browsing habitat). While fuels 
managers had to write the prescription for such treatments, they were for the most part 
uninvolved in the larger more onerous planning process carried out by those managers 
whose program objectives drove the project. Since 2000, fuels managers now participate 
fully in this larger planning process, proposing projects specifically to meet their own 
program’s objectives. 
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This larger planning process in the Forest Service is dynamic and complex, 
characterized by both overlapping and competing objectives between the various resource 
management programs. The varying degrees of overlap and competition arise from the 
fact that the various treatments available to meet the specific objectives of one program, 
affects the resources managed by programs and thus their ability to meet their objectives. 
This interconnection between program objectives and their pursuit through the various 
kinds of treatments must be adjudicated during project development and planning. 
 
At its most basic, project planning in the Forest Service may be divided into two 
parts; the first is the process leading up to a proposed action and the second is the process 
that follows a proposed action. The first half of the project planning process is referred to 
as NFMA analysis. NFMA analysis encompasses all the procedures through which a 
formal proposed action document is developed. The completion of a proposed action 
document initiates the formal procedures required by the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). While the process of complying with NEPA is important and can influence 
the final character of a project, NFMA analysis is where the heart of a project is 
established. It is during NFMA analysis that a project‘s rationale for management action 
are established (its “purpose and need”) as well as its objectives and proposed treatments 
to meet these objectives and address these needs. It is during NFMA analysis and the 
development of a proposed action, in other words, that the overlap and competition 
between the objectives of the various resource management programs is adjudicated. 
NFMA analysis is essentially a process of negotiation.  
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The purpose of NFMA analysis is to address these factors as thoroughly as 
possible in an effort to develop a proposed action that is as complete as possible and 
ready to move forward into the process of NEPA compliance. There are a myriad of 
factors that must be negotiated during NFMA analysis and the development of a 
proposed action. The most important are encompassed in two interrelated sets of key 
factors: 1) targets and funding and 2) compliance with law, regulation and agency policy, 
the threat of litigation and the cost of data collection and analysis determined to be 
necessary for compliance and to mitigate the threat of litigation. While NFMA analysis is 
intentionally ill-defined and lacking specific direction in order to provide flexibility to 
managers, there are certain aspects of the organizational structure of the Forest Service 
that leads to a distinct pattern to the otherwise fluid process of negotiation. This is the 
Forest Leadership Team’s development of the annual program of work. The program of 
work has the effect of dividing the process of NFMA analysis into three phases: 1) the 
preparation of project proposals for presentation to the Leadership Team; 2) the 
Leadership Team’s acceptance, prioritization and allocation of resources, principally 
funding and specialist’s time, for the development and planning of the project; and 3) the 
determination of resource conditions and the development of a proposed action by the 
assigned interdisciplinary team. The negotiation process that takes place during these 
three phases of NFMA analysis is the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE PRACTICE OF FUELS MANAGEMENT PROJECT 
PLANNING IN THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter describes the practice of developing fuels management project 
proposals. It is a practice dominated by a process of negotiation. In his classic study of 
the Forest Service Kaufman (1960 and 2006) describes the organizational structure of the 
agency as a decentralized hierarchy. According to Kaufman (1960 and 2006, p. 83) this 
structure represents the “heart and core” of the agency’s administrative philosophy and 
that management activities are administered as much as possible at the district level 
because “resource management begins and belongs on the ground.” As much authority 
and discretion as possible is therefore delegated to the districts which “constitute the 
backbone of the organization” (Kaufman, 1960 and 2006, p. 83). Higher level authorities, 
such as the regional forester vis-à-vis a forest supervisor, the forest supervisor vis-à-vis a 
district ranger and the district ranger vis-à-vis the resource management specialists on an 
interdisciplinary team190, are described as playing the role of compliance officers of 
management activity, rather than the originators and planners of management activity. 
District rangers, in other words, are accorded a great deal of discretion over how 
management activity is conducted and higher level authorities do not direct management 
action so much as ensure that it is in line with law, regulation and agency policies and 
                                                          
190 The invention of interdisciplinary as a formal entity required in the planning process is new since 
Kaufman published his work but the relationship describes here extends to them as well. 
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goals. This combination of delegated authority and discretion granted to lower level 
managers that is nonetheless checked closely for compliance by higher level managers 
results in what current Forest Service officials describe as a “collaborative leadership 
management style” such that “progress depends on a collective acceptance of any new 
proposal” (GAO, 2003b, p. 15). This collaborative style is characterized by negotiation 
and it is through negotiation that collective acceptance is achieved. The process of 
developing project proposals is primarily a process of negotiation between resource 
management program specialists and their line officer over program objectives and the 
type and extent of treatment activities employed to meet these objectives that will be 
included in the final proposed action. 
 
As described in the previous chapter, fuels managers are responsible to meeting 
hazardous fuels acreage targets within the budget allocation handed down from the Forest 
Service regional office. This is accomplished by maintaining “shelf stock” of ready to 
implement treatments composed of different levels of complexity and expense that can be 
carried out under a variety of seasonal conditions. Maintaining this “shelf stock” is in 
turn accomplished by developing projects composed of different combinations of 
treatment types and extent in conjunction, by necessity, with other resource management 
programs. It is the combination of different treatment types and extents that determine the 
nature and complexity of a project and it is the nature and complexity of the project that 
in turn determines the requirements for compliance with the many different laws, 
regulations and agency policies as well as the potential threat of litigation a particular 
project may face. These compliance requirements and this threat of litigation are 
considered in determining how much and what kind of data to collect as well as the 
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methods and extensiveness of analysis to perform. These issues may be characterized as 
two sets of key factors: 1) targets and funding and 2) compliance with law, regulation and 
agency policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of data collection and analysis 
determined necessary for compliance and to mitigate the threat of litigation. 
 
All of these factors that affect the development of fuels management proposed 
actions are subject to negotiation. The term “negotiation” was in fact used by some 
managers in describing the project planning process. However, others terms more 
commonly used to describe interactions between specialists were “discussion” and 
“fighting.” Negotiation, as used here denotes this spectrum of behaviors from cordial 
deliberation to highly contested struggles often resolved by a district ranger’s fait 
accompli. The process of negotiation takes place in three phases of NFMA analysis: 
Phase One - The generation of initial project ideas and their refinement 
into a proposal for consideration by the Forest Leadership Team for 
inclusion on the annual program of work; 
 
Phase Two - The Forest Leadership Team’s development of the annual 
program of work and its selection and prioritization of which projects to 
pursue, their tentative level NEPA analysis and documentation required 
and the allocation of funding and resource specialists’ time for 
determination of resource conditions and the development of a proposed 
action; 
 
Phase Three - The subsequent determination and development of a formal 
proposed action document by the assigned team of resource specialist. 
 
 
This chapter is composed of five sections: Section 5.1 provides a brief review of 
the concepts from Actor Network Theory used in this research to analyze and describe 
the process negotiation that occurs in the development of fuels management projects. 
Section 5.2 describes the first phase NFMA analysis: District-Level Negotiation. Section 
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5.3, the second phase of NFMA analysis: Forest Leadership Team Negotiation of the 
Program of Work, and section 5.4 the third phase of NFMA analysis: Determining 
Conditions and Developing Proposed Actions. Section 5.5 provides a discussion of the 
enigmatic role played by the determination of fire risk and the ecological role of fire in 
fuels management project planning. This is followed by a summary of the chapter, 
section 5.6, 
 
5.2 Actor Network Theory 
 
Before describing the process of negotiation during the three phases of NFMA 
analysis the basic concepts of negotiation employed in this research will first be 
reviewed. The theoretical framework employed in this research - Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) growing out of the work of Bruno Latour and Michael Callon – is essentially a 
theory of negotiation. It is a theory of the translation and transformation of the object of 
negotiation as increasing numbers of actors become involved in the process. As applied 
here, the object of negotiation is the project itself, its objectives and the combination of 
treatments proposed to meet these objectives. In the language of the Forest Service, 
projects begin as a management opportunity, an idea for a project refined and 
transformed into a proposal to the Forest Leadership Team and then transformed yet 
again into proposed actions. In this process of transformation the nature and complexity 
of a project is determined. ANT provides a set of heuristic concepts for examining this 
process of negotiated transformation. 
 
Callon (1986) identifies four characteristic aspects of the processes of negotiation. 
These are problematization, interessement, enrollment and mobilization. 
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Problematization is the act of making a case for a course of action or an array of courses 
of action that more or less correspond with the perspectives, interests and objectives of 
those framing the problem in that way. The presented management opportunity thus 
reflects this correspondence. Callon (1998) employs Goffman’s (1971) concept of 
framing and points out that much of the content and significance of a frame may be 
implicit and self evident to the protagonists initially involved if they share strong 
connections of some kind, especially disciplinary training or shared objectives, such that 
agreement or consensus on the nature of the frame may not be explicit and only loosely 
specified. In effect the proposed course of action may also be only loosely specified, the 
details also being implicitly understood. Making the frame of the problem and course of 
action more explicit becomes necessary, however, when actors whose participation is 
necessary for the course of action to proceed are brought in but who do not perceive or 
frame the problem in quite the same way due to different interests and objectives. These 
actors must be convinced somehow of participating, and this is done by making them 
interested in the course of action. 
 
Callon’s second aspect of negotiation is interessement. Interessement is roughly 
translated as “to make interested.” It is the forming of alliances by aligning the various 
perspectives, interests and objectives of other actors with a proposed course of action. To 
the extent that these new actors’ perspectives, interests and objectives are different such 
alignment will result in altering the course of action into something different. Enrollment 
occurs when buy-in is achieved; it “describes the group of multilateral negotiations, trials 
of strength, and tricks that accompany interessement and enable it to succeed” (Callon, 
1986). Finally, mobilization is the process whereby those actors made interested in and 
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enrolled in supporting or adopting a particular course of action work together as allies in 
subsequent negotiations with additional actors to continue to move an effort forward. 
While these four moments of negotiation are conceived to be more or less sequential for 
any given set of actors, the dynamics of negotiation is determined by the addition of new 
actors and the degree alignment or divergence between their interests and objectives. 
Thus several of these moments may be in play at any time, but as a management 
opportunity is transformed into a proposed action, it becomes more stable. In the context 
of the three phases of NFMA analysis, negotiation during phase one is characterized 
more by problematization and interessement in order to get a project on the program of 
work. Once on the program of work, the basic outlines of a project, its problem frame, is 
established. Negotiations during phase three exhibit more of the characteristics of 
enrollment and mobilization. Because the project has been sanctioned by the leadership 
team, what remains to be negotiated during phase three of NFMA analysis is how to align 
the interests and objectives of the various resource programs involved. 
 
5.3 NFMA Analysis Phase One: District-Level Negotiation 
 
The first phase of project planning involves negotiations aimed at getting a project 
accepted by the Forest Leadership Team and placed on the program of work, and thus 
funded. The first phase of NFMA analysis is in many ways the most important in terms 
of problematization and defining the nature of the management opportunities that will be 
pursued. It is the least structured and formalized, however. Initial project ideas, for the 
most part, “sort of bubble up from the district level” (BPF36). While the formal decision 
as to the size and mix of activities is not made until a final decision document is signed 
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after public scoping, in practical terms this decision is provisionally made during this first 
phase of project planning. Estimating the level of analysis needed and the recommended 
NEPA category is provided as part of the presentation of the project idea to the Forest 
Leadership Team for inclusion on the program of work. As one forest planner described 
it “when we ask the districts for projects, the work on the planning side that they think 
needs to be done, they’ll give us the assessment piece as well…” (BSH27). The estimated 
NEPA category helps determine the expense of planning and is a central consideration of 
whether a project will get on the program of work. These initial ideas for projects are 
very general, including only a rough estimate of type of activities and their extent 
associated with the different resource management programs.  
 
The district ranger is the key actor in the negotiations over whether an opportunity 
becomes a project proposed brought before the Forest Leadership Team because, as many 
program area specialists described, the district ranger “basically is the person who either 
champions them at a forest wide level or decides ‘no we’re not going to work on that 
particular thing at this point’ and it’s also the district ranger who decides what depth of 
NEPA analysis is appropriate for the project, the proposed project” (BPF36). The initial 
glimmer of an idea for a project itself, however, comes primarily from program 
specialists. Specialists might take a project idea directly to the ranger as one district 
AFMO noted “For [these two CE] projects, we started getting calls from homeowners 
after the fires of 2000. So I kind of took it to the ranger and then the other specialists and 
said, ‘hey, we’re getting a lot of interest in this area. We need to do a project here’ 
(KNH16). Alternatively, specialists may get together amongst themselves and then 
present an idea to the ranger. As another district AFMO described it “Right now on a lot 
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of these projects…we’re looking from our individual disciplines, looking at what kind of 
projects would be beneficial to fire or sheep or silviculture or something and then we 
come back together and we try and talk to the rangers” (BJP29). 
 
Though the decision is ultimately up to the district ranger as to whether a project 
will be proposed to the leadership team for inclusion on the program of work, typically 
this decision is reached through the “collaborative management style” noted by the GAO 
(2003b). This is achieved by aligning the interests and objectives of the district ranger 
and several key resource specialists. This is achieved through complex negotiation. The 
district rangers are responsible for meeting integrated targets but they are also given 
direction from Congress and the Washington Office (via the annual Program Direction) 
to emphasize certain types of activities. As one district AFMO noted “the rangers have 
their own ideas because they’re being given direction to march to. Either [they] need to 
produce timber or need to produce hazardous fuels acres in the urban interface…” 
(BJP29). Individual resource management programs are responsible for meeting their 
own program’s target and they do so by proposing the type and extent of activities its 
specialists deem most appropriate for an area from their disciplinary and professional 
perspective. These initial problematization or framing of a potential project is referred to 
as a management opportunity. As one district AFMO put it “we always call them 
opportunity areas, basically, whether its wildlife opportunity, vegetation management, 
fire and fuels, timber, you know, opportunities for a project.” (KNH16). 
 
Getting other resource specialists interested and enrolling them to support a 
project proposal for submission to the leadership team is quite difficult. At this stage of 
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NFMA analysis, since the project is not yet on the program of work, the time and effort 
expended by resource managers is paid for by their program’s general operating budget 
(Force Account) rather than a project code (P-Code) and thus added pressure to promote 
individual program objectives. Because of this added pressure of not being funded by a 
P-Code, these negotiations have been described as “backroom dealing between 
specialists,” over competing resource management programs objectives: “ladder fuels 
don’t have value but timber [management] has quotas to meet, the veg shop’s always 
pressuring to manage for historic age class, and hazardous fuels is hiding cover so [we 
have to] leave some thick fuels for hiding cover to appease wildlife [managers], even if 
the area was historically open…” (HCK18 & HGJ19). Even when it is agreed the project 
idea is a good one backroom negotiations are often unsuccessful if the objectives of 
enough specialists necessary to move a project forward cannot be aligned. One Fuels 
specialist describes the reaction to an idea presented by fuels and vegetation management 
this way: 
We ran into a wildlife issue where the forest plan standard for hiding 
cover is based on canopy closure…so we read the forest plan very 
thoroughly and came back with, ‘well, it says that’s subject to hydrologic 
or other resource constraints. Fuels management is a resource. Fire is a 
resource. We, as fire and fuels managers, are telling you that we cannot 
protect this resource, this hiding cover as you’re calling it, from a stand 
replacing event’…Same with the timber shop. It says in the forest plan 
we’re supposed to be managing for old growth. How do you manage for 
old growth [age class] in ponderosa pine? You cut out the little stuff. You 
reintroduce fire. You don’t go and take the big trees off; you take the little 
trees out from underneath but that’s not always going to give you a 
[merchantable] product…‘Yeah, its probably a good project> Yeah, 
you’re right at the fire return interval that you should go after this stuff. 
But we don’t like it’…we let it go…It never made the program of work 
(HRM13). 
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There is a general pattern to successfully negotiated projects that make it on the 
program of work. For fuels management this essentially means focusing on small 
projects, usually Categorical Exclusions. Small Categorical Exclusion projects, as 
described previously, help to maintain shelf stock by spreading out analysis costs and 
time between small, cheaper and faster to plan CE projects and large, expensive and time 
consuming EISs. Fuels managers identifying project opportunities to employ the 
Categorical Exclusion must avoid extraordinary circumstance (such as threatened and 
endangered species habitat) while at the same time enrolling at least one or two other 
resource management programs by incorporating their objectives. One district AFMO 
called their tactic maintaining shelf stock as “a shotgun approach” (LLW22). Another 
(from a different forest) described it this way: 
…we’re just choosing to take the tack of ‘let’s keep it small, let’s figure 
out extraordinary circumstances’…We’re avoiding this, we’re avoiding 
that, so that we don’t have any extraordinary circumstances…the lead 
team ultimately makes the decisions what the priorities are…so we’re 
proposing thousands of little spread out projects…What’s going to get us 
the biggest bang for our buck? Cheap acres and lots of them! 
Underburning for [wildlife browsing] habitat. And timber volume because 
that’s what’s getting funded right now…. (BJP29) 
 
 
The concern with multiple small Categorical Exclusion projects is that these 
cannot be too close together. One forest ecologist noted, for example, that “…you can’t 
do CE, CE, CE and have connected activities and say that none of them are connected 
because there’s a limit, an undefined limit, where you violate the known effects…” 
(BTO35). Only a certain number of small projects in a given area over a certain time 
period would pass legal muster. This effectively limits future project placement. To 
balance program costs and keep the shelf stocked with projects, fuels managers for the 
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most part must piggyback on larger projects, driven by other priorities and identify 
opportunities for treatment acres within project planning area. As one district AFMO put 
it: 
The only time fuels is a driver is in the WUI…and small scale…There’s 
got to be either some real, real high, high, high priority that allows it to 
happen, or there’s going to be some economic feasibility to it; i.e., timber 
sold, that allows the rest of the stuff to get done…On this forest…large 
projects from fire fuels saying “hey, we need to treat this area” just never 
becomes a big enough priority… if there isn’t some other driver... 
(KNH16). 
 
 
Large projects that will be pursued as an EA or EIS always include multiple 
program objectives. A Forest Planner described it this way: “What we’ve tended to do is 
look for a lot of opportunities, you know, ranging from fuels management, some 
vegetation treatments, road improvement, watershed etc. We’ve tended, on our larger 
projects, to lump a lot of those activities together into a big NEPA project…you look for 
opportunities to get the work accomplished, of course, within the funding” (KJG28). 
 
In order for large projects proposed by fuels management to make it on the 
program of work, they must mobilize the support of external actors in order to merit the 
commitment of the necessary funding and specialist’s time for an assessment, such as an 
EAWS. Mobilization of external actors essentially leads to the enrollment of the district 
ranger to champion the project to by the Forest Leadership Team by appealing to their 
responsibility to the policy goals of the National Fire Plan and its emphasis on 
collaboration, in addition to their other programmatic responsibilities for integrated 
accomplishments. As one district AFMO described a successful combination of interests: 
We took it a little farther into our forest, and [the Community Fire 
Protection Committee] took it a little farther down onto private and…kind 
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of came up with some project ideas of where a lot of our homes are 
located, our wildland urban interface, and proposed a couple projects and 
[the ranger] took a step back and said, well, ‘there’s a lot of potential 
projects in here …product removal to open up the canopy…some strictly 
burn units…historic grasslands with a lot of Doug fir encroachment 
coming in reducing [wildlife] forage…We were able to get an assessment 
funded throughout, an Environmental Assessment Watershed Scale, an 
EAWS…probably an EIS next year depending on priorities…The 
community’s doing their side so that helps push things…” (HDN11). 
 
This first phase of NFMA analysis is characterized primarily by negotiation 
aimed at aligning enough interested program specialists, and perhaps external actors, to 
enroll and mobilize the district ranger to champion the project before the Forest 
Leadership Team for consideration. The Leadership Team’s establishment of the program 
of work and its periodic adjustments to the program of work, constitutes a different kind 
of negotiation process than that between specialists and their district ranger. These can 
have important consequences for the development of fuels management projects. 
 
5.4 NFMA Analysis Phase Two: Forest Leadership Team Negotiation 
of the Program of Work 
 
The Forest Leadership Team generally accepts the proposals as presented by each 
district ranger, including the level of assessment and analysis, and, if added to the 
program of work, the project is passed back to the districts for assessment and 
development. The difference is that the negotiations during the first phase of NFMA 
analysis are over combining management opportunities to create individual project 
proposals whereas the negotiations of the Forest Leadership Team are over the 
combination of all projects that will take place on the forest. The effect on individual 
projects is, in a way, in direct as the focus is not on the mix of objectives included in an 
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individual project. The Leadership Teams’ prioritization and allocation of funding and 
specialist time to each project sets parameters within which the project will be developed 
However, these parameters can have a strong impact on the amount of funding and 
specialists time put into assessment, data collection and analysis necessary for 
compliance with law, regulation and policy and mitigating the threat of litigation. 
 
The Leadership Team engages in a similar effort to that of the fuels managers’ 
attempt to maintain shelf stock by having a variety of projects in various stages of 
planning and varying levels of NEPA complexity but there is no catchy name for this 
effort at the Leadership Team level. As one forest FMO described it, the Leadership 
Team strives to “spread out NFMA or NEPA planning allocations to keep the pump 
primed for funding coming down from the RO” (HBR15). Just as with individual 
program managers’ efforts, there is no set process or criteria for this is done. One forest 
planner stated simply that “we have all these projects…it’s apples and oranges, but you 
just have to sort of make some decisions about which one’s you’re going to handle…” 
(BSH27) Rangers are referred to as champions of their projects because individual 
project proposals must compete for funding and high priority status against other project 
proposals. District rangers, as is typical in any bureaucratic organization, have an 
incentive to maintain and protect their capacity to perform and achieve the expectations 
they are evaluated against (e.g. integrated targets and the emphasized items outlined in 
annual program direction). Fuels management, unlike most other resource programs in 
the Forest Service, has a substantial staff and overhead on each district.191 Thus, between 
                                                          
191 This fluctuates over the year, more than doubling in size during the summer fire season, using separate 
funding for preparedness but these seasonals, supervised by permanent staff, accomplish substantial fuels 
work when not preparing for or fighting fires. One forest AFMO noted that they had been “discussing the 
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the district ranger and fire management, there is tremendous institutional incentive to 
maintain the program on their district. This in turn leads to a great deal of horse trading to 
spread projects across each district. In other words, just as individual specialists fight for 
the interests of their program when negotiating over the combination of project 
objectives, district rangers and fire management officers fight for interests of their 
district. And, just as with individual programs, the management objectives of a district 
include both biophysical and administrative dimensions. A forest fire ecologist described 
this situation this way: 
You get money for projects…Everyone needs a piece of the pie to fund 
their programs…you can’t fluctuate permanent employees from year to 
year. You have to have a certain amount of dollars – project money – to 
fund all these people that work for you on a permanent basis and so you 
got to get funding for some projects and you got to have some that are 
high priority. Politics comes into play on what projects actually get chosen 
to develop (BTO35). 
 
 
The politics involved in spreading around projects and funding is made more 
complicated by the fact that an important source of project ideas and funding in the 
Forest Service comes from outside the agency. The most common mentioned by fuels 
managers were from industry (such as mining companies seeking permits or power/utility 
companies seeking transmission line installation or repair work) or  non-governmental 
conservation organization such as the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation or Trout 
Unlimited (pursuing habitat restoration projects). 192 All these project proposals along 
with their associated funding are “added to the hopper” (BLM3) of projects considered 
                                                                                                                                                                             
wisdom of the big fire hire” (BRF14) of 2001 for a couple years that established the large number of 
overhead positions, such as an FMO and AFMO, on each district contributing to this impetus to turf 
protection. 
192 Acreage targets accomplished with such external funding are reported in the FACTS database as 
“contributed accomplishments.” 
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by the Leadership team. External actors and the funding they bring with them can heavily 
influence the Forest Leadership Team’s prioritization process. One district AFMO noted: 
[t]he big projects that I’m familiar with, that I’ve been here from the 
beginning, have come from some sort of outside influence on why we 
need to go look at that area or why this is a priority project…All the most 
recent ones on this list were kind of the politics and outside 
influence…[Industry Name], for example, is actually funding some of our 
specialists on [EIS project X]. So, of course, that influence of someone 
else offering to funding it makes it kind of the bigger priority (KNH16). 
 
 
The organizational necessity of keeping the pumps primed with projects by 
spreading out planning commitments that incorporate these “outside influences” creates 
both opportunities and tremendous difficulties. One district AFMO noted that “an 
advantage of an EIS coming in from the SO is that I get to propose large natural burn 
units within that watershed…” (KMM31). According to managers, industry will often 
fund NEPA analysis to help expedite the project while conservation groups tend to fund 
implementation only. However, the agency must still fund substantial assessment and 
planning work, such as the EAWS assessments that precede each EIS. The presentation 
of these outside ideas for projects and their associated funding are often the reason that 
additional Leadership Team meetings are held to adjust project prioritization and the 
allocation of funding and specialists’ time. This creates tensions between line officers 
responsible for maintaining their programs and achieving integrated accomplishments 
and individual program specialists responsible for developing projects and meeting 
individual program targets. Such changes are often passed down almost out of the blue to 
the districts. For fuels managers, this means dropping the projects they are working on 
and finding acres in the new project area. “Surprise projects from management,” one 
district AFMO notes, “causes a lot of consternation. You never know what projects you 
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are going to get when you walk out of these meetings” (BLM3). Another district AFMO 
described it in stronger terms, explaining the effects of changing Leadership Team 
priorities on project planning: 
I mean, our NEPA prioritization, we have a quarterly NEPA meeting to 
talk about the current prioritization of projects [and] it seems like its 
always changing…some of these new projects that sneak in the back door, 
some funding attached to it so we have to make it a priority instead of 
staying the course…means some of the smaller projects are getting 
derailed because they’re not a high priority…it’s like the process is failing 
because when you got 20, 25 tie priorities and only a limited number of 
resource specialists to do assessments or data collection for planning, but 
also implementation…I mean, our shortage of specialists…silviculturer’s 
hung up. Our poor plant people are hung up. Our soils people always get 
hung up…(BJP29). 
 
5.5 NFMA Analysis Phase Three: Determining Conditions and 
Developing Proposed Actions 
 
Once projects get on the program of work, the third phase of NFMA analysis 
begins. This effort consists of a more formal assessment of conditions and refining the 
mix of management objectives that will be pursued, including what kind of treatments 
and their boundaries, such as which areas will be proposed for prescribed burning pre-
commercial or commercial thinning. Project development proceeds slightly differently 
for small Categorical Exclusion (CE) projects than for larger projects pursued under an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The 
difference is due primarily to the differing assessment requirements for determining 
NEPA compliance. In the case of projects identified for development as a CE, this 
assessment is considered part of the process of developing the proposed action itself. The 
project is listed in the Schedule of Proposed Actions (SOPA) as “developing proposal.” 
Assessments for CEs consist primarily of specialists making sure no extraordinary 
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circumstances exist in the project area. For larger projects perused as EA or EIS a more 
formal assessment, such as an Environmental Analysis at the Watershed Scale (EAWS), 
is conducted before work on a proposed action itself is undertaken. These large scale 
assessments are also often listed in the SOPA as “conducting assessment.” 
 
 The assessment process for larger projects such as EAWS does not itself include 
negotiations over the mix and extent of program activities and objectives. Rather, such 
assessments produce information that is used in such negotiations later. The assessment 
process itself often involves little interaction among specialists. “Typically resource 
specialists do this analysis separately at different times” noted one district AFMO, “due 
to on-the-ground issues, i.e. biologist when plants are flowering, hydrologists at peak run-
off, fuels when there’s no fires burning, etc.”(BLM3). There are tensions over the 
conduct of these assessments, however, but this is primarily between line officers and 
specialists over the amount of time and money to be spent. As the AFMO noted, 
“management folks often want to shorten this [left] leg of the [NEPA] triangle” (BLM3). 
One district rangers, for example, told his Assistant Fire Management Officer that “the 
EAWS is just something you write up using existing data. We don’t have any money to 
fund you to go do field work, to go do plots, to go do assessments, nothing. Use existing 
data, you do it from your office chair and you just get it done and get it on paper we’re 
gong to move on” (BTO35). Once an EAWS or some other less intensive assessment 
process is completed, the project is then listed in the SOPA and work begins on 
developing the proposed action. 
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Once Assessments are complete, development of the proposed action begins. It is 
a process of determining the nature and complexity of a proposed action so there is 
something concrete to scope when formal NEPA commences. One forest AFMO 
described this later stage of NFMA analysis as a “kind of a fine tuning of the complexity 
of the project and what the potential impacts are” (HRC20). It is a process of 
determination in both sense of the term – implying both discovery and selection - in an 
iterative progression of proposals and counterproposals between resource specialists as 
they negotiate over the type and size of treatments corresponding to their program 
objectives. These negotiations can be intense. “That’s where those discussions really 
start,” noted one forest planner. “Okay, here are our broad priorities for this area but we 
only have this much money, time, and manpower to get it done. What’s our highest 
priority? Where do we get the most benefit out of doing this with the resources that we 
have right now?” (KJG28) Or, as one district AFMO put it more pointedly, “there’s a lot 
of fighting within the agency before we even come out with something for the public to 
look at. Then it starts all over” (KNH16). 
 
The negotiation process appears remarkably similar between small projects 
prioritized as CEs and larger projects developed as EAs or EISs. The process is fluid, led 
by each program area specialist pursuing their program’s objectives. Fuels managers 
attempt to enroll other resource specialists negotiating over specific areas for treatment 
and/or varying the intensity of these treatments in an effort to enroll other resource 
specialists by meeting their interests and program objectives. The principle difference 
between large and small projects is that most Categorical Exclusions are constrained by 
size limits. The Fuels reduction Categorical Exclusion is limitated to 1,000 acres of 
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mechanical treatment and 4,500 acres of prescribed burning.193 This requires negotiation 
over how to meet multiple objectives within a small area. As one district AFMO 
described it: 
…[we’re at] the very beginning to look at these areas, whittle it down to 
get to within that CE limit because the ranger’s management direction is to 
not to do the larger scale analysis…Even though there might be other 
biological or ecological reasons to look at a larger scale…there’s a bunch 
of fire restoration stuff up here…nice old growth ponderosa with a lot of 
fir coming up under it that if you had a fire now, you’d probably lose that 
old growth pine…But as soon as we start getting at that scale, all these 
other treatments, you’ve exceeded the CE authority so you’d have to do at 
least an EA…(KNH16). 
 
 
Projects conducted with CE authority are prioritized and placed on the program of 
work based on the objectives of the resource program that initially proposed the idea. 
This appears to frame the negotiation over project objectives and treatment mixes in only 
a very general way. For example, the objectives established on the program of work for 
some projects may remain the same but the layout and prescription may be “taken over” 
(HRM13) by another program. In such cases the program specialists, while not mobilized 
to act as spokesman for the project in an effort gain further support (as Callon 1986 
defines the term) they nonetheless may remain enrolled by dint of being ordered to by 
their line officer. Two fuels specialists viewed a project one project as “a misuse of 
CatEx 10 which started out as mostly burning but now its mostly thinning where they can 
remove product and its no longer laid out to take advantage of natural [fire spread] 
                                                          
193 These size limits are different for different CEs. CE #6, however, for “stand and/or wildlife habitat 
improvement activities” does not have a size limit yet may “include but are not limited to” activities such 
as “thinning or brush control to improve growth or to reduce fire hazard” and “prescribed burning to reduce 
natural fuels build-up and improve plant vigor”. It is not used when timber is sold. CE # 12 for “Harvest of 
live trees” is not to exceed 70 acres but may not include even-aged regeneration harvesting (clear-cutting) 
and can include no more than half a mile of temporary road construction. CE # 14 for “Commercial and 
non-commercial sanitation harvest of trees to control insect or disease” may not exceed 250 acres and can 
include no more than half a mile of temporary road construction. (FSH 1909.15.31.2 (2004)) 
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barriers…” (HCK18 & HGJ19) In other cases, project objectives are kept “simple” and 
the objectives are successfully returned to what was originally identified in the program 
of work. “On [CE project Y]” one district FMO noted, “we got the product removal 
aspect back out to keep it simple because we need to move forward and avoid [public] 
controversy” (BSH7). 
 
The negotiation of project objectives and the mix of program activities is intense 
for larger projects as well but the lack of size restrictions allows specialists more 
flexibility to arranging different program activities over a broader area. For example, one 
district AFMO noted, that two treatment units initially identified as opportunities for 
fuels reduction within the EAWS analysis boundary would “probably go to timber…we 
did one field trip up [to project X], and from what was initially identified to what I see on 
the ground is significantly different so we’re going to go back out and do some more field 
work and redraw boundaries” (BTK9). It is comparatively easier, in other words, to meet 
each program area’s objectives with more room to combine management opportunities 
together. As one district AFMO described it: 
On a fire side, we’ll kind of look at the whole area that we can treat…if 
it’s a soils thing…areas that soils doesn’t want us to go into, we might pull 
that back out. Same thing with wildlife hiding cover or thermal cover for 
elk, or we’re into nesting areas for birds. We’ll pull those units out or… 
mitigate some of those concerns by doing less thinning or lower severity 
burning…we’ll get back around the table and kind of hash out all the 
concerns and issues everyone has (HDN11). 
 
 
Larger projects provide more room to maneuver to mix and match program 
objectives across the landscape but these negotiations are also marked by conflict 
between resource managers fighting for their interests. What makes the negotiation over 
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program objectives intense on larger projects are the constraints posed by the shifting 
priorities of the Leadership Team and the associated changes to funding on specific 
projects. This often makes addressing the threat of litigation and determining legal and 
regulatory compliance requirements extremely difficult. Larger projects, especially EISs, 
are closely scrutinized in this region and compliance requirements in themselves are 
subject to a great deal of uncertainty, as described previously, over the issue of deference 
to specialists’ professional judgment in recent court decisions rejecting the methods and 
data employed in direct, indirect and cumulative effects analysis. Before these effects can 
be analyzed, however, the mix of proposed treatments, as well as an inventory of past 
treatments, must be determined. This effort is directly impacted by shifting priorities and 
budget allocations in the program of work. As one AFMO described the situation on her 
district: 
probably half of the specialists or better, are only funded 50% now for 
[Projects X, Y and Z]. Don’t know where the money’s going to come 
from…that shifts folks to work on a smaller subset of those 
projects…that’s an impact to our planning projects in terms of how much 
data we collect and what’s important…maybe even have to pull out some 
[treatment] units (BKB30). 
 
 
Projects at this stage of development rarely fail to go forward but they often get 
delayed. The negotiation process is over which treatment units, supporting which 
resource management program’s objectives, will be reduced in size or intensity or simply 
pulled due to the cost of data collection and analysis. The end result of this long and 
arduous negotiation processes is that resource specialists and the line officers supervising 
them mobilize around a clearly defined proposed action. This proposed action will 
outline the agreed-upon mix of program activities, their location, type and extent such as 
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acres of prescribed burning, commercial or pre-commercial thinning. In the process, the 
initial glimmer of an idea for a project introduced during the first phase of NFMA 
analysis, the initial problematization or framing of the management opportunity, will 
have undergone substantial transformation by the time it is developed into a proposed 
action in the third phase of NFMA analysis. The overall goal of NFMA analysis, to 
repeat the forest planner quoted earlier, “is that by the time you get to a proposed action, 
you have something that is pretty well defined and laid out that if you were to make the 
decision today that you could implement that and be in compliance with laws and 
regulations and Forest Plan standards” (HDH17). 
 
But what of reducing fire risk or restoring the ecological role of fire and forest 
health, the ostensible goals and objectives of the Federal Fire Policy, the National Fire 
Plan, and  the Healthy Forest Initiative? The absence of policy and agency direction 
regarding the assessment and determination of fire risk or fire ecology and how such 
information should inform project planning, means that these issues are not the subject of 
negotiation to develop a proposed action. Simply put, there is nothing definitive to be in 
compliance with. This does not mean that fuels managers are not concerned about fire 
risk or restoring the ecological role of fire. It does mean, however, that factors affecting 
fire behavior and ecology and conceptions of fire risk and restoration are woven into the 
more overt and administratively prescribed concerns over targets and budgets and the 
things that directly affect the accomplishment of acreage targets within budget – 
compliance with law regulation and policy, the threat of litigation and the cost of analysis 
– the two key factors of project development. The following section discusses the 
enigmatic role played by the determination of fire behavior and ecology and perceptions 
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of fire risk reduction and restoring the ecological role of fire in the development fuels 
management project proposals. 
 
5.6 The Enigmatic Role of Fire Risk and the Ecological Role of Fire in 
Fuels Management Project Planning 
 
The previous sections described the general process of developing a proposed 
action through the negotiations over targets and budgets and costs and the compliance 
requirements between specialists and line officers during the three phases of NFMA 
analysis. Rhetorically, and according to official policy, reducing fire risk and restoring 
the ecological role of fire should be at the heart of fuels management project planning. 
And indeed they are. But when asked about the factors that influence project planning, 
managers rarely mentioned these two issues. The discussion focuses instead on the two 
sets of factors described previously – targets and budgets and compliance and the threat 
of litigation. Negotiating over these two sets of factors during the three phases of 
developing a proposed action overshadow and dominate the process of analyzing and 
specifying fire risk and the ecological role of fire. A fuels manager’s perception of 
treatment needs is just one element among many that are on the table during negotiations. 
 
The goals to reduce fire risk and restore the ecological role of fire are the 
omnipresent background noise of fuels management project planning. Managers are 
always concerned about these goals but their practical application in the project planning 
process is obscure. Other resource specialists and line officers do not challenge fuels 
managers’ knowledge of fire behavior so this knowledge is not part of the negotiation 
process. Likewise Fuels managers do not question wildlife biologists whether underbrush 
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is wildlife hiding cover or not. More importantly, what fire managers know about fire 
behavior and ecology and how they conceive of risk and restoration is not documented 
until late in the planning process as part of writing the proposed action itself. 
 
The methods by which fire behavior and the ecological role of fire are 
characterized and analyzed are varied. These differences are not simply due to the 
different analytical requirement of the three NEPA categories (CE, EA and EIS). Rather, 
there are large differences in the analysis methods employed for each project, ranging 
from professional judgment to extensive sampling and spatial modeling using various 
techniques and computer software. Even between two CEs conducted on the same district 
and especially between larger projects conducted as EISs have multiple methods of 
analysis and subsequent representations of the ecological role of fire. As one district 
Assistant Fire Management Officer (AFMO) described it: 
…each project’s different…it varies, definitely, from forest to forest, even 
from district to district here on how we analyze things, you know, what 
exactly goes into the specialist report…A lot of it varies by each project, 
you know, like a project I do is going to be a little different than even 
when [other AFMOs] do one… (KNH16). 
 
The depth and detail of analysis and the rigor of the methods used increases as the 
process of refining a proposed action progresses. As discussed previously, the forest 
leadership team’s decision to place a project on the program of work is based largely on 
the experience and judgment of specialists working for the districts. Simply put, more 
formal methods of analysis to determine fire behavior and ecology take place after many 
of the key decisions have been made about the mix of objectives included in a project 
along with the general location and type treatments to achieve these objectives. “The 
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literature suggests analysis comes first,” one district AFMO noted, “but in reality the idea 
of something at risk comes first then analysis is done. Modeling, GIS. Analysis is more 
for confirming suspicion or validation” (BLM3). As another AFMO described it: 
 
We don’t have forest-wide fuels data at all, or a layer for GIS, on the 
whole forest. It’s developed on the smaller scale for each project…[We] 
walk through most every stand that is going to have some sort of treatment 
associated with it…all those opportunities that are identified, we go walk 
through there and come up with what fuel model it is or whatever it may 
be, their way or choice in deciding how to describe it (KNH16). 
 
 
It is challenging to capture and quantify professional experience and judgment. 
The idiosyncratic selection of more formal methods of data collection and analysis late in 
the planning process does not provide an accurate picture of the content of professional 
judgment. After all, as discussed above, fuels managers must sometimes provide analysis 
and documentation rationalizing projects they do not believe should count as fuels 
management. Because the results of more formal analysis are largely used to validate 
professional judgment, those analyses are treated more as a form of documentation of the 
choices made rather than documentation of how analysis informed those choices. Thus it 
is impossible to determine, in any precise or meaningful way, what a manager’s 
knowledge of fire behavior and ecology, risk and restoration consists of and how this 
knowledge informed their role in project negotiations.194 
 
This obscured role played by professional judgment and later analysis is 
revealing. On the three forests examined for this research, fuels management and its 
                                                          
194 NEPA documentation for 26 projects between 2001 through 2007 was reviewed for this research (ten 
small projects conducted under CE authority, nine EAs and seven EISs). Seven additional project 
documents completed in the late 1990s were also reviewed. The project files of one CE and one EIS on 
each of the three forests was also reviewed but copies were not made or analyzed in depth. 
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expanded target and budget line item has simply been added to and subsumed into the 
Forest Service’s extant project planning process and extant set of resource management 
programs and objectives where each project is negotiate anew under unique 
administrative constraints established in the ever shifting program of work using 
whatever data and analysis methods are ready to hand. There is no formal or consistent 
process for defining or characterizing beneficial or detrimental fire behavior and effects 
in a watershed or treatment unit, let alone the relationship between multiple treated units 
across time and space within a watershed. There is no formal process for identifying, 
collecting and managing consistent data needed for such characterization. There is no 
formal process or set of criteria for prioritizing areas of higher and lower risk, addressing 
the associated trade-offs between treating one area over another, or for addressing the 
trade-offs between treating risks to social or economic values from ecologically 
beneficial fire – all of which are called for in the Federal Fire Policy and the 10-Year 
Comprehensive Strategy of the National Fire Plan. 
 
 The existing project planning process is dominated by the idiosyncratic project-
by-project mixing and matching of different resource management program objectives, 
their associated treatments and funding sources in order to achieve integrated target 
accomplishment. While the outcome of this process obscures how fire risk and the 
ecological role of fire are defined and determined and how results of this determination 
are employed in the negotiation over project objectives, there are several general patterns 
that emerged from this research. These patterns shed some light on the sources of tension 
and confusion arising from the high degree of discretion granted local managers and this 
discretions corollary lack of definitions in legislation and agency direction on basic 
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concepts and policy goals such as fire risk and sustainability. These patterns also shed 
some light on why it is impossible to determine how the policy goals of fire risk 
reduction and the restoration of the ecological role of fire are incorporated into fuels 
management project planning. These patterns derive from the fact within fire 
management there is a general distinction made between reducing fire hazard and 
restoring or maintaining the ecological role of fire. Neither side of this distinction is 
clearly defined, however, but rooted in professional knowledge and policy rhetoric. One 
fire ecologist noted: 
…fire ecology is not equatable to risk and a lot of people in fire 
management are very risk oriented…They’re thinking fire behavior, 
they’re thinking people and that’s where a lot of confusion starts because 
people start throwing terms around about risk and terms about ecological 
risk and ecological sustainability and WUI and pretty soon we’re not 
talking about the same thing anymore (BTO35). 
 
 
 Fuels managers focus primarily on the reduction of fire hazard or risk. (The terms 
are used synonymously along with threat and danger.) Managing for the ecological role 
of fire is a distant second, to the point that its role in fuels management project planning 
and decisionmaking is essentially unintelligible. This appears due not so much to its 
perceived lack of importance as it does from the professional background and skill set of 
the majority of fuels managers. The lone fire ecologist on each forest plays a supporting 
role to the fuels management program on each district. Most fuels managers have a 
background in firefighting. This background places a premium on the use of professional 
judgment for the determination fire behavior but provides little foundation in fire 
ecology. Reducing fire risk is therefore approached as reducing the fire behavior 
characteristics familiar to firefighters – flame length, fire intensity and potential crown 
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fire initiation and spread. Fuels managers use their professional judgment to determine 
hazard and risk while also relying on this professional orientation to interpret ill-defined, 
inconsistent and often conflicting agency direction. Their interpretation recognizes the 
primacy of achieving acreage targets within budget. Their interpretation also recognizes 
the lack of institutional support for conducting assessments of the ecological role of fire 
as sanctioning the use of their professional judgment for such determinations. Despite 
this professional orientation towards risk as determined through professional judgment, 
however, fuels managers almost universally expressed the need for greater effort and 
support for information collection to move beyond the project by project approach 
(though none referred to fire policy while doing so) and especially condemn the failure to 
monitor treatment effects and effectiveness. The following describes the interrelationship 
of these issues as they pertain to fuels management project planning and decisionmaking. 
Policy Direction 
 
Policy direction regarding restoring the ecological role of fire is presented in 
terms of fire regime condition class (FRCC). This direction reflects the ambiguity 
between fire risk and ecology quoted above, and the misrepresentation of FRCC 
inscribed in the categorical exclusion (CE) for fuels reduction, the Healthy Forest 
Restoration Act (HFRA) and the Forest Service ACtivity Tracking System (FACTS) 
accomplishment reporting database. Fuels managers almost universally expressed the 
need for greater effort and support for information collection to move beyond the project-
by-project approach to fuels management and especially condemn the failure the agency 
to support monitor treatment effects and effectiveness. 
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Recall that the process of project planning in the Forest Service is characterized 
by three phases of NFMA analysis in which general ideas for projects are proposed, the 
type and intensity of various kinds of treatments are negotiated and finally settled on. 
Only during the later stages of NFMA analysis, when the general mix of program 
objectives and treatment types (if not their precise boundaries and extent) have already 
been tentatively agreed upon, are more formal methods for characterizing and analyzing 
fire risk and ecology employed. As one district AFMO put it: “We got thousands of acres 
to look at you know…we don’t have the time and people to go out and do that [fire 
behavior and GIS] analysis until we get way down the NEPA [triangle] road” (BTK9). 
The decisions and determinations made during the negotiation process prior to the 
conduct of these more formal methods of characterization and analysis are based on what 
is usually referred to as professional judgment or experience. In the Forest Service 
professional judgment is considered a method of analysis.195 
 
The extent to which more formal methods of analysis are employed to supplement 
and refine the professional judgment used in project planning is ultimately up to the line 
officer in charge of the project usually the district ranger. They usually make this 
decision with input from the resource specialists (and sometimes the forest leadership 
team) during the later stages of project planning. The operative direction for conducting 
analysis is that found in the Forest Service Handbook (FSH) which, as described 
                                                          
195 The GAO (2005, 2007) also referred to professional judgment as an analysis method and described it as 
the most common method used in the Forest Service Northern Region, for the determination and 
prioritization of fire risk. 
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previously, states that the “[d]evelopment of criteria or standards may be necessary to 
guide the analysis process.” 196 The first two bullets in the list are: 
1) Identify and select data sources, analysis methods, and set standards of 
accuracy and 
 
2) Determine the depth or detail of the analysis. 
 
This direction in the FSH is followed by the admonition that “[w]hen formulating 
analysis and evaluation criteria or standards, be sure to consider Forest Service objectives 
identified in legislation, policies, and plans…” This admonition requires a great deal of 
interpretation as the “objectives identified in legislation, policies, and plans” are 
extremely vague and do not address the inherent incongruities between them. The most 
important direction guiding fuels management appears to be that linked to the 
accomplishment of acreage targets, which, as described previously, is a criteria in 
manager’s annual evaluations and directly tied to future program funding. A 
representative example is found in the fiscal year 2007 Program Direction. Hazardous 
fuel reduction is defined in this direction as the manipulation of vegetation “so that the 
intensity, severity, or effects of wildfire are reduced. These reductions should be 
measurable or predictable using fire behavior prediction models or fire effects models” 
(USDA Forest Service, 2007a, p 14-24). This direction states that this is the assumed 
objective of projects carried out with the hazardous fuels budget line item (WFHF). This 
direction also provides a very basic description of the fire regime condition class concept, 
paraphrasing the definitions in the HFRA, which is how they are employed in the FACTS 
accomplishment reporting database. The extent of the direction regarding project 
planning in these areas reads: “Program managers should maximize opportunities to 
                                                          
196 FSH 1909.15.12.31 (USDA Forest Service, 2004b). Emphasis added. 
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implement projects in priority areas including WUI and Condition Classes 2 or 3 lands in 
Fire Regimes 1, 2, and 3 that will reduce hazardous fuels and/or contribute incrementally 
to a landscape-scale improvement in condition class” (USDA Forest Service, 2007a, p 
14-18). 
Potential incongruities not addressed in this or any other agency direction are 
numerous but one example stands out and may serve as a general case – fire severity. 
Reducing severity is part of the assumed objective of hazardous fuels reduction and it is 
one of the factors in the determination of FRCC. For example, fire regime 1, 2 and 3, 
listed above, are characterized predominantly by low-severity, high or stand replacement 
severity and mixed severity respectively. The determination of fire severity in FRCC is 
measured in terms of percentage of overstory mortality resulting from fire. However, this 
measure of fire severity is directly related to the spatial scale over which it is measured as 
well as the delineation between classes (e.g. 70% or 80% mortality as the breakpoint 
between mixed and high severity categories). In other words, a small patch or stand of 
trees killed in a fire within a larger area of surviving trees may be said to be high severity 
when measured at the patch or stand-scale, while measurement of a broader area with 
predominantly live trees after a fire would produce a lower severity result. The 
disciplines of disturbance and landscape ecology call attention to the importance of 
selecting the spatial scale of measurement appropriate to the phenomena in question.197 
Simply put, severity is meaningless (or rather full of meaning since it can mean anything) 
unless it is accompanied by some reference to scale and measurement framework more 
                                                          
197 The FRCC Guidebook provides guidelines as a starting point. These generally increase in size as the 
frequency of fire decreases such that it is recommended that assessment of fire regime 1 in flat terrain 
encompass 50-2,000 acres while fire regime 5 characteristic of infrequent stand replacing fire encompass 
5,000 to 1,000,000 acres in flat or rolling terrain. Steep and broken terrain requires smaller areas since this 
tends to check fire spread. 
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generally. Comparisons for purposes of prioritization or monitoring cannot be made 
unless scale and measurement assumptions are provided. 
Professional Judgment 
 
Guidance such as the fiscal year 2007 Program Direction (USDA Forest Service, 
2007a) implies that fire behavior models should be used for determining reduced fire 
severity but it does not require it. Similarly, while the description of FRCC also implies 
the use of the formal method developed for its assessment - the FRCC Guidebook - this 
also is not required. There are a wide variety of methods and models to choose from and 
considerable debate on the merits of each. The relationship between professional 
judgment and more formal methods of characterizing and analyzing fire behavior or 
ecology is highly complex. No reliable, consistent analysis methods exist independent of 
professional experience in observing fire behavior, traditionally gained through 
firefighting, or, in the case of fire ecology, through field experience in ecological 
classification. However, this is the primary reason for adopting formal procedures and 
documenting assumptions.198 It is therefore significant that consistency and transparency 
is not required for whatever method is employed on issues such as the spatial scales at 
which fire severity is determined, since it figures so prominently in even the vaguest 
direction provided for fuels management.199 
 
There are several interrelated consequences of this focus on reducing fire 
behavior characteristics based primarily on professional judgment without any guidance 
                                                          
198 Stratton (2006) in Guidance on Spatial Wildland Fire Analysis: Models, Tools, and Techniques put out 
by the Forest Service’s Rocky Mountain Research Station Fire Sciences Lab notes that “modeling is an art 
as well as a science and one’s field experience enables the art of the modeler.” P. 1. 
199 The Healthy Forest Initiative and Healthy Forest Restoration Act Interim Field Guide (USDA and 
USDIO, 2004) also recommends but does not require FRCC Guidebook assessments when conducting 
Healthy Forest Initiative projects. 
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or standards. One important consequence is that professional judgment is considered a 
form of analysis in and of itself and that the use of more formal methods such as 
computer modeling is viewed largely as an exercise in validating or proving accuracy of 
their professional judgment, a documentation exercise in response to the threat of 
litigation rather than a tool of investigation. As one district AFMO put it: 
Old fire dogs, like most FMOs are, they don’t even know what the new 
[fire behavior computer] models are…The level, I wouldn’t even say the 
level of analysis, the analysis was always there, but how you prove it, I 
guess, has gotten a lot more complicated. You know, models are still 
models…They’re very, very limited in what they tell you. And it’s a lot of 
work to understand and learn how to run them just to tell you what you 
knew beforehand, you know…But we might use them just to try and prove 
a point because as we’ve seen, professional judgment alone doesn’t get us 
out of litigation. It tends to get us in litigation if you don’t have some way 
of proving it (KNH16). 
 
 
The other consequence of professional orientation of fire managers upon reducing 
fire behavior characteristics and effects perpetuates some notable biases that effect the 
perception of fire risk and the identification of projects. One important bias, recognized 
even by many fire managers themselves, is a stand-level perspective. As one forest 
AFMO described it: “The experience of fire folks is stand level…we see fire across the 
landscape but we think of treatments as stands” (KDR6). This predisposition towards 
professional judgment based on reducing stand-level fire severity, and skepticism over 
models leads to erroneous ecological perceptions, particularly regarding the purpose of 
FRCC. One district AFMO, for example noted: 
I don’t care what some model tells you. It comes down to knowing when 
to apply fire to the landscape, when not to, what’s going to stop the 
fire…that’s corporate knowledge from the generations that went before 
us…especially here on [this forest], I mean, fire use started [in this 
region]. We know that fire’s good for the landscape. We know it’s good in 
ponderosa pine but not so much for Lodgepole or Doug fir because we 
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have a lot more mortality, higher severity…now [we’re told] ‘show me 
that through that model.’…How does [FRCC] apply to us down at the 
ground level?...It’s not the site specific thing that we’re dealing with on a 
project-unit by project-unit basis because that’s where we’re getting beat 
to death in courts…FRCCs more of a broad landscape, 500,000-acre 
look…(BJP29). 
 
 
These biases towards stand-level reduction of fire behavior characteristics and 
viewing modeling as primarily a means of proving the validity of professional judgment 
sometimes leads to friction between some fuels managers and the forest fire ecologist and 
the silviculturists, precisely over the biases inherent fuel managers professional 
background. Simply put, drawing from the above quote, where fire is good for ponderosa 
pine, for example, is not necessarily clear from a perspective based purely on reducing 
fire severity and effects. The assumption that fire is not so good for Lodgepole pine due 
to high mortality defies generally understood fire ecology principles since the serotinous 
cones of Lodgepole require fire to open and release their seeds and forests are 
characterized by high severity fires. While the general difference between stand and 
landscape perspectives is recognized, the forest fire ecologist’s and the silviculturist’s 
concerns over the implications of these biases for project design is typically negotiated on 
a project by project basis. The purpose and utility of broad scale assessments is largely 
lost in the bureaucratic refusal to encroach on manager’s ability to achieve targets and 
balance program costs. 
…my understanding is that if the primary purpose of a project is fuels, 
WFHF…you better do FRCC…So we asked the Regional Office for 
clarification on the role of FRCC assessments for [accomplishment 
reporting in] FACTS and got conflicting answers. So some said it wasn’t a 
big deal, just gloss over it …I guess the question about intuitiveness…We 
think we know what the condition class is out there, we think we know 
what we’re looking at but…some of the fuels staff roll their eyes and go 
‘Give me a break! Why does it matter? Let’s just treat areas where we 
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know we need to reduce the potential flame length, the potential crown 
fire’…That’s what they know and that’s what they are really good at. But 
when we start thinking big picture, broad landscapes, that’s just a little 
beyond them…A lot of times everyone’s jumping on this bandwagon 
about the classic ponderosa pine stand, ‘they used to drive wagons through 
it.’ ‘It was all grass and widely spaced and open’ and blah blah blah. The 
silviculturalists and I sit in the back of the room and go ‘Yeah, but! Yeah, 
but! Yeah but! There were always other developmental stages in these 
stands. It was never wall to wall old growth Ponderosa…all low severity’ 
(BTO35). 
 
Determining FRCC 
 
In practice, FRCC assessments using what one fuels specialist called the “bona 
fide method” (HGJ19) are simply not conducted for small projects carried out as a 
Categorical Exclusion. The point of the Healthy Forest Initiative and the agencies’ 
development of the fuels CE regulation, after all, was to reduce analytical requirements. 
For small projects, in other words, FRCC is determined through professional 
judgment.200 FRCC assessments were conducted as part of several EAWS assessm
These assessments were conducted in a variety of ways, involving various degrees of 
rigor in data collection according to the formal FRCC Guidebook methods or using 
existing data and putting it into the FRCC format – all of which is acceptable according 
to the formal m
ents. 
ethod.201 
                                                          
 
200 Only one project conducted under Categorical Exclusion decision authority reviewed for this research 
had an actual FRCC Guidebook assessment associated with it and this was because the project was delayed 
by the forest leadership team in order to collect additional data on old growth following the Iron Honey 
decision in the Ninth Circuit. During this delay a project with an adjoining boundary being pursued as an 
EIS completed its EAWS and this analysis included an FRCC Guidebook assessment. Portions of this 
FRCC assessment information was then included in the small CE project’s revised NEPA documentation. 
The treatment itself, however, remained the same and was not altered by the findings of this analysis. On 
another forest, two CE projects on different districts planned within a year of each other in fact had 
verbatim description of FRCC in the project area suggesting one had been copied from the other. 
201 FRCC relies on a vegetation classification called Biophysical settings that divides the developmental 
stages into five classes: A, post replacement; B mid-seral closed; C mid-seral open; D late-seral 2 closed 
and; E late seral 1 closed. 
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Recall that the results of EAWS assessments provide the bulk of the information 
included in the Affected Environment chapter of subsequent Environmental Impact 
Statements (EIS). Both EAWS assessments and the Affected Environment chapter of 
EISs are divided into sections according to resource program such as “fire and fuels,” 
“vegetation” and “wildlife,” etc.. Each section is prepared by specialists from the 
corresponding resource management programs. Of particular interest here are the sections 
on vegetation and fire. Comparing these two sections demonstrates the challenge of 
determining how the perception or analysis of the ecological role of fire informs 
management decisionmaking and treatment design. 
 
All seven EIS documents reviewed for this research used the terminology from 
the FRCC Guidebook to describe the projects analysis area in the fire and fuels section of 
the Affected Environment chapter. Only three used the FRCC Guidebook methods to 
derive the resulting FRCC classification. Only one of the three EISs, however, used the 
resulting assessment information for the description of the ecological role of fire in both 
the vegetation and fire and fuels sections of the EIS Affected Environment chapter. The 
six other EIS documents, including the two for which “bone fide” FRCC Guidebook 
assessments were conducted, employed different ecological classification systems to 
describe the ecological role of fire in the vegetation section. 
 
The two most common vegetation classifications used in the vegetation sections 
of the EISs were Habitat Types and Vegetation Response Units (VRU). These are based 
classifications of dominant or potentially dominant vegetation (known as potential 
vegetation groups or PVG). Both Habitat Types and VRU classifications have eleven fire 
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regime groups. This is not an insignificant difference. FRCC is based classification called 
Biophysical Settings (BpS) and includes a broader set of indicators. BpSs were designed 
explicitly to overcome errors in determining fire regimes based on PVG classifications. 
According to Hann (2004, p. 30), the principle developer of the FRCC Guidebook, “local 
terrain, climate, fire weather, ignition source and juxtaposition (patch mosaic) of more or 
less flammable vegetation types, appear to be more important causal factors for 
determining the fire regime than PVG.” In other words, a simple transposition of the 
eleven fire groups from the Habitat Type or VRU classification systems into the five of 
FRCC is not accurate or reliable. Crosswalks have been created but it is more involved 
than simply overlaying one on top of the other. 
 
The description of the proposed treatments in these six EIS documents and how 
the treatments would improve forest conditions and restore the ecological role of fire 
were tied to the description of Habitat Types or VRUs in the vegetation section rather 
than the FRCC description in the fire and fuels section. Only the one EIS that included 
the FRCC description in both the vegetation and fire and fuels section linked the 
description of proposed treatments and its intended effects to the characteristics of FRCC. 
In other words, as the fire ecologist above noted, FRCC is treated primarily as a reporting 
requirement that is not viewed as needing to reflect any relationship to management 
action. One district AFMO noted that “FRCC is in the CE and the National Fire Plan but 
our SO [forest supervisor’s office] won’t support doing assessments. Someone will catch 
on that we’re not really doing FRCC” (LLW22). 
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Monitoring 
 
Despite fuels managers’ confidence in their professional judgment and the 
perception that analysis is primarily a means of validating what they already know, 
managers also recognized that this was a response to the pressure of meeting acreage 
targets and did not necessarily constitute good or efficient land management planning. 
The project-by-project approach to information collection and analysis was widely seen 
as inadequate. This was expressed predominantly in terms of the desire for better 
monitoring. Several managers pointed out with envy that the “Park Service is really good 
about doing data collection [with] their Fire Monitoring Handbook, a lot of intensive 
monitoring, not like the Forest Service where we don’t even have a protocol” (BJP29). Or 
as another district AFMO put it “There’s constantly wishes to have better monitoring, I 
mean, it would make us a better land management agency…you know, in a perfect world, 
all the stuff you learned in college about how to actually come up with more precise 
numbers and what really is out there and see what effects you are having…but with the 
constant downsizing…and budget pressure…” (KNH16). While some managers were 
rather sympathetic to the institutional challenges of the agency, as if monitoring were a 
nice extra but not really necessary, others were rather more adamant that the lack of 
support for monitoring represented a larger organizational disconnect between broader 
agency initiatives and priorities and those of local managers at the district level where 
land management actually impacts the land. As one district AFMO noted, referencing the 
Environmental Management System (EMS) process, established with the 2005 forest 
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planning rule that was supposed to guide adaptive management and organizational 
learning:202 
…monitoring is a good example of lack of support. Even for old growth, a 
highlighted issue…Seems like they get the wood out…so where’s the 
funding?... Probably the best direction for monitoring is EMS…but our 
EMS rep for the forest comes down to [the district office] and babbles and, 
says ‘hey, you guys know what EMS is all about now. Sign here to say 
that you’ve been to the training’…they’re checking boxes! It’s not like 
they’re giving you monitoring protocols and funding to go with it…My 
frustration is, it’s like how do you know you’ve met your initial objectives 
if you don’t follow up on your plan instead of just, okay, we’re done here, 
let’s go to [Project X] (KMM31). 
 
 
 Manager’s frustration with the lack of organizational support for monitoring 
became even more vehement in some cases when discussing information collected as 
inputs to project planning, information that would be necessary for monitoring to 
evaluate post treatment change. One fuels specialist described the Forest Service’s 
approach to planning as entirely reactionary, responding only to court challenges, stating 
that: 
I don’t think our agency is capable of proactive action…I think they 
realize, the specialists and leadership team, that we’ve got to collect data 
or we’ll never go anywhere in court because what we’ve got in our timber 
stand database203 is garbage and what we have from satellite imagery is 
garbage204… but, at the same time, there doesn’t seem to be an interest in 
working on basic information…if it’s not tied to a project they’re not 
interested in looking (HRM13). 
 
 
                                                          
202 Since the 2008 planning rule has been enjoined and a new planning rule development process, begun the 
status of EMS has become uncertain. See for example the EMS discussion website at 
http://forestpolicy.typepad.com/ems/. 
203 This refers to the Timber Sale Management Reporting System (TSMRS), the same one identified in the 
Iron Honey litigation. 
204 This refers to SILC 3. Newer remotely sensed data combined with simulation models resulting in newer 
broad scale vegetation classifications was just being released to which this specialist noted “I’ve got a lot of 
hopes for VMAP. A lot of people here have a lot of hopes for VMAP…LANDFIRE too…but inherently 
they’re still going to need to be ground truthed too…The assumptions in their classification rules don’t 
always hold up on the ground and things change. And they’re not fine enough scale for project work.” 
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These general themes expressed by many local managers over the need for basic 
information to inform planning, the lack of institutional support for information 
collection and monitoring and the general disconnect between agency initiatives, 
direction and funding with the realities of actual project planning was summed up nicely 
by one assistant forest planner by pointing out the contradictions in one of the Forest 
Service’s longstanding rhetorical tropes about efficient management: 
 
…we’ve got the federal government going corporate quote-unquote, a big 
push for the agency the last 15 years, and yet having all the land base that 
we have and not having a detailed inventory of what we’re trying to sell so 
to speak. You know, a store usually has an inventory of its goods. We 
don’t have that. We’re just in, not a complete vacuum, there’s some 
conceptual things we can say because we know that nobody challenging 
us is going to have any better information, but if we’re trying to take 
concepts, like FRCC and some wildlife habitat issues, we need some 
detailed information, some consistent information across a large enough 
area to represent the issue…When lynx was listed205, there was a lot of 
consternation…Leadership said ‘hey, Lynx habitat, that’s now a purpose 
and need for forest management’ and now we have a purpose and need for 
getting fire back on the landscape…but it’s left for the folks down at the 
ground level to take what information they have to kind of try and figure it 
out for each project and ensure that its effective (BKB30). 
 
 
 Fuels manager’s frustration with the lack of institutional support for information 
collection and analysis to inform project planning and monitoring of the effects of 
management activity combined with the exigencies of the project planning process, 
particularly the Leadership Teams prioritization process, and the overwhelming influence 
of targets and budgets, compliance with law regulation and policy and reaction to 
litigation lead many to describe fuels management as “totally ad-hoc” (BJP29) that it 
                                                          
205 The US Fish and Wildlife Service listed the Canada lynx (Lynx canadensis) as threatened under the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) in March, 2000. 
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amounts to “a shotgun approach to fuels management” (LLW22). “We might as well 
throw darts at the district map”, noted one district AFMO, and continued: 
In fact one time we did with a chunk of money that came in late spring, 
right as we started transitioning to preparedness [for fire season]. What 
difference does it make? Most areas need some sort of treatment and it 
will get changed in NFMA anyway. We practice random acts of risk 
reduction (LBS23). 
 
 
The inefficiency and dysfunction of the project planning process is widely 
recognized by managers at the forest level as well. As on forest fire ecologist described it:  
 
I can’t put my finger on it exactly. I mean we spend a lot of money on this 
forest in planning and yet we pull off these rinky-dink projects. Sometimes 
I just think, you know, ‘how did we get here?’ We go to meeting after 
meeting after meeting, we have quarterly NEPA meetings where we 
reschedule and we sit there with our calendars open ‘how many days do 
you have available, we need you on [project X], we need you on [project 
Y], these are our priorities.’…We had a meeting last week…and some 
people walked away from that meeting going ‘I’ve had that conversation 
every year for the last 12 years on this forest.’ That’s how the whole thing 
starts. You have to have the specialists agree and move the project forward 
and move to implementation. It’s always done on a stand level. It always 
has been done on a stand level… In reality I don’t know if it would ever 
make a difference if we came up with a strategy or a priority map…we 
can’t even come up with a five-year [fuels reduction] plan and that doesn’t 
have to do with landscape planning but with keeping our shelves stocked 
with projects so that we can pull something off when the weather is right 
[for prescribed burning]. It’s hard enough just to have projects on the shelf 
let alone a landscape strategy…Cause you got to get funded. You got to 
get projects lined up every year…You got to meet your target every year 
so you got to fund your people every year. I think the view is, right now, 
that if we were to spend time coming up with a landscape strategy it would 
be just totally pie in the sky (BTO35). 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
With the focus on wildland fire fuels following the fires of 2000, fuels 
management is finally a significant part of land management. This has brought about the 
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developing projects that included fire management objectives, what used to be referred to 
in the 1970s as “fire considerations,” as an explicit purpose and need. Nearly thirty years 
have passed since researchers and high-level agency fire and aviation management 
leadership began to discuss the importance of such participation. The new role of fuels 
managers in project planning is an advancement from the past when fuels managers were 
essentially “janitors, the clean up guys” for other resource management programs. 
However, fuels management has been absorbed into the Forest Service’s extent project 
planning decision making structure and process, which does not allow fuels programs to 
pursue the role outlined for it in the Federal Fire Policy or the National Fire Plan of 
working collaboratively to develop an integrated landscape-scale fuels management 
program or strategy. 
 
The Forest Service project planning and decisionmaking structure and process is 
focused primarily on keeping the “shelf stocked” with project ready to implement. This 
focus derives from the need to accomplish acreage targets with the minimum analysis 
necessary to meet legal and regulatory requirements and mitigate the associated threat of 
litigation. Simply put, meeting acreage targets ensures future funding to meet future 
acreage targets. 
 
The Federal Fire Policy, the various strategies of the National Fire Plan as well as 
recent legislation, such as the Healthy Forest Restoration Act, all focus rhetorically on 
reducing the risk posed by wildfire and forest and ecosystem health through fuels 
management and restoring the ecological role of fire. Concern for fire risk and the 
ecological role of fire is paramount, though more so for fire risk, among fuels managers 
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at the local level. But this concern exists largely in the background as part of fuels 
managers professional judgment and experience. This background knowledge of what 
constitutes risk and the ecological role is almost taken for granted as managers negotiate 
to develop projects to meet targets. There are no specifications or standard set of criteria 
for what constitutes fire risk or the ecological role of fire and no specified procedures for 
determining them. Manager’s professional judgment is paramount. 
 
While their own professional judgment is never questioned, most managers 
recognized that collecting information on fuels prior to selecting individual projects and 
monitoring the effects of projects post treatment would greatly improve their programs. 
However, fuels managers feel there is little support for gathering information that is not 
explicitly required for proving the professional judgment in order to legitimate a decision 
on a clearly defined project. Information and analysis, in other words, is treated by the 
larger institution, primarily represented by the Forest Leadership Team, as compliance 
requirement not a necessity of effective fuels management. Fuels managers in turn 
recognize that planning and developing projects within this planning and decisionmaking 
structure results in “random acts of risk reduction” and “totally ad-hoc” fuels 
management. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This research suggests that the organizational structure and administrative 
philosophy of decentralized hierarchy described by Kaufman (1960 and 2006) remains 
intact today, along with the concomitant level of decisionmaking discretion and authority 
granted each lower level manager that this structure is intended to promote. It is reflected 
in and reproduced by the three stages of NFMA analysis during which proposed actions 
are developed. Indeed, it appears that the general concept of the NEPA triangle and the 
overall content of the Forest Service’s NEPA/NFMA Forest Plan Implementation 
Training Course (1900-01) (USDA Forest Service, 2006c) from which it comes, 
represents an effort by the agency to graft the myriad legislative and regulatory 
requirements onto the agency’s historical organizational structure and delegated 
discretion and decisionmaking authority. It is, however, an organizational structure and 
project planning process that is increasingly viewed as dysfunctional and floundering 
under the weight of its poorly defined and contested multiple use mandate (Biber, 2009) 
compounded by an increasingly rigid and inflexible set of statutes and regulatory 
procedures (Nie, 2004). 
 
Recall from chapter four that the proposed action includes the fundamental nature 
and underlying assumptions of a project, its purpose and need, objectives and suite of 
treatments employed to meet these needs and objectives. These defining elements of a 
proposed project are decided before compliance requirements are actually encountered in 
an effort to determine what these compliance requirements actually are. This is done in 
 - 252 -  
an effort to employ the vast discretion and flexibility provided during NFMA analysis 
where there are no requirements. But with the patchwork of legislative and regulatory 
requirements that have been layered upon it, the Forest Service has become, as Nie 
(2004) put it “a case study in inefficient discretion.” 
 
Indeed, fuels management project planning results in what many managers 
describe as a “totally ad-hoc” (BJP29) fuels program, or what others call “a shotgun 
approach to fuels treatment” (LLW46). “We practice random acts of risk reduction” 
(LBS23) noted another. Local level fuels managers, in other words, recognize that the 
actual practice of fuels management project planning does not accord with the broad 
goals of the Federal Wildland Fire Policy, or the National Fire Plan and yet, as one fire 
ecologist put “…if we were to spend time coming up with a landscape strategy it would 
be just totally pie in the sky” (BTO35). 
 
Perhaps this perception that landscape strategies and priorities informed by broad-
scale assessments are incompatible with the reality of local level fuels management 
project planning requires a reconceptualization of what constitutes efficient and 
functional project planning. Judging the efficiency and effective functioning of an 
administrative structure and process, after all, depends on the actual goals and objectives 
being pursued through this structure and motivating this process. What is really driving 
the practice of fuels management is the immense effort to simply to keep the shelf 
stocked with projects in order to meet annual targets. As described in chapter three, the 
agency currently has no clear set of overall goals or objectives towards which the 
implementation of this shelf stock contributes. The political conflict over the 
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interpretation of sustainability that lead to the withdrawal of the 2000 forest planning led 
the agency to explain its goal of achieving sustainability in the Strategic Plan for 2004-
2008 required by the Government Results Performance Act (USDA Forest Service, 
2004c) in the most non-committal language possible - “sustainability is a journey that 
may have a range of acceptable outcomes, as well as a range of potential courses to 
achieve those outcomes” (USDA Forest Service, 2004c, p. 25).206 In other words, all 
projects meet the agency’s goal of sustainability. 
 
Perhaps the Forest Service project planning and decisionmaking process, though 
it results in ad-hoc fuels management, is actually rather well adapted to the larger 
political context within which the Forest Service operates. Perhaps if efficiency is 
measured against what Latour (1996) calls “system goals” aimed at ensuring the 
dominant political and administrative order, efficiency might be judged differently. In 
many ways the apparent dysfunction and conflict ridden nature of the relationship 
between fire and fuels management and Forest Service land management more generally, 
what one internal review207 titled described as “functionalism,” mirrors the apparent 
dysfunctional and conflict ridden nature of public land management policy making and 
budget allocation at the broader national level. Both produce a patch-work quilt of 
disconnected outcomes and ad-hoc uncoordinated actions. 
 
                                                          
206 Recall also that the Cohesive Strategy (USDA Forest Service, 2000b) recommended that when the 
GPRA Strategic Plan is updated it should include programmatic requirements to design and implement 
systematic methods for landscape-scale assessments of the history, status, and trajectory of ecosystem 
conditions for fuels management. 
207 An Agency Strategy for Fire Management (USDA Forest Service, 2000a). 
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It is at the congressional level, however, where the Forest Service’s “preformed 
decisions,” those “special kinds of directions” called program targets (Kaufman (1960, 
2006) originate. Many of the most important and effectual forest management decisions 
are made through the Congressional budgetary process, according to Nie (2003). Of all 
Washington’s processes, according to Colburn (2008), the budget process is the most 
opaque yet it is where most of the real decisions on fire and fuels management policy are 
being made. A particularly onerous aspect of what Nie (2008, p. 188) calls 
“appropriations politics” are the decisions made in key congressional resource and 
appropriations committees. “Congress uses the power of the purse to get what it wants, 
and this happens outside the planning process” (Nie, 2008, p. 185). It is often in 
committee reports where earmarks or instructions for such things as timber quotas or 
what types of treatments are to be emphasized with specific resource program budget line 
items are specified (such as emphasizing the use of mechanical treatments for fuels 
reduction).208 
 
The GAO has consistently criticizing the Forest Service’s use of acres treated as 
an accomplishment metric since the late 1990s because it provides no information 
relevant to fire behavior or ecology, regardless of the definition of fire risk and the 
ecological role of fire one might employ to measure risk reduction and ecological 
restoration. Thus even with the new accomplishment reporting database, FACTS, the 
Forest Service still cannot determine how much is actually spent on different kinds of 
treatments in different areas; which funding sources actually paid for the treatments or 
                                                          
208 Biber (2009) notes that these key committees have been disproportionately made up of members from 
timber producing states or districts. He notes further that such committee reports cannot be effectively 
debated or amended by Congress as a whole since it is the text of the appropriations bills themselves not 
these committee reports that are voted on. 
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what the results were - other than gross acres treated. The Congressional Research 
Service (CRS, 2009), for example, reported recently that in analyzing the Forest 
Service’s primary funding sources used for fuels reduction it was unable to determine 
how much from each account was used nor what the results were. The CRS (2009, p. 1) 
continues: 
…the reporting on hazardous fuel treatment funding for the various types 
of fuel reduction activities and on accomplishments are insufficient for 
Congress to assess progress…information on funding (from annual 
appropriations and mandatory accounts) used for thinning and other 
activities that are substantially intended for wildfire protection, and 
reporting on results, are inadequate to compare the benefits and costs of 
these activities and funds. 
 
Many researchers have noted that the Forest Service has a history of failing to 
collect such information, either biophysical or budgetary, especially information which 
might raise questions about its current management activities and funding priorities. 
Yaffee (1994, p. 17), described the agency’s role in the conflicts surrounding old-growth 
timber sales in spotted owl habitat in the late 1980s and early 1990s and noted that many 
Forest Service officials had a “fundamental desire not to know more” because additional 
information “could only conflict with current management direction.” Critics of the 
agency’s implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) have noted 
findings similar to those discovered in this research, described in chapter 4, that 
information on environmental conditions is collected only after the agency has more or 
less committed to an action or set of actions (CEQ, 2002; Karkkainen, 2004). Forest 
Service leadership and Congressional appropriations committees have failed to support 
monitoring (Camancho, 2007; Nie, 2008), particularly the development and use of 
specific, well defined criteria and indicators for evaluating the effects of specific 
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management action (GAO, 2004b). As described in chapter 4, useful information and 
quantitative data is incomplete and out of date, a principle reason the agency has lost so 
many court cases, such as Iron Honey. Rather than address the situation the CEQ issued a 
memo legitimating the data and analysis methods the court found fault with. There is a 
complete lack of direction as to what information ought to be collected to inform project 
development, little support for what managers themselves deem important and no support 
for post-treatment monitoring. 
 
The findings of the Forest Service’s internal review titled An Agency Strategy for 
Fire Management (USDA Forest Service, 2000a, as discussed in chapter three) are as 
valid now as when they were released in January, 2000 – before the fires later that 
summer and the subsequent initiation of the National Fire Plan and the massive increase 
in fuels management funding: 
The standard approach of conducting a review, finding problem areas, 
developing recommendations, and implementing action plans does not 
seem to solve repetitive and recurrent issues. The approach to solving 
these continuing, repetitive issues has always been the same and the 
results are also always the same…[The] issues raised repeatedly in 
program reviews seem to transcend fire management such that they 
require an agency solution, rather than a simple program fix (USDA 
Forest Service, 2000, p. 4). 
 
 
 It seems clear that the problem is larger than just the Forest Service itself, 
however, but also involves Congress, the administration and perhaps even the courts.209 
Colburn (2008, p. 252) points out that in the Forest Service “the actual prioritization of 
fuels treatment projects has gone so far underground that real accountability is becoming 
                                                          
209 See Colburn (2006), footnote 208, pointing out that the courts have rejected challenges to Forest Service 
minimal monitoring requirements or refused to enforce even significant monitoring requirements in forest 
plans and regulations. 
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impossible…if there is any coherence to the priority of appropriations and project 
selection, it is submerged in oceans of patronage and politics-as-usual.”210 Simply put, 
the inability to account for what appropriations are actually spent on and what the effects 
of fuels treatments are, is due to accounting metrics and systems (acres treated reported in 
the Forest ACtivity Tracking System - FACTS) that are not linked to treatment outcomes 
along with the refusal to support systematic data collection, analysis and monitoring of 
such outcomes. These problems have been repeatedly pointed out by the GAO, agency 
auditors and numerous fire management reviews and large fire cost reviews to the 
relevant decision makers in Washington DC for decades. Leadership in Congress, the 
White House and the Senior Executive Service of the Forest Service, however, seem 
unable or unwilling to do anything about it because actually addressing these issues 
would end their appropriations logrolling party. 
 
James Baldwin (1963) argues in The Fire Next Time that America far too often 
operates in a mode of self-perpetuating delusions and that the ‘American dream’ 
encourages us to lead unexamined lives.211 Such is the role of the Forest Service’s 
organizational structure and leadership, its fire and fuels management policy and practice 
– an unexamined life. Increasing fire hazard and the disruption of fire’s ecological role on 
the landscape are commonly described as the unintended consequences of past land 
management policies and practices. Decades of fire suppression policy is cited these days 
                                                          
210 The opacity has become even thicker in the last few years with the invention of “phonemarking” where 
members of Congress or their staff contact administrative agency heads directly, making it even more 
difficult to account for spending preferences and direction of members of Congress. See Washington Post 
story of May 24, 2007 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/23/AR2007052301782.html Last accessed January, 2010. It is unknown 
whether this technique has been employed for hazardous fuels funding or more general Forest Service 
budget direction. 
211 This poetic linkage comes from Colburn (2008). 
 - 258 -  
as the principle cause, though back in the 1990’s, when ecosystem management was still 
in vogue and the Federal Fire Policy was formulated, timber management and livestock 
grazing were also widely cited causes of this disruption. Fuels management, broadly 
defined, is now being applied across the country as the antidote for these unintended 
consequences. Yet suppression remains the dominant response to fire starts and timber 
management and grazing continue. 
 
Fire is such a complex phenomenon that there remains a great deal of uncertainty 
over the effects and effectiveness of fuels treatments upon fire behavior and ecology at 
multiple spatial and temporal scales (van Wagtendonk, 1996; Pollet and Omi, 2002; 
Graham et al., 2004; Stephens and Moghaddas, 2005). Fuels management is, in effect, a 
grand experiment with great potential for future unintended consequences. Yet all 
managers need to do to claim treatments towards target accomplishment is declare fuels 
management an objective and show a change in fire behavior through a computer 
simulation. It is, for the most part however, going unexamined to the lament of local fuels 
managers themselves. 
6.1 Recommendations and Future Research 
 
The legislation governing land management, such as the National Environmental 
Policy ACT (NEPA, 1970), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA, 1973), the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA, 1976) and the Healthy Forest Restoration Act 
of 2003 (HFRA, 2003), as well as the various policies and plans guiding fire and fuels 
management more specifically, such as the Federal Fire Policy and its various 
implementation guidance (USDA and USDOI, 2001, 2009) and the various documents of 
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the National Fire Plan, are broad in scope and yet also often difficult to reconcile. They 
do not provide clear guidance to the local or field level on how they are to be reconciled 
and implemented to connect the outcomes of individual projects at the local or field level 
to these broad goals (Finney and Cohen, 2003; Barbour et al., 2005). Yet, as Finney and 
Cohen (2003, p. 360) note, the field level is where: 
specific fuel treatment units are identified and landscape planning is 
performed. This is the critical level that determines the success or failure 
of fuel management, where the “rubber meets the road” and the fire meets 
the fuels…the success of an entire national policy hinges on the success of 
fuel treatments accomplishing the field-level benefits promised and 
expected. 
 
 
Fire is such a complex phenomenon that there remains significant uncertainty 
over the effects and effectiveness of fuels treatments upon fire behavior and ecology 
under various conditions at various spatial and temporal scales (van Wagtendonk, 1996; 
Pollet and Omi, 2002; Baker and Ehle, 2003; Graham et al., 2004; Stephens and 
Moghaddas, 2005; Barbour et al., 2005). Fuels management is, in effect, a grand 
experiment with great potential for future unintended consequences, even if carefully 
planned. Many wildland fires are almost archetypal landscape processes, far larger than 
individual treatments (Finney and Cohen, 2003). Thus, even the intended consequences 
of reducing risk and restoring forest ecosystems requires planning for cumulative effects 
of multiple treatments across the landscape rather than the common practice of planning 
and effects analysis geared towards mitigating cumulative impacts. 
 
Policy conflicts over forest planning rules and the development of a cohesive 
fuels management strategy to implement the three tiered planning called for in the 
Federal Fire Policy (e.g. forest plan, fire management plan and project or incident 
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response plan) have remained in stuck in a state of fibrillation for over ten years. Thus 
there is no clear guidance translating broad legislation and policy into operationally 
relevant guidance to the field-level for managing landscape processes. This research 
suggests that in the absence of clear goals and objectives, operationalized at the field 
level, where individual projects are planned and implemented, the de-facto operational 
objective of fuels management has defaulted to achieving annual acreage targets and the 
allocation of resources for assessment and effects analysis geared towards supporting this 
objective. The end results are random acts of risk reduction and restoration with each 
project being a one-off achievement. With the concomitant absence of monitoring 
requirements, protocols and dedicated funding, evaluation of the effectiveness of these 
projects in meeting their stated goals is rare and inconsistent. Thus their contribution to 
the larger policy goals of risk reduction and restoration is largely speculative and 
anecdotal. 
 
So what is to be done to link the broad policy goals of reducing the risks posed by 
wildfire and restoring the ecological role of fire with the actual practice project planning? 
It is naïve to believe the scientific uncertainty and political conflicts over the nature and 
measurement of risk reduction and forest restoration will abate any time soon. Yet it 
appears that agency leadership is waiting for a degree of consensus among researchers 
and managers to emerge on set of physical attributes and their proper measurement 
before developing national guidance on assessing risk and forest health and replacing the 
acres treated accomplishment metric. Congress demands accomplishment metrics, 
through the passage of Government Performance Results Act (GPRA, 1993) and audits 
by the GAO and OMB, for example, yet continues its historic failure to fund monitoring 
 - 261 -  
(Camancho, 2007; Nie, 2008). These observations aside, this research suggests two 
actions Forest Service leadership could take that would likely have a large positive 
impact on project planning at the local level to bring it in line with policy goals outlined 
in the Federal Fire Policy and the 10-Year Comprehensive Policy of the National Fire 
Plan. 
1. Eliminate acreage targets or de-couple them from fuels management program 
funding at the national forest level. 
 
2. Create monitoring Budget Line Item or specify a proportion of the fuels budget 
allocated to each national forest be spent on monitoring the effectiveness of 
individual projects, or a representative sample of individual projects, in achieving 
their stated objectives and how they contribute to large program goals. 
 
 
In and of themselves adopting these recommendations would not solve the 
problem of defining risk and restoration or what criteria aught to be used to prioritize and 
design individual projects to have the desired impacts upon fire behavior and ecological 
function across the landscape. Nor do they solve the related problem of the lack of 
monitor guidelines given the lack of definitions of fire risk and ecological restoration. 
These recommendations must be understood in the current context of the latest initiatives 
affecting fire and land management in the near future: a new round of forest planning rule 
revisions and the new efforts to develop a cohesive strategy called for in the Federal Land 
Assistance, Management and Enhancement Act (FLAME Act, 2009212). While these 
efforts have just begun and their outcomes uncertain, each includes proposals to establish 
procedures for defining attributes and assessing conditions multiple scales intended to 
inform management action. There is thus reason for measured optimism that these 
difficult issues will receive attention in the near future. 
                                                          
212 Title V, Section 503 of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act FY 2010. 
 - 262 -  
These broad initiatives, being national in scope, do not address how local level 
project planning is to contribute to the larger goals of landscape management being 
described. According to the information available at present neither the current proposed 
approach for forest planning or the cohesive strategy address the specific issue of 
alternative accomplishment metrics to replace the current acres treated metric. The 
pernicious effects acreage targets have on the assessment and planning of individual 
projects is not addressed. This research suggests that despite what direction may emerge 
from these initiatives for the assessment and effects monitoring for risk reduction and 
restoration, if local program funding is dependent on meeting annual acreage targets and 
resources for monitoring is not isolated from this accomplishment, any new policies and 
guidelines landscape management that do emerge will necessarily compete with this 
overriding program objective. These recommendations are intended to relieve local 
managers from this pressure and allow for assessment and monitoring processes being 
proposed in the forest planning rule and cohesive strategy to actually inform project 
planning – the organizational level where the rubber meets the road, where policy 
encounters the biophysical environment. The following is a very brief overview of these 
current initiatives. 
Forest Planning Rule Revision 
 
On December 17, 2009, Tom Vilsack, the new Secretary of Agriculture, 
announced the commencement of a new round of efforts to develop forest planning 
regulations. The Final environmental impact statement is expected to be completed in 
October, 2011 and the record of decision in November 2011.213 The development of the 
                                                          
213 74 Fed. Reg. 67165 (December 18, 2010). 
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planning rule is being undertaken through a series of panels and roundtable discussions 
with each round being summarized and the planning rule team detailing its responses and 
current proposed approach made available on the Forest Service’s planning rule 
website.214 The currently proposed emphasis of the planning rule are (USDA Forest 
Service, 2010a): 
 
1) Maintaining healthy, resilient ecosystems, and 
 
2) Using ecological restoration as a resource management tool to achieve desired 
conditions where ecosystems have been damaged or degraded. 
 
Forest plans are to include desired conditions, objectives, standards and guidelines 
for achieving these goals. The current proposed approach of the planning rule team 
includes three phases to be carried out in a continuous loop of: assessments, plan 
revisions or amendments and monitoring (USDA Forest Service, 2010b). Assessments 
will be conducted at the unit level (national forests) and at larger landscape-levels as 
appropriate and determined by the responsible official. These assessments are to include 
a focus on resilience, risk and uncertainties with input from multiple stakeholders in a 
collaborative process “well before a proposed action” (USDA Forest Service, 2010b, p 
3).  It is implied that this collaborative approach will be used to identify the questions and 
ecological attributes or indicators employed in the assessment and tied to the definitions 
of the plans desired conditions. Findings of assessments lead to forest plan revisions or 
amendments. Monitoring, like assessment, is to be conducted at appropriate scales, such 
as the unit or broader landscape-scales, in order to determine progress towards achieving 
the desired condition set forth in the forest plan. Each national forest is responsible for 
                                                          
214 http://fs.usda.gov/planningrule 
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developing a monitoring program in collaboration with partners and agency and external 
scientists specifying the questions, objectives and associated indicators or metrics that 
will be used for determining progress towards plan goals and desired conditions. Forest 
level monitoring must be coordinated with the monitoring at larger landscape-scales 
coordinated by the regional forester. Both assessment and monitoring are to evaluate risk 
to and uncertainty over management activity related to the various plan components 
identified in the stated desired conditions. 
Developing a New Cohesive Strategy 
 
Though the development of the new forest planning rule is a separate process 
from that of the cohesive strategy, which is interagency in scope, there are many areas of 
conceptual overlap. With the passage of the FLAME act in October, 2009 the USDA and 
USDOI are required to develop a “cohesive wildfire management strategy, consistent 
with the recommendations described in recent reports of the Government Accountability 
Office” (Title V, Section 503 of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act FY 2010) as well as seven other “elements” specified in the 
legislation.215 The development of the cohesive strategy is being overseen by the 
Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) and its report to Congress outlining the 
cohesive strategy is scheduled to be completed in November, 2010 (WFLC, 2010a). The 
new cohesive strategy has three broad goals: 
 
                                                          
215(1) the identification of the most cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources;  
(2) the reinvestment in non-fire programs by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture;  
(3) employing the appropriate management response to wildfires;  
(4) assessing the level of risk to communities;  
(5) the allocation of hazardous fuels reduction funds based on the priority of hazardous fuels reduction 
projects;  
(6) assessing the impacts of climate change on the frequency 
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1) Restore and maintain landscapes to be resilient to disturbances in accordance 
with management objectives; 
 
2) fire adapted communities that can assess the level of risk they face and mitigate 
the risk and consequences of wildfire and; 
 
3) all jurisdictions participate in implementing safe, effective and efficient risk-
based fire management decision 
 
The WFLC has selected a specific report of the GAO (GAO, 2007) from which to 
draw the recommendations referred to in the FLAME act (WFLC, 2010b). The core of 
these recommendations, arguably, is the second encapsulated in their second 
recommendation to “develop and implement a common approach to risk assessment, to 
provide for a broad, national assessment of hazard, risk, and values, as in the Forest 
Service’s [national] allocation model, as well as more refined regional and local 
assessments” (GAO, 2007 p. 66).216 The current framework for the development and 
implementation of the cohesive strategy is a phased approach where phase one is the 
initial report to Congress outlining the process and timelines due in November, 2010, 
phase two encompasses regional identification of values and the assessments of risk to 
these values according to the process outlined in phase one while phase three is described 
as a roll-up of regional strategies into a national strategy that establishes priorities, 
mitigates risk to communities and landscapes and monitors effectiveness (WFLC, 2010a). 
                                                          
216 The other four recommendations from the GAO (2007, p. 66) are: 
1) “…develop a common, systematic funding allocation process [that] should be applied at all levels within 
the agencies… the Forest Service’s model for allocating funds shows promise as the foundation 
of a systematic process.” 
3) “Devote resources to developing a measure of, and subsequently collecting data on, fuel reduction 
effectiveness, so that the agencies can usefully estimate the extent and duration of risk reduction from 
potential fuel treatments.” 
4) “Use information on risk and fuel treatment effectiveness, once available, in concert with information on 
the cost of treatments, to assess the cost-effectiveness of various potential fuel reduction treatments.  
5) “Finally, the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior should provide guidance that clearly 
distinguishes the relative importance of the various factors used in allocating funds and selecting 
projects…This guidance should also distinguish the relative priority of different values at risk…” 
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The definition of the regional boundaries for phase two have not yet been identified or 
made public and while the landscape method being developed is to be adaptable to local-
scales, this has also not been defined and it is not clear at present how assessments at the 
local level will be incorporated into the strategy (WFLC, 2010a). 
 
The WFLC has appointed a science team to develop a common approach to risk 
assessment scalable to the national, regional and local levels as called for by the GAO 
(WFLC, 2010a). This team has been developing a procedure for such a scalable risk 
assessment framework and conducted a national evaluation (Calkin et al., 2010; Calkin et 
al., 2010)217. Risk is defined similarly in the current forest planning documents and in the 
current proposal by the science panel developing the risk assessment framework for the 
cohesive strategy and may be summarized as the probability of a change event and the 
degree of change likely to result from this event upon a natural resource. While this 
general definition is not elaborated upon in the current documents on the forest planning 
rule revision, it is clearly elaborated in the fire risk assessment procedure employed by 
the cohesive strategy science panel.218 Wildfire risk assessment, according to this 
definition entails determining the probability of fire at different intensity levels (using 
flame length as a surrogate) and estimating the potential for positive and negative effects 
upon natural resources (or values) at these different intensity levels, what are called 
“response functions” in Ager et al. (2010). Once such an assessment is complete, the 
resources can be prioritized based on the likely hood of positive and negative effects of 
                                                          
217 An overview of this effort as well as these two documents referenced above is available at the Western 
Wildland Environmental Threat Assessment Center (WWETAC) website at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/wwetac/projects/calkin.html. 
218 Risk is defined as “a combination of the likelihood that a negative outcome will occur and the severity 
of the subsequent negative components” (USDA Forest Service, 2010a). 
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the predicted fire intensity. Ager et al. (2010) and Calkin et al. (2010) have suggested 
using some form of multi-criteria analysis to assign values to non-monetized natural 
resources, evaluate trade-offs and assign priorities for risk reduction and restoration 
treatments. Whether this suggestion has been taken up by the WFLC for the cohesive 
strategy framework is currently unknown. 
The Importance of Eliminating Acreage Targets and Funding Monitoring for the 
Success of Forest Planning and the Cohesive Strategy 
 
 Fundamental to resource assessment as described in the forest planning 
documents and the approach to fire risk assessment being developed by cohesive strategy 
science panel is clearly delimiting the spatio-temporal scales over which assessments will 
be conducted and defining the resource values and their attributes assessed at these scales 
(USDA Forest Service, 2010a; Calkin et al., 2010a). For the fire risk assessment, this 
includes the spatio-temporal scales at which the probability of fires of different intensities 
are summarized, the clear definition of the natural resources and their attributes that 
wildfire will encounter at these differing fire intensities and clear definition of the effects 
of these different fire intensity levels upon these resources (e.g. response functions). The 
spatio-temporal scale at which fire probability and intensity are estimated must be 
commensurate with the spatio-temporal scale employed in the definition of the resources 
and their attributes affected by fire. 
 
The forest planning rule framework in its current form clearly specifies, as 
required by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), that the national forest are the 
organizational level at which assessment, planning and monitoring is to take place (in 
addition to the as yet defined landscape-level). It is vague, however, on the details of the 
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process within which the definition of resources and attributes comprising the desired 
future conditions, assessment and monitoring of forest plans will be determined and how 
individual projects will be linked them. The cohesive strategy in its current form does not 
specify what the definition of regional and local levels are for the purposes of risk 
assessment and prioritization. And though the process for identifying, defining and 
prioritizing resource values is also unclear, as with the current forest planning rule, the 
concept of wildfire risk as the probability of impacts of various wildfire intensities upon 
resources provides a clear conception of the types of information is needed and hence the 
outlines of the processes that should be undertaken to derive them – collaboratively 
developed definitions of resource values and the likely impacts of different fire intensities 
upon these values at the selected levels. With wildfire a quintessential landscape process 
and agent of ecological change, the definition of regional and local scales and the 
institutional process employed for defining and prioritizing resource values and their 
attributes for the cohesive strategy risk assessments should be integrated and coordinated 
with the assessment and monitoring scales and the institutional process employed for 
determining and defining desired conditions in national forest plans and regional 
assessments and monitoring proposed for the forest planning rule. 
 
Local level managers and resource specialists should be relieved of the 
institutional pressure to meet annual targets in order to allow them to participate in such 
an integrated and coordinated process. As noted above, the project level is where the 
resource management assessment and planning physically impacts the environment, 
“where the rubber meets the road” (Finney and Cohen, 2003). This suggests that the local 
level should be defined as that level where actual ground disturbing management 
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activities are planned and implemented – the district offices as well as the national forest 
headquarters. This also suggests that the local managers engaged in planning and 
implementation at this organizational level should be involved in the process of 
determining the definitions of resources and their attributes as well as the development of 
response functions at the local level. It is these local managers that will have work with 
stakeholders in the collaborative management envisioned in the current forest planning 
rule revision (e.g. desired conditions and risks to these conditions on national forests) and 
the cohesive strategy (e.g. Restoring landscapes and Community Wildfire Protection 
Planning to promote resilient fire-adapted communities). 
 
Though both the cohesive strategy and forest planning rule revision documents 
currently available discuss, in general terms, the promise of defining social and 
ecological values and selecting their attributes, assessing current conditions and 
developing monitoring protocols and processes for evaluating the effectiveness of 
management actions in achieving the desired conditions outlined in cohesive strategy and 
forest plan goals and objectives, there is no mention of these criteria, once developed, 
will also be employed as inputs to the project planning process or replacing the acres 
treated accomplishment metric. Even if local level managers and resource specialists are 
not involved in the development of assessment criteria and standards, if these do not 
replace the acres-treated accomplishment metric this research suggests it is unlikely that 
project planning will proceed differently from its current focus on meeting annual targets. 
These new assessment and monitoring criteria may end up being uncoupled from the 
actual process of planning individual projects, the cumulative effect of which determines 
the success of both the future cohesive strategy and forest plans. 
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Actor-Network Framework and Future Research 
 
The policy discourse over land management in general and fire and fuels 
management in particular, has apparently adopted the concept of “landscape-scale” or 
“landscape-level” in place of the earlier concept of management at the “ecosystem-scale” 
or ecosystem management, the discourse under which the 1995 and 2001 Federal Fire 
Policy were developed. While currently fashionable, it is not at all clear how 
management focused at the landscape-scale, or level since they are often used 
interchangeable, is different from the previous focus on ecosystem management (NIE, 
2010). Ecosystems and landscapes are notoriously ill-defined and subject to a great deal 
of uncertainty, both epistemic and linguistic uncertainty (Elith et al., 2002; Regan et al., 
2002) with, for example, epistemic issues pertaining to knowledge of scalar relationships 
as well as the stochasticity inherent in the entities and processes studied and linguistic 
mixed up with and often undifferentiated from linguistic uncertainties of, for example, 
culturally primed and discipline specific concepts and definitions of the entities and 
processes studied such as ecosystem health, valued resources water quality and fire 
severity. Allen (1998) suggested the notions of landscape level and scale should in fact be 
avoided due to the confusion surrounding these concepts back when these concepts were 
still used to try and define the domain of ecosystem management. Simply put, a 
landscape is not a scale and the concept of level, applied to landscapes, has caused too 
much confusion between physical relationships that are scalar and those that derive from 
definitions (Allen, 1998). The attribution of “thingness” comes from the observer and is a 
matter of definitions and language, according to Allen (1998) and while this attribution is 
helpful, perhaps even necessary, to observation and the development of observation 
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protocols, there is nothing necessary about the relationship between definitions of things 
and the material world. Observed relationships that are scalar are thus a matter of real 
material relationships but the observation protocol and the choice of scales employed in 
observation are also a matter of choice of the observer (Allen, 1998). 
 
Little attention has been given to the influence of ecological scale and its nuances 
and varied concepts on policy formulation and decisionmaking, (Rykiel, 1998) notes, but 
this relationship involves a gap between scientific judgments and political value 
judgments that must be bridged through making explicit the uses of scale concepts. This 
is particularly important with regard to epistemic and linguistic uncertainty (Elith et al., 
2002; Regan et al., 2002) and the assumptions often left implicit even in formal 
ecological models (Burgman et al., 2005) let alone such “ecotheocratic” concepts such as 
ecosystem or forest health that mix up ecology as a science from ecology as a belief or 
value system (Kapustka, 2008). 
 
  In both risk assessment, as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA, 1998) and the various forms of multi-criteria decision analysis proposed by Ager 
et al. (2010) and Calkin et al. (2010) for the determination and prioritization of resource 
values at risk for the cohesive strategy, such as the Analytical Hierarchy Process219 
(Saaty, 2000 Saaty and Vargus, 2001) begin with a problem formulation phase. It is 
during this problem formulation phase, ideally, that stakeholders of an issue or problem 
and their conceptions and definitions of values (the assigned “thingness” of various 
                                                          
219 The Forest Service allocation model referred to by the GAO (2007) in their recommendations for a 
cohesive strategy is called Hazardous Fuels Prioritization System (HFPAS) and employs a form of multi-
criteria analysis. See USDA Forest Service FY 2011 proposed budget at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/budget-2011/fy-2011-usfs-budget-justification.pdf. Last accessed August, 
2010. 
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natural resource values) are identified, including the uncertainties involved (both 
epistemic and linguistic) and the attributes of these resource values are selected for 
assessment and monitoring. The importance of clearly articulating the problem to be 
addressed and defining the resource value to be assessed in order to engender mutual 
understanding of between stakeholders and decisionmakers alike is critical, particularly 
for defining and selecting the attributes to be assessed and monitored. Such “things” as 
risk or resiliency are not assessed and monitored directly but evaluated through the use of 
the selected attributes of the thing that serve as surrogates for the thing itself.220 The 
selection of attributes is fraught with difficulty in both risk assessment (Niemi and 
McDonald, 2004) and multi-criteria analysis (Keeney and Gregory, 2005) and must be 
undertaken with care. 
 
In both risk assessment (Simberloff, 2005; Duvall and Wyatt, 2009) and in multi-
criteria analysis (Franco and Montibeller, 2009), however, there is often much less 
attention paid to this first phase of problem formulation. There are myriad reasons this is 
often the case, ranging from regulatory and organizational factors, such as budget and 
time constraints, that manifest themselves in risk assessments being viewed as 
requirements fulfilled after the decision has already been made rather than a useful 
process to inform decisionmaking (Kapustks, 2008) and in multi-criteria analysis, owing 
to its origins in engineering and operations research as the search for subjective 
preferences among already well understood and defined objective problems (White, 
2009; Franco and Montibeller, 2009). 
 
                                                          
220 In the risk assessment these are called assessment endpoints (EPA, 1998) while in multi-criteria analysis 
these are simply called attributes (Keeney and Gregory, 2005). 
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As all these aspects of problem formulation are matters of negotiation, 
deliberative or otherwise, including the establishment of the regulatory and 
organizational setting of negotiations themselves, the nature of the resource values being 
assessed as well as the identification of the actors  involved and their competencies, 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) offers a flexible approach to understanding these dynamic 
processes and the myriad factors involved, whether individual, organizational and 
political or technical and scientific. Due to its principle of symmetry and agnosticisms 
towards the identity of actors and the nature of the problem and its setting, ANT, like the 
problem formulation phase in risk assessment and multi-criteria analysis, tries make 
explicit the factors involved in determining the choices made. By focusing on the process 
of negotiation and the translations that result, rather than the subjects and objects of 
negotiation involved in negotiation ANT can be fruitfully employed from the outside, so 
to speak, to study how risk assessment and monitoring programs and procedures are 
developed and implemented, including the potential role of multi-criteria analysis, as well 
employed from the inside as part of the process of developing and implementing such 
programs and procedures themselves. Of particular relevance would be the application of 
ANT to the problem of scale and its various conceptions intermingling epistemic and 
linguistic uncertainty, especially in collaborative management settings. Such an 
application would be particularly relevant to the process contemplated in the new 
cohesive strategy of defining resource values at risk, selecting attributes that represent 
these values and evaluating their response to predicted fire severities and the selection 
and definition of the different scales at which these effects are evaluated, tradeoff 
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analysis conducted and priorities established. Such could be the topic of future research 
into fire and fuels management policy and practice. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation explored the following three questions; 1) What is fuels 
management policy and what was its history that led to its current form?; 2) How are 
fuels management projects actually developed into project proposals?; and 3) What are 
the key factors that affect this development of fuels management project proposals? 
These questions are explored in two ways; the first broad based focusing on fire and fuels 
policy and its history and the second examining the practice of fuels management project 
development via a more fine grained empirical approach. This chapter is composed of 
three sections. 6.1 provides a discussion of the study limitations encountered in this 
research. Section 6.2 provides a brief summary of chapter three on the policy and 
historical development of fire and fuels management. This is followed by a section 6.3 
providing a summary of the material covered in chapters four and five on the practice of 
fuels management project development and planning in the U.S. Forest Service. 
 
7.1 Study Limitations 
 
The potential limitations of this research are similar to those of all historical and 
qualitative studies – that of interpretation. This problem takes slightly different forms for 
the two main parts of this research, that on policy and that on practice. For the analysis of 
policy, every effort was made to collect and analyze all the relevant policy documents as 
well as a diverse set of supporting documents and scholarly analysis and commentaries 
on fire policy. Many specific conclusions drawn are shared by other researchers and duly 
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cited. Many others, however, were my own. In these cases every effort was made to build 
the case for such judgment with available evidence. Nonetheless, other perspectives are 
possible, a great deal of material was surely missed that could lead to alternative 
interpretations on specific details or upon overall conclusions. 
 
The limitations posed by interpretation upon the empirical investigation of fuels 
management practice are common to qualitative research in general, especially that 
employing a case study approach. This problem revolves around the issue of the 
representativeness of the data collected and the sites from which it was collected. In this 
research, substantial effort was made in an attempt to overcome this problem by 
employing three different national forests with varying organizational structures and 
capacities (as discussed in chapter 2 methods and theoretical approach) and at least two 
districts from each forest. While the analysis of the resulting data from these three 
different forests revealed similar patterns lending support for the conclusions drawn, 
using qualitative methods that rely on in-depth interviews on three different sites also 
introduced another limitation that was not anticipated in the research design. This 
limitation arises from the relevance of non-fire management personnel in the 
development and planning of projects. Once data collection commenced and initial 
analysis conducted it became clear that a richer understanding would be gained by 
including a comparably representative sample of individuals from the many other 
resource management programs. Several such individuals were included but they cannot 
be said to constitute a comparably representative sample to the preponderance of fire and 
fuels managers interviewed. This was not practical. As a result, this research is influenced 
by the fact that the majority of accounts of project planning are those of fire managers 
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which, as this research revealed, are much less isolated from the programmatic interests 
and objectives of other resource management programs than they once were. In short, the 
standard problem of finding a balance between breadth and depth was more complicated 
than anticipated. 
 
7.2 Summary of Results: Fire and Fuels Policy 
 
Since the early 1970s, when the Forest Service began experimenting with 
alternatives to its policy of total fire control in Montana and Idaho, fire managers and 
researchers have been calling for the integration of fire management into overall land 
management. It was recognized that fire impacts all of the resources the agency 
statutorily charged with managing, principally by the Multiple Use Sustained Yield 
(MUSY, 1960). With the name change of the agency’s Division of Fire Control to the 
Division of Fire Management the agency recognized that fire cannot be fully controlled 
in order to pursue multiple use management but that the interaction of wildfire with these 
resources and their use must be managed in a more integrated and comprehensive 
fashion. The principle means by which these early researchers and managers proposed 
integrating fire management with land management was through expanding fuels 
management, guided by what was then referred to as “fire knowledge,” to allow more 
efficient fire suppression and prescribed natural fire for resource benefit where wildfire 
was not wanted. Fire knowledge, a mixture of professional experience and an expanding 
research on fire behavior, fire history and fire ecology, in other words, was proposed as 
vital inputs to decisionmaking on the setting of broad scale land management objectives 
and planning to meet these objectives. Fire researchers and managers in the Forest 
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Service had high hopes for such integration in the development of the first round of Land 
and Resource Management Plans (forest plans) under the National Forest Management 
Act (NFMA, 1976). This integration, however, did not occur. Fire suppression remained 
the predominant response to all but a few widlfires in some wilderness areas. Fuels 
management was relegated to supporting other resource management activities, primarily 
timber management (but also burning for wildlife habitat) and was not employed as a 
means of influencing fire across the landscape. 
 
Successive severe fire seasons, such as 1988, 1994 and 2000, have led to 
successive revisions of the Federal Fire Policy (1990, 1995 and 2001), each more 
strongly than the last calling for roughly the same thing – the development of what is now 
referred to as landscape-level fire and fuels strategy, one that takes into account the fact 
that wildfire ignores jurisdictional boundaries. Such a strategy should be informed by 
multi-scale assessments of fire behavior and ecology and implemented through 
collaboratively developed fire and fuels management plans at these multiple scales. 
Forest Plans are the legislative foundation of Forest Service land management into which 
the principals and goals of the Federal Fire Policy are supposed to be integrated. 
However, overall land management policy and planning in the Forest Service remains 
locked in seemingly endless political conflict. Planning regulations for revising forest 
plans have been proposed and withdrawn due to this political conflict in 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2008. 
 
Each successive Federal Fire Policy revision and the many reviews of its 
implementation have led to tinkering at the margins of administrative guidance, such as 
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the many revisions issued for prescribed fire and wildland fire use planning and 
implementation or the many changes in various chapters of the Forest Service Handbook. 
Such guidance reflects the political deadlock over forest management by providing 
copious procedural requirements with no guidance on the actual goals and objectives of 
fire and fuels management or adjudicating conflicting policies, goals and implementation 
procedures. Thus, while there is a formal Federal Fire Policy it does not in fact guide 
actual fuels management activity in any meaningful sense. Its primary goals and 
recommendations remain unfulfilled. There is no integrated landscape-scale fire and fuels 
strategy or management plans at the local level. There is no systematic data collection or 
formal risk based assessment process to inform treatment prioritization and design in 
order to allow increased use of fire for resource benefit to both reduce hazardous fuels 
and restore or maintain ecological processes. There is, in other words, no comprehensive 
policy guiding the actual practice of fuels management, and according to many, “there 
are few indications that such a policy is in development” (Franklin and Agee, 2003; 
Stephens and Ruth, 2005).  
 
Congress, rather than stepping forth and dealing directly with controversial land 
management policy issues, reproduces this conflict by exerting pressure on federal land 
management decisionmaking. It has instituted numerous changes to procedural and 
analytical requirements over the years without clarifying policy or consistently funding 
its legislative mandates. Many of these procedural changes are often designed to thwart 
other legislative mandates agencies are required to comply with (Nie, 2004). The 
administrative branch does this as well. It does this through its control of the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) overseeing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
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compliance. Many of the legislative and administrative changes to forest and fuels 
management were introduced under President Bush’s Healthy Forest Initiative, 
principally the Categorical Exclusion from analysis under NEPA for fuels reduction and 
the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA, 2003) or the CEQ memo on cumulative 
effects analysis, issued following the Forest Service’s defeat in the Ninth Circuit in the 
Iron Honey case (Lands Council V. Powel, 2005).221 The implementation of various 
provisions of the Healthy Forest Initiative have in many ways run counter to the 
principles and objectives of the Federal Fire Policy, the centerpiece of the National Fire 
Plan (the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy developed under the auspices of the Western 
Governors Association) and in many instances the stated goals of the Healthy Forest 
Initiative itself. 
 
7.3 Summary of Results: The Practice of Fuels Management 
 
Fuels management in the Forest Service has transitioned from playing simply a 
supporting role to other resource management programs or, as one fuels specialist 
described it, being the “janitors” for the timber program, responsible primarily for 
burning logging slash left behind from timber sales. Since the fires of 2000 and the 
substantial increase in funding allocated by Congress that initiated the National Fire Plan, 
fuels managers now propose projects and participate on the interdisciplinary teams (ID 
teams) of resource management specialists in the process of developing proposed actions 
and ensuring compliance with NEPA and the myriad other statutory, regulatory and 
agency requirements. This new more active role for fuels management, however, has 
                                                          
221 Also known as Iron Honey. The CEQ memo refers to Guidance on the Consideration of Past Actions in 
Cumulative Effects Analysis (June 24, 2005). See chapter two. 
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been inserted into the extant organizational structure and project planning process of 
Forest Service natural resource management. 
 
The planning process in the Forest Service is dynamic and complex, characterized 
by both overlapping and competing objectives between the various resource management 
programs. The varying degrees of overlap and competition arise from the fact that the 
various treatments available to meet the specific objectives of one program, affects the 
resources managed by programs and thus their ability to meet their objectives. This 
interconnection between program objectives and their pursuit through the various kinds 
of treatments must be adjudicated during project development and planning. Lacking 
clear direction from Congress or forest plans, major value conflicts and prioritization are 
replayed continuously with each project. 
 
Project planning in the Forest Service is composed of two basic components; the 
first component is the process leading up to a proposed action, where there are no 
regulations to comply with or guidelines to go by. The second component is the process 
that follows a proposed action characterized by a host of legal and regulatory 
requirements. The first half of the project planning process is referred to as NFMA 
analysis while the second is referred to as NEPA analysis a division that originates in the 
Forest Service’s NEPA/NFMA Forest Plan Implementation Training Course (1900-01). 
NFMA analysis encompasses all the procedures through which a formal proposed action 
document is developed. The completion of a proposed action document initiates the 
formal procedures required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). While the 
process of complying with NEPA is important and can influence the final form of a 
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project, NFMA analysis is where the heart of a project is established. It is during NFMA 
analysis that a project‘s rationale for management action are established (its “purpose and 
need”) as well as its objectives and proposed treatments to meet these objectives and 
address these needs. It is during NFMA analysis and the development of a proposed 
action, in other words, that the overlap and competition between the objectives of the 
various resource management programs is adjudicated. NFMA analysis is essentially a 
process of negotiation between the specialists from the various resource management 
programs and their district rangers over the program objectives pursued in a proposed 
action and the extent to which the treatments employed effect the objectives of other 
programs. The intent of NFMA analysis is the efficient development of a proposed action 
that is as close to compliant and ready for NEPA analysis as possible. There are a myriad 
of factors that must be negotiated during NFMA analysis and the development of a 
proposed action. The most important are encompassed in two interrelated sets of key 
factors: 
1. targets and funding and 
 
2. compliance with law, regulation and agency policy, the threat of litigation and the 
cost of data collection and analysis determined to be necessary for compliance 
and to mitigate the threat of litigation. 
 
The overriding objective of Fuels management is maintaining what is described 
by many managers as “shelf stock” of projects ready to implement. It is through 
implementation of projects that have made their way through the NEPA process and 
signed by the district ranger or forest supervisor that fuels management acreage targets 
are met. Program funding is allocated based on this acreage target. Key factor one, in 
other words, is of primary concern. In order to maintain this shelf stock of projects ready 
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to implement, fuels managers must invest in project development and planning. The cost 
of planning, however, is largely determined by the suite of issues encompassed in factor 
two above regarding compliance. This set of factors affects the cost of planning which in 
turn affects the nature of the project, its mix of program objectives and the type and 
extent of treatments proposed. Many resource management programs are engaged in 
similar efforts with similar concerns and they must all negotiate on the mix of objectives 
and treatment employed to meet their various program targets. 
 
NFMA analysis is intentionally ill-defined and lacking specific direction. This is 
intended to provide flexibility to managers but makes it a very nebulous and fluid 
process. There are, however, certain characteristics of the organizational structure of the 
Forest Service that leads to a distinct pattern to the otherwise fluid process of negotiation. 
This is the Forest Leadership Team’s development of the annual program of work. 
Individual resource management programs do not control the funding allocated to them to 
meet their respective targets. This funding is controlled by the Forest Leadership who is 
responsible for meeting “integrated accomplishments,” among all resource programs, 
often favoring certain activities over others based on direction passed down from 
Congress detailed in the annual program of work that accompanies each year’s 
appropriations. The program of work has the effect of dividing the process of NFMA 
analysis into three phases: 
 
1. the preparation of project proposals for presentation to the Leadership Team; 
 
2. the Leadership Team’s acceptance, prioritization and allocation of resources, 
principally funding and specialist’s time, for the development and planning of the 
project; and 
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3. the determination of resource conditions and the development of a proposed 
action by the assigned interdisciplinary team. The negotiation process that takes 
place during these three phases of NFMA analysis is the subject of the following 
chapter. 
 
 
The first phase of project planning involves negotiation among specialist aimed at 
getting a project accepted by the Forest Leadership Team and placed on the program of 
work, and thus funded for further development. These initial ideas for fuels management 
projects generally originate from the specialists on the districts. The first phase of NFMA 
analysis is in many ways the most important. While the formal decision as to the size and 
mix of activities is not made until a final decision document is signed after public 
scoping, in practical terms this decision is provisionally made during this first phase of 
project planning. Estimating the level of analysis needed and the recommended NEPA 
category is provided as part of the presentation of the project idea to the Forest 
Leadership Team for inclusion on the program of work.  
 
The Forest Leadership Team generally accepts the proposals as presented by each 
district ranger, including the level of assessment and analysis, and, if added to the 
program of work, the project is passed back to the districts for assessment and 
development. The negotiations of the Forest Leadership Team are over the combination 
of all projects that will take place on the forest rather than the combinations of objectives 
and treatments comprising an individual project. The effect on individual projects is, in a 
way, indirect as the focus is not on the mix of objectives included in an individual 
project. The Leadership Teams’ prioritization and allocation of funding and specialist 
time to each project sets parameters within which the project will be developed. 
However, these parameters can have a strong impact on the amount of funding and 
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specialists time put into assessment, data collection and analysis necessary for 
compliance with law, regulation and policy and mitigating the threat of litigation. 
 
Once projects get on the program of work, the third phase of NFMA analysis 
begins. This effort consists of a more formal assessment of conditions and refining the 
mix of management objectives that will be pursued, including what kind of treatments 
and their boundaries, such as which areas will be proposed for prescribed burning pre-
commercial or commercial thinning. The negotiation process is over which treatment 
units, supporting which resource management program’s objectives, will be reduced in 
size or intensity or simply pulled due to the cost of data collection and analysis. 
 
The negotiation over the mix of program objectives and treatments for fuels 
management projects is based largely on the professional judgment of the fuels manager 
engaged in project development. Formal data collection and analysis efforts are 
conducted late in phase three of NFMA analysis once the mix of objectives and types of 
treatments have been more or less established. The result is that such efforts are treated as 
confirmation rather than investigation. This effort is principally motivated by the threat of 
litigation because of a number court cases found fault with the data and analysis methods 
employed for fuels management projects but agency direction does not require or provide 
direction for such activities but rather leaves it up to the discretion of the line officer 
signing the decision document to decide what level of effort is appropriate. Curiously, 
while managers decry what they view as the courts overstepping their traditional 
deference to agency judgment as to what level of analysis and data collection is necessary 
they also overwhelmingly denounce what they view as the complete lack of support for 
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monitoring of projects to assess their effects on other resources as well as their 
effectiveness in altering fire behavior as predicted. 
 
The overall effect of fuels management project planning and decisionmaking 
within this organizational structure and budget allocation process characterized by 
project-by-project negotiation during these three phases of NFMA analysis, based largely 
on the professional judgment of the fuels managers involved, is described “ad-hoc.” “We 
practice random acts of risk reduction” (LBS23) noted one district Assistant Fire 
Management Officer. This practice is widely recognized as failing to meet the policy 
goals of the Federal Wildland Fire Policy or the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy of the 
National Fire Plan, which emphasize the need for collaborative, landscape-scale fuels 
management based on strategic prioritization of risk reduction and ecological restoration. 
 
 In order to move beyond ad-hoc fuels management and implement the Federal 
Fire Policy through coordinating fuel treatments across the landscape and integrating 
them with the goals of restoring ecological resiliency, this research suggests that the acres 
treated metric must be eliminated or at lest the fuels management programs annual 
operating budget must be de-coupled from this accomplishment metric. Elimination of 
the acres-treated accomplishment target should not wait until an alternative metric is 
developed. Rather, because on-the-ground fuel treatment is where the policy goals of 
wildfire risk reduction and restoring the ecological role of fire are made manifest, and 
there is as yet no scientific or political consensus on what an alternative metric should be, 
project level fuels management planning should be part of the process of developing this 
alternative metric. This leads to the second recommendation that results form this 
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research, the funding and requiring monitoring. As with accomplishment metrics, what to 
monitor and how are subject to debate. But treatments are being implemented and for the 
most part their effects are going unexamined. This research suggests that local managers 
strongly desire the opportunity to monitor the effects of their projects and they realize 
that monitoring requires pre-treatment inventory and assessment, regardless of the 
protocol adopted. Rather than wait for organizational consensus on a monitoring protocol 
managers should be provided the organizational support to conduct pre-treatment 
assessment and post-treatment monitoring with the requirement that these endeavors be 
documented and built into a process explicitly organized for the purpose of building a 
monitoring program and developing a protocol for the specific fire ecology of the 
peculiar to the individual forest, testing various approaches and procedures and 
developing mutual understanding and consensus among resource specialists. Only in the 
absence of the pressure to achieve annual acreage targets would such an endeavor be 
feasible. 
 
Accomplishment metrics and effects monitoring are, however, tied to opaque and 
byzantine process of budgetary politics between Congress and the Senior Executive 
Service of the Forest Service. It is unclear what is at stake and what the factors are but 
there are few reasons to expect this situation to change anytime soon. As new efforts gets 
underway to develop another cohesive strategy and new forest planning regulations, 
however, presents the opportunity to investigate and perhaps influence the continuing 
efforts to integrate fuels management into land management planning and 
decisionmaking, particularly the application of Actor Network Theory to the problem of 
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attribute selection and their response to predictions of fire severity in wildfire risk 
assessments. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Schedule 
 
 
Interview Questions 
 
1. Describe the development, planning and analysis of a fuels management project. 
 
2. How are project objectives determined? 
 
3. How are fuels management projects selected and prioritized? 
 
4. How are existing conditions that affect fire behavior and ecology determined? 
 
5. What methods are used for this determination? (Probe for specific models, data, 
sampling protocols, classification systems particularly FRCC if not brought up.) 
 
6. What are the criteria used? 
 
7. Why were these criteria selected? 
 
8. How does the planning process affect the development of projects? (Probe for 
project objectives, size, boundaries and treatment type if not brought up.) 
 
 
Added Probe Questions 
 
 Where do project ideas originate? 
 
 How does NFMA analysis progress? 
 
 Who is involved and at what stage? 
 
 Describe how projects and specialists are funded at these different stages. 
 
 Describe the role of districts and the forest leadership team and their relationship 
in the development of the program of work and project prioritization. 
 
 How is the level of NEPA analysis and documentation (CE, EA & EIS) decided? 
(Probe for litigation pressure) 
 
 
 
